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Abstract
The global fisheries crisis has been of great concern to the international community,
and has led to the adoption of a series of instruments under the fisheries framework of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). These post-LOSC
fisheries instruments include the Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the
High Seas (Compliance Agreement); the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement); the Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries (Code of Conduct); and the International Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IPOAIUU).
The aforementioned instruments have improved the LOSC fisheries
framework and had considerable impact on the way fisheries resources are utilised
and managed. However, they have not stopped the continual depletion of fisheries
resources as they rely largely on the implementation by individual states to achieve
their management objectives. The ineffectiveness of these instruments is mainly due
to the fact that they have not been widely implemented by, or incorporated into, the
fisheries law and policy of states.
As one of the major fishing nations with the largest population in the world,
China has faced many problems managing its fisheries: the severest of which are the
depletion of fisheries resources and the deterioration of the marine environment. This
situation has necessitated China’s alignment with international fisheries law and
policy. The study analyses China’s legislative harmonisation and policy adjustment in
response to these international fisheries instruments, in particular resource
management, distant water fisheries, and regional fisheries cooperation for the shared
fisheries resources in the form of bilateral fisheries agreements with Japan, South
Korea, and Vietnam.
The study pinpoints the fact that China’s fisheries development, particularly
the problems it has encountered, including its excessive fishing capacity, economic
incentives, population pressures, and a weak institutional framework, reflect the
global situation and provides a basis for understanding the driving forces behind a
gradual loss of control of fishing capacity leading to the depletion of resources.
China’s national action and regional cooperation mirrors the overall effort of the
international community in searching for possible solutions to address the fisheries
crisis.
The study emphasises that the LOSC will remain as a dynamic instrument and
a point of reference for the legal norms at the global, regional and national levels to
deal with the countless issues of fisheries management. The post-LOSC instruments
will stand as guidelines for states to conserve and manage fisheries resources on the
way to achieving sustainable fisheries. States like China will have to fully commit
themselves to their obligations and responsibilities to achieve sustainable fisheries
management.
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INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL FISHERIES CRISIS AND
MANAGEMENT EFFORT
Marine fish are a precious natural resource of enormous ecological, social and
economic value. In many parts of the world, millions of people make their living from
fishing, and for most of them fishing goes far beyond being just a source of income, it
is a way of life.1 Healthy fisheries industries contribute significantly to the quality of
human life. 2 They provide employment opportunities, generate hard currencies,
contribute to food security, and are increasingly seen as an important component of
national economies. However, the rapid development of fishing technology has
improved fishing capacity significantly and more and more fish species are now
overfished, and stocks have shrunk substantially.3 According to the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 75% of the world’s fisheries resources
have been fully exploited, overexploited or significantly depleted.4 The international
community is now facing a global fisheries crisis.

The Causes of the Fisheries Crisis
Many factors have contributed to the fisheries crisis, and each of them forms an
important issue for fisheries conservation and management. They include the negative
impact of some fundamental concepts practised in the fisheries sector. These concepts
include the freedom of the seas, 5 inexhaustibility of fisheries resources; 6 and the

1

See the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 1996 WWF Species Status Report: Marine Fisheries in
the Wild, (WWF, Switzerland, 1996), p.6.
2
See FAO, Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries: Fisheries Management, vol. 4 (Rome:
FAO, 1997), p.1.
3
For the status of the global fisheries crisis, see WWF publications: Population Action International:
Catching the Limit: Population and the Decline of Fisheries Population and Environment Programme
(1995); 1996 WWF Species Status Report: Marine Fisheries in the Wild (1996); Endangered Seas
CampaignCreating a Sea Change: Resolving the Global Fisheries Crisis (Lisbon: WWF, 1998);
Endangered Seas CampaignThe Footprint of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries (WWF,
1998); WWF/IUCN, WWF/IUCN Marine Policy: Creating a Sea ChangeResolving the Global
Fisheries Crisis (1998); WWF/IUCN/WCPA, The Status of Natural Resources on the High Seas
(Gland: WWF/IUCN, 2001) (available from www.panda.org/endangeredseas/index.htm).
4
See FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA 2002) (Rome: FAO, 2002), p.23.
5
In the course of fisheries resources exploitation, the “freedom of the seas” doctrine should be singled
out as being particularly important to the current fisheries crisis. See D. J. Cocheba, "Perspectives for
evaluating fisheries management options with particular references to green paper issues," Safish
MagazinePolicy April-June (1990), p.5.
1

common property nature of fish stocks.7 A host of other factors have also contributed
to the worrisome depletion of fisheries resources. These include the biological
characteristics of the stocks; 8 fishing competition; 9 the enormous expansion of the
world’s fishing fleets that has led to the overexploitation of fish stocks;10 fisheries
subsidies; 11 ecosystem degradation by marine pollution and destructive fishing; 12
ineffective fisheries management resulting in vessel reflagging, by-catch and discards,
and harmful fishing practices. No matter how long the list, it is common knowledge
that fish stocks have been subject to increasing pressure from excessive fishing
capacity for many years. The overexploitation of the world’s fisheries resources has
significantly threatened long-term sustainable fisheries.
Besides the attention given to identifying the causes of the growing pressure
on fish stocks, considerable effort has been made to evaluate their consequences on
long-term sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources. Substantial research on
various aspects of fisheries management has also been conducted to look for an
effectual solution, but no silver bullet has been offered; countless measures have been

6

Until the beginning of the last century fish stocks were firmly believed to be inexhaustible resources,
see L. Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean Governance,
(London: Routledge, 1996), p.17.
7
Some literature emphasises that a fisheries crisis typically stems from the “common property” nature
of most fisheries resources, which results in the famous ‘tragedy of commons’. See G. Hardin, "The
tragedy of the commons," Science 162 (1968), pp.1243-1248; G. Hardin, "Extensions of the tragedy of
the commons," Science 280 (1990), pp.682-683.
8
The characteristics of fish stocks, such as their migratory nature, distinguish fishing industry from
other economic activities based on the exploitation of natural resources, which consequently increases
the management difficulties. For discussions, see R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea,
3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.281; A. W. Koers, International
Regulations of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional Fisheries Organisation (Bristol: Fishing News
(Books) Ltd, 1973), pp.23-27; E. Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine
Fisheries Resources: The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Cooperation Between States
(Dordrecht: Maritnus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), pp.15-22.
9
This is also stated as “the nature of fishing is competition.” While using a resource in common, each
fisherman is understandably motivated to take as many fish as possible before others catch them. Thus
fishermen compete intensely with each other, leading to conflicts, overexploitation, and stock collapse.
This barricade drove fisheries to be the most competitive industry. See WWF, Endangered Seas
CampaignCreating a Sea Change: Resolving the Global Fisheries Crisis, p.5.
10
It is estimated that the world fishing fleet possesses more than twice the level of fishing effort
needed to achieve a catch level that would not deplete stocks. See WWF, Endangered Seas
CampaignThe Footprint of Distant Water Fleets on World Fisheries, p.3.
11
The issue over subsidies has caused great debate about its effect on fisheries. For a recent view see:
M. Benitah, "ASIL insights: Ongoing WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies," The American Society
of International Law June (2004).
12
For discussions on the destruction of critical habitats and the environmental impact on fish stocks,
see: M. C. Baker et al., "An environmental perspective," in The Status of Natural Resources on the
High Seas (Gland: WWF/IUCN/WCPA, 2001), pp.1-68.
2

suggested to improve fisheries management, yet no effective system of fisheries law
and policy has been established to stop the depletion of fish stocks.13 It is widely
accepted that the attempts at managing fisheries resources have in general failed to
prevent the downturn of fisheries resources. 14 As the FAO stated, “changes in
fisheries systems are only slowly reversible, difficult to control, not well understood,
and subject to changing environment and human values.”15
In the heat of the discussions on the fisheries crisis and inadequate
management, no one has yet produced a definitive solution to the problem. Of the
many studies that have looked at the seriously declining state of fisheries resources,
few have investigated the inadequacies and failures of fisheries management as a
whole. This is because the fisheries crisis is caused by a wide range of factors, which
are easy to examine from different perspectives, but rather difficult to describe and
analyse from the whole management point of view. This situation has made research
on fisheries management fragmented and far from being informative and constructive.

Effort to Resolve the Fisheries Crisis
The global fisheries crisis recognised by the international community has engendered
the greatest concern for the need to improve the fisheries legal system. 16 The
international community has made an effort to find appropriate and effective
measures to strengthen fisheries management.17 Meanwhile, the dramatic decrease of
fisheries resources has also stimulated coastal states’ unanimous action of “ocean
enclosure movement”,18 that is, in the absence of an appropriate management regime,
some coastal states adopted unilateral measures in an attempt to protect the fisheries
13

International organisations led by the FAO and WWF have conducted many projects in this regard,
see http://www.fao.org/fi/asp, and http://www.panda.org/endangeredseas/index.htm.
14
According to Gulland, fisheries management in the past was mainly a matter of restrictive
regulations to minimise the harmful effects of too much of the wrong kind of fishing. International
action toward the actual implementation of specific management measures did not start until only
recent decades. See J. A. Gulland, The Management of Marine Fisheries (Bristol: Scientechnica
(Publishers) Ltd., 1974), p.1.
15
FAO, FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible FisheriesPrecautionary Approach to Capture
Fisheries and Species Introductions, vol. 2 (Rome: FAO, 1996), p.6.
16
See Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources.
17
For a comprehensive discussion on fisheries science and management, see P. J. B. Hart and J. D.
Reynolds, Handbook of Fish Biology and Fisheries, vol. 1 and 2 (Leicester: Blackwell Publishing,
2002).
18
See P. Oei, "The origins of the 'Ocean Enclosure' movement," Maritime Studies May-June (1998),
pp.23-30.
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resources in their coastal waters. 19 This practice advanced the demand for a new
regime to regulate fishing activities in the world oceans, and eventually led to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)—the most important legal
framework governing all aspects of ocean activities.20
The LOSC was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 and came into
force on 16 November 1994. 21 Its greatest contribution to world fisheries is the
creation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime that grants coastal states
sovereign rights and obligations to conserve fisheries resources in their EEZs.22 Being
the legal instrument with the widest acceptance, the LOSC has profoundly changed
the international law governing access to and uses of the oceans. 23 A new age of
“managed world oceans” has taken the place of the centuries-old era of “freedom of
the seas”.
The creation of the EEZ regime has started a new era for fisheries
management. In many respects it is significant to the development of the fisheries
legal system, but some of its provisions are inadequate, especially in respect to the
migratory fish stocks that have caused many problems for fisheries management. One
such problem has been the fish stocks that cross from one state’s EEZ to another’s, as
well as those with a significant migratory range between the EEZs of coastal states
and the high seas. The migratory nature of these stocks necessitates the cooperation of
neighbouring states. There is also a need for a new legal regime to regulate high seas
fisheries, to improve cooperation among states, and to enhance compliance by fishing
vessels.
To address these concerns and new issues arising from fisheries management,
the international community under the auspices of the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) and the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) produced a number
of important fisheries instruments, both legally binding and non-binding, to improve
19

The unilateral action started from some Latin American states such as Chilli and Peru. See Churchill
and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, p.308.
20
UN, The Law of the Sea: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final
Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (New York, UN Publication, 1983).
21
For a historical perspective of the LOSC, See R. P. Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of
the Sea: History of International Law Revisited (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983). See also Juda,
International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean Governance.
22
Part V of the LOSC deals with EEZ regime. See Chapter 1 for discussions.
23
As of 16 July 2004, 145 states and the European Community (EC) have ratified or acceded to the
LOSC, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/refernce_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
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the coordinated fisheries management in the post-LOSC era. 24 These instruments
include:
• the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance
Agreement);25
• the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea Convention on 10 December 1982 Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement);26
• the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Code of Conduct);27 and
• the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU).28
These globally applicable instruments attempt to fill the gaps of the LOSC fisheries
framework and to promote responsible fisheries. They provide detailed principles and
guidelines to address ongoing fisheries issues, including vessel reflagging; lack of
selectivity of fishing gear; 29 insufficient monitoring, control, and surveillance of
fishing vessels; and no mechanism for the collection and exchange of scientific
data.30 To deal with these major obstacles, management measures were set down to

24

The non-binding instruments include Cancùn Declaration and Agenda 21. The Cancùn Declaration
is the outcome of 1992 Cancùn Conference on Responsible Fisheries, hosted by the government of
Mexico, which provided input for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), or “Earth Summit”. Agenda 21 was one of the significant outcomes of the UNCED. There
were 178 governments attending the conference, held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-15 June 1992.
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, also called “the Oceans Chapter”, was adopted within UNCED on 14 June
1992. It deals specifically with the sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources of the
high seas, as well as those under national jurisdiction. The full texts of both documents are available
from http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/index.htm.
25
The Compliance Agreement was adopted within the FAO on 24 November 1993, and came into
force on 24 April 2003. The full text is available from: http://www.fao.org/fi/agreem/compliance.asp.
26
It was adopted within the UN on 4 August 1995, and it came into force on 11 December 2001. The
full text is available from http://www.oceanlaw.ne/texts/index.htm.
27
The Code of Conduct was adopted within the FAO on 31 October 1995. The full text and relevant
information is available from http://www/fao.org/fi/agreem/condecond/condeon.asp.
28
It was adopted within the FAO on 23 June 2001. For the full text and intensive information on this
instrument, see http://www/fao/org/docrep/meeting/003/y0220e00.htm.
29
This often leads to large bycatch and discards. The FAO has issued the International Plan of Action
for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, (Rome, FAO, 1999).
30
Agenda 21 calls upon states to take effective action, consistent with international law, to conserve
fisheries resources. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 lists the key issues to fisheries crisis as unregulated
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enhance flag state responsibilities, to regulate fishing activities, and to improve
cooperation by emphasising the management role of regional fisheries organisations.
It is the objectives of these instruments to restore the ever-diminishing fisheries
resources and to achieve sustainable fisheries.
Under the guidance of these instruments, fisheries management has made
noticeable progress in recent years. Policies and objectives appear more realistic,
concentrating more on management and less on development, and making the best
social use of resources. There has been a growing acknowledgement of the necessity
to protect the fisheries ecosystem as well as individual stocks through measures like
the establishment of marine reserves. Explicit recognition of fisheries management
and consideration of longer-term utilisation of resources are increasingly reflected in
decision-making. Fisheries management regimes are taking a more precautionary
approach.31
Based on these improvements, one could be heartened at the prospect that
fisheries management could resolve the global fisheries crisis. This seems, however,
to be far from the case considering the continuous depletion of fisheries resources.
The reality is that the stresses on fish stocks are becoming more pronounced with
advanced navigational technology and more efficient fishing methods.
Challenges facing fisheries management still remain in many areas, and
overcoming these challenges is by no means easy. This is because fisheries
management is an integrated system with complex characteristics, and all the issues
associated with it are linked to each other in a complex way. The management
measures stimulated by the instruments do not provide an answer to all of the
problems facing fisheries management.
More importantly, the management measures endorsed by international
fisheries instruments are undermined by the non-compliance of many fishing states.
For the binding instruments, their legal regime and management measures rely on the
participation and ratification of states that are parties to them; whereas the
management objectives of non-binding instruments can only be realised by states
voluntarily incorporating them into their national legislation. Thus they have not
fishing, overcapitalisation, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging, insufficiently selective gear,
unreliable data, and lack of sufficient cooperation between states. See Agenda 21, Chapter 17.
31
See Chapter 2 for discussions on the Fish Stocks Agreement.
6

turned out to be as promising as they were expected, and the success or failure of
these instruments is determined by the implementation and compliance of states that
are involved in fishing.

Study Aim and Objectives
Against the background outlined above, the study aims to analyse China’s response to
international fisheries law and policy represented by the fisheries regimes envisaged
in the LOSC and also the management measures of the post-LOSC instruments. The
objectives of so doing are threefold.
First, the examination of the international fisheries regime and management
measures is to identify their effectiveness and inadequacies for fisheries management
and to lay down the foundation for understanding the way they are implemented by
states. It will be shown that the international fisheries law and policy rely largely on
coastal states and fishing states to implement them at a national level.
Second, the analysis of China’s response is to determine the gap between
theoretical considerations of fisheries instruments and the reality of state practice.
This will be illustrated from two aspects. One is China’s domestic action reflected by
its legislative harmonisation and policy adjustment in accordance with the requests of
international fisheries instruments. The other is China’s commitment to regional
cooperation in the form of bilateral fisheries agreements.
Third, being a small part of a larger picture, China’s fisheries management as
a whole is a vivid reflection of the global situation. The development of China’s
fisheries industry and the problems it has encountered underscore a similarity to the
factors that contribute to the global fisheries crisis. China’s national action, both
domestic and regional, mirrors the overall effort of the international community in
searching for a solution to address the fisheries crisis.
At the heart of this study is a desire to investigate the causes of the global
fisheries crisis and possible solutions to achieve the sustainable fisheries. To this end,
the study attempts to answer the following three questions: how can the international
fisheries instruments address the global fisheries crisis? What role does a state play in
the achievement of the management objectives of international fisheries instruments?
How great is the gap between the management practices of a state and the objectives
of international fisheries instruments?
7

The study argues that the major problem facing global fisheries is not the
lack of legal and policy frameworks at the international level but the incomplete
implementation of fisheries instruments by states. Efforts to build a more effective
system of fisheries management must start with the implementation of the LOSC as
well as other existing fisheries instruments. The international fisheries instruments
have to improve their potential for full implementation and compliance by states.
The selection of China’s fisheries as the subject of the study is based on three
considerations. First, China’s fisheries management is highly representative of global
fisheries issues. As one of the largest coastal states and a major fishing nation, China
has been the world’s largest fish producer since 1990. 32 This has been achieved
largely by intensive exploitation of fisheries resources of China’s coastal waters (as
well as by considerable development of aquaculture, but this is beyond the scope of
this study).33 Due to an increasing demand and economic incentives, China’s fisheries
industry still attracts a large amount of investment regardless of the fact that the
capture of fish stocks has far exceeded their biological reproduction limits.
China’s fisheries have faced serious problems, especially the decline of
fisheries resources and the deterioration of marine ecosystem, and the industry
requires strategic restructuring to achieve sustainable development. This coincides
with the global fisheries crisis and necessitates China’s implementation of
international fisheries instruments. Despite evidences of China’s positive response in
supporting international fisheries law and policy and domestic progress on fisheries
management, there is still great concern about China’s impact on fisheries
sustainability and global food security. China’s fisheries management practices, as an
important part of the global effort, have critical impact on the state of world fisheries.
China’s progress towards sustainable fisheries is of interest to all parts of the world.
Second, China’s fisheries management, to a certain extent, has unique
characteristics due to the political, social, and economic circumstances in which it is
embedded. This management system may not be applied, as a comprehensive model,
to all states of the world. However, essentially, China’s fisheries management is
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China’s annual aquatic products have taken the first place from 1990 onwards, reaching around 43
million tonnes in 2000 and accounting for more than 30% of the world total: FAO, SOFIA 2002.
33
This study does not cover China’s large aquaculture industries, nor China’s inland fisheries.
Likewise, the study will not discuss the biology, ecology and distribution of major exploited species.
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typical of a developing country, in particular, its principles and practices. Fisheries
management by developing countries has been the weakest link in the global effort
and presented a great challenge in addressing the fisheries crisis. The experiences of
China, especially those in the post-LOSC era, may provide a valuable lessen for
developing countries to make use of China’s success and to avoid its failure.
Third, China borders a range of three semi-enclosed seas, the Yellow Sea, the
East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Geographical proximity, fishing
competition, maritime disputes, and social and political differences have resulted in
complex bilateral relations and long-standing fisheries conflicts between China and
its maritime neighbouring states. In the face of seriously depleted shared fish stocks
and the degraded fisheries ecosystems, these states need to make concerted effort
towards the conservation and management of their shared fisheries resources.34 The
advent of the EEZ regime and its far-reaching impact ushered in a new fisheries order
in these semi-enclosed seas and marked a new stage of regional cooperation.35 Within
this context, China signed three fisheries agreements respectively with Japan, South
Korea, and Vietnam. This scenario provides an ideal case study to illustrate how the
cooperative framework of international fisheries instruments is responded to at a
regional level. By examining the three bilateral fisheries agreements, the study
provides an in-depth understanding of states’ reaction to their LOSC obligations and
highlights the challenges in the progress of international cooperation.

Scope and Limitation
In a study that deals with a complex issue of global fisheries law and policy and
management practices of China that extends over a significant period of time, one is
faced with difficult choices about topics and areas the study should cover. Within the
inevitable space constraints of a thesis, it would not be possible to discuss every
global fisheries instrument and China’s responses to all of them without being
superficial in the extreme. For this reason only four major fisheries instruments in the
34

For the exploitation of the shared fish stocks among China, Japan, and South Korea, see R. Liu,
"Exploitation and management of the fisheries resources and regional cooperation in the Yellow Sea
and the East China Seas," in Ocean Affairs in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Korean-Chinese
Maritime Cooperation, ed. D. Kim, et al. (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994), pp.45-74.
35
China, Japan, and South Korea all ratified the LOSC and proclaimed their EEZs in 1996. See
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
9

post-LOSC era are selected to represent international fisheries law and policy.
As the centrepiece for fisheries management, the fisheries legal framework
under the LOSC is highlighted. In a more selective way, the study discusses some of
the major management measures and general principles of the Fish Stocks Agreement,
the Compliance Agreement, the Code of Conduct, and IPOA-IUU. These post-LOSC
fisheries instruments marked distinctive phases in the development of the global
regime for the conservation and management of fisheries resources. They have
significantly improved international fisheries law and policy from many aspects
including the areas covered, species protected, and concepts applied. Consequently,
they have had considerable impact on states’ practice towards the way fisheries
resources are exploited and managed.
To decide which areas of fisheries management best reflect China’s response
to international instruments is even more challenging. In respect to domestic actions,
this study selects three elements of China’s fisheries management as subjects of
examination to avoid overwhelming verbosity. A brief review of China’s management
progress and an analysis on its resource management illustrate China’s overall effort
in responding to the general requirement of international fisheries law and policy,
notably the LOSC and the Code of Conduct. A detailed examination of China’s
maritime legislation on its territorial sea and EEZ is to determine to what extent the
LOSC framework is implemented. China’s policy adjustment regarding its distant
water fishing fleets to respond to flag state responsibilities highlight China’s
incorporation and application of the management measures of the Fish Stocks
Agreement and the Compliance Agreement, together with the IPOA-IUU measures to
combat IUU fishing.
International cooperation is critical in fisheries management, particularly in
the semi-enclosed sea context. Bilateral fisheries relations have been an important
component of China’s fisheries management. The study focuses on China’s bilateral
fisheries relations with three of its neighbouring states (Japan, South Korea, and
Vietnam) to present the effort taken by these states to fulfil their obligations on
cooperation. Although similar in content, each of the three agreements has its own
characteristics in terms of situations that brought them into being and issues involved.
The fisheries agreement between China and Japan is an actual product of the LOSC
regime change on the redistribution of resources, whereas the agreement between
10

China and South Korea is a combination of the EEZ regime and the relaxation of the
political relations between the two states. Finally, the agreement between China and
Vietnam bears more complex characteristics that derive from the South China Sea
context, but carries great weight for a bright future in the area of fisheries cooperation.
Generally speaking, little is known about China’s fisheries management in
the outside world. Compared with the abundance of scholarly work on international
fisheries law and policy, 36 information on China’s fisheries management and its
response to international fisheries law and policy is scarce.37 In China the essential
role of fisheries management from the policy perspective has not been given
sufficient attention by the government. This has resulted in a lack of support to
encourage systematic studies on the science and theory of this subject. Consequently,
fisheries management has not attracted much attention among academics, nor has it
become the subject of any groundbreaking research or theoretical analyses. The
limited Chinese writings are generally sectorial and are reportage from the relevant
fisheries administration.
The theme of China’s participation in and implementation of international
fisheries instruments is only recent and no research has been undertaken. China tends
to keep its decision-making process secret. Although more may be known now about
China’s policy deliberations and governmental administration than at any time
previously, it is still hard to find sufficient information for analysis. Without a fairly
good understanding of the Chinese social system and culture, it can be difficult for
outsiders to understand fully the complex structure of fisheries management
organisations and how they make or implement their decisions. This explains the
scarcity of literature and references.
The best available sources contributing to this study came from literature
generated by regional issues involving China’s fisheries widely scattered in matters
such as security, maritime boundary issues, territorial disputes, and the exploitation of
36

See, for instance, Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea; E. Hey, Developments in International
Fisheries Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); S. M. Kaye, International Fisheries
Management, International Environmental Law & Policy Series (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2001).
37
Comprehensive works on China’s practice on the law of the sea include J. Greenfield, China's
Practice in the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); E. V. W. Davis, China and the Law of
the Sea Convention: Follow the Sea (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995). However, fisheries
issues do not take much weight in their discussions.
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natural resources (mainly oil and gas).38 Apart from referring to these sources, the
study is largely based on undocumented governmental reports and publications on
fisheries from relevant ministries and agencies, and China’s legislation and policy
documents regarding various aspects of fisheries management.
The design of such a study signifies the first attempt to enquire into China’s
fisheries management practice by focusing on its response to international fisheries
instruments. A substantial effort was made to examine China’s major areas of policy
adjustment in the post-LOSC era to identify the progress achieved and the problems
to be solved in its fisheries management practice. In this way, attention is drawn to
some of the management problems that beset China and that can be a lesson to other
parts of the world. Thus, one of the modest purposes of such a study is to make a
contribution to this field, at the same time, the study is also an effort to build a bridge
between China and the world for better understanding in the area of fisheries
management.

Chapter Structure
The study is designed to achieve its aim and objectives in eight chapters. The first
chapter examines the LOSC framework for fisheries, which constitutes the underlying
legal basis of other post-LOSC fisheries instruments including China’s bilateral
agreements selected for analysis. The chapter deals with the LOSC fisheries
framework in three areas: coastal states’ sovereign rights under the EEZ regime,
which has produced a fundamental impact on world fisheries management practice;
the LOSC provisions for particular migratory stocks, which have stimulated the
development of international fisheries law and policy; and the LOSC provisions on
38

There are quite a few works on this account, see for instance, C. Park, East Asia and the Law of the
Sea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983); C. Park, D. Kim, and S. Lee, The Regime of the
Yellow Sea: Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the Changing Environment, vol. 11, East
and West Studies Series (Seoul: The Institute of East and West Studies, 1990) C. Park and J. K. Park,
The Law of the Sea: Problems form the East Asian Perspective: Proceedings of Two Workshops of the
Law of the Sea Institute (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1984); D. Kim
et al., Ocean Affairs in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Korea-China Maritime Cooperation (Soul:
Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1994); D. Kim et al., Marine Policy, Maritime
Security and Ocean Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, vol. 37, East and West Studies Series (Seoul:
Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1995); D. Kim et al., UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea and East Asia, vol. 40, East and West Studies Series (Seoul: The Institute of East and West
Studies, Yonsei University, 1996); S. P. Kim, "The UN convention on the law of the sea and new
fisheries agreements in North East Asia," Marine Policy 27, No. 2 (2003), pp.97-109.
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high seas fisheries, which have restricted the traditional concept of freedom of fishing
on the high seas. The chapter also points out the weaknesses of the LOSC in
addressing the global fisheries crisis.
Chapter 2 discusses the major management measures of the post-LOSC
fisheries instruments. These instruments reflect the concern that the introduction of
highly mechanised fishing methods and technologically advanced fleets has brought
about severe consequences to marine fisheries resources, including the high seas fish
stocks. The major management measures and principles of the Compliance
Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Code of Conduct, and the IPOA-IUU are
evaluated. The chapter highlights the progress achieved by these instruments in
improving the LOSC fisheries regime, and pinpoints the fact that their management
objectives can be realised only when they are supported by states.
Chapters 3 to 5 focus on China’s domestic actions in addressing its fisheries
problems in accordance with the requirements of international fisheries instruments.
Chapter 3 presents the fundamentals of China’s fisheries and problems encountered in
the process of its management practice. Key factors contributing to its fisheries
problems are identified.
Chapter 4 concentrates on China’s legislative harmonisation and policy
adjustment regarding the conservation and management of its fisheries resources. The
guiding principles for China’s national actions are the overall requirements of the
international fisheries instruments, particularly the LOSC provisions on coastal states’
obligations and the general principles of the Code of Conduct.
Two subjects are selected in Chapter 5 to illustrate China’s response to
coastal state rights and flag state responsibilities. China’s maritime legislation on its
territorial sea and EEZ are scrutinised with an emphasis on their fisheries-related
elements to determine the extent to which China’s legislation is consistent with the
LOSC framework. China’s policy adjustment regarding its distant water fishing
vessels is examined to demonstrate China’s compliance as a flag state with the
management measures of the Compliance Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement.
China’s commitment to international cooperation in combating IUU fishing is also
discussed.
Chapter 6 deals with China’s regional fisheries cooperation with Japan and
South Korea for shared resources. The chapter discusses the characteristics of the
13

migratory stocks and the fragile ecosystems of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea
together with an identification of the key issues contributing to the complex relations
of the three states. Followed a review of the relevant provisions of the LOSC to
highlight the overall responses and cooperative obligations of the three states, the
chapter scrutinises the fisheries relations between China and Japan, and between
China and South Korea to understand better the pressures endured and progress
achieved towards the conclusion of the two bilateral fisheries agreements in the postLOSC era. Major management regimes under the two agreements are examined to
identify their significance and constraints for the management of the shared resources,
and the challenges for the implementation.
Chapter 7 investigates China’s bilateral fisheries relations with Vietnam in
the form of a cooperative agreement for the shared resources in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Such a cooperative mechanism was established within the South China Sea context
where maritime disputes and fisheries conflicts have been common. The chapter
provides a brief account of the progress towards the achievement of this cooperative
framework. The major management measures in various Agreed Zones are evaluated,
followed by a discussion on their significance of the establishment of this long-term
cooperative mechanism for shared resources.
The final chapter concludes the study by highlighting the observations of the
international effort in addressing the global fisheries crisis and an assessment
regarding China’s domestic action and regional cooperation in responding to
international fisheries instruments. The chapter underlines the essential role of states
towards the achievement of sustainable fisheries management.
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CHAPTER 1 FISHERIES REGIME UNDER THE LOSC
Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) was the result of hard
work by the international community. It took over 14 years and involved the
participation of more than 150 states before the terms of the LOSC were agreed to and
signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982. 1 It was another 12 years
before the sixtieth ratification brought it into force on 16 November 1994.2 As of 16
July 2004, 145 states and the European Community (EC) have ratified or acceded to
the LOSC and made it a universally accepted legal instrument.3
With its 320 articles and nine annexes, the LOSC sets up a comprehensive
framework dealing with all aspects of the uses and resources of the seas and the oceans.
It “goes farther than any previous attempt to codify norms and update rules for the use
of the world’s oceans.” 4 The LOSC represents a monumental achievement of the
international community, stands as the most important achievement since the
establishment of the UN, and it is called the “Constitution of the Oceans”.5
Under the LOSC the vast oceans and seas are divided into various zones
where appropriate regimes apply. In the case of fisheries, the LOSC divides the oceans
into three jurisdictional zones: zones under coastal states’ sovereignty including
internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas; 6 zones under coastal states
sovereign rights including the EEZ and the continental shelf; and the high seas.
This chapter focuses on the LOSC fisheries framework with particular
reference to three areas: the EEZ, the high seas, and some particular stocks that
straddle or migrate in and out of both the EEZ and the high seas. The chapter does not
1

The LOSC, Introduction, Para. 1, xix.
In accordance with Article 308 (1), the LOSC came into force “12 months after the date of deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession.”
3
See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/refernce_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm for a list of
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the LOSC.
4
C. C. Joyner, "The United States and the new Law of the Sea," ODIL 27 (1996), p.41.
5
“A Constitution for the Oceans”, The LOSC, Remarks by T. B. Koh of Singapore, President of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, xxxiii.
6
The fisheries regimes in zones under coastal states’ sovereignty include internal waters, territorial seas,
and archipelagic waters. Within these maritime zones, it is up to coastal states to determine how their
fisheries resources are managed and exploited (it thus beyond the discussion of this study). See Articles
8, 17, 19(2)(j), 42(1)(c), and 51 (1) of the LOSC. The term “sovereignty” is defined as the “supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed.” See Blacks’s Law
Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publication, 1990), p.1396.
2
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cover the processes leading up to the establishment of EEZs, nor does it aim to account
for all possible effects of EEZs. Rather, it centres on the key elements regarding the
regulation of fishing activities in different zones, together with the regimes applied to
particular migratory stocks. Such a discussion is intended to set the legal background
for fisheries management on which other fisheries instruments subsequent to the
LOSC fisheries framework are examined, and against which China’s responses are
analysed later in this study.

Coastal States’ Sovereign Rights for EEZ Fisheries
The LOSC creates a maritime zone, EEZ, for coastal states to manage the fish stocks
that occur within 200 nm measured from their territorial sea baselines. The EEZ
regime is crystallised in Part V of the LOSC with 20 articles that define its physical
scope, legal status, and coastal states’ rights and obligations.7 Regarding its legal status,
the LOSC makes it clear that the EEZ is different from that of the territorial sea and the
highs seas, as the EEZ lies outside of, but adjacent to, the territorial seas of a costal
state and within 200 nm measured from the baselines of territorial seas.8 By virtue of
this regime, coastal states are granted exclusive power to determine the way that
fisheries resources are utilised, as well as a general obligation to prevent the resources
therein from being endangered by overexploitation.
The creation of the EEZ has significantly expanded coastal states’ sovereign
rights over the majority of the world fisheries resources. 9 By according them EEZ
jurisdiction, the LOSC has brought an additional 35%-36% of the world’s most
productive ocean, and the most intensively utilised, under the jurisdiction of coastal
states.10 This is especially significant for fisheries, as more than 90% of the world’s
fisheries resources are located in the waters within 200 nm of the coastal line.11
7

Article 55 of the LOSC defines EEZ as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea”. Article 57
sets down the outside limit of EEZ as not to extend beyond 200 nm. A coastal state’s EEZ may extend to
200 nm including 12 nm territorial sea, thus an EEZ is actually 188 nm. The complex nature of the EEZ
regime and characteristics of fisheries also involve provisions from other parts of the LOSC, such as
Part XV “Settlement of Disputes”.
8
The LOSC, Articles 55 and 57.
9
The fisheries regimes in zones under coastal states’ sovereign rights include EEZ and the continental
shelf which will be dealt with in this chapter. See The LOSC, Articles 56(1) (a), 68, and 77.
10
See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999),
p.134.
11
UN, The Oceans: the Source of Life-20th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the LOSC
(1982-2002), 2002, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm (accessed 31 March 2003), p.5.
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The great resource potential within the 200 nm encourages coastal states to
establish EEZs and exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction over fisheries resources.12
If every coastal state claims its full entitlement to EEZ, the total high seas of the world
(104 million square kilometres) will be diminished to some 67 million square
kilometres, with approximately 37 million square kilometres falling under coastal
states’ jurisdiction.13 The enormous wealth, which was previously open to all, has now
become the asset of coastal states. The rights and obligations for the conservation and
utilisation of fisheries resources have profoundly changed access to, and utilisation of,
fisheries resources.14
The most important achievement of Part V is the establishment of coastal
states’ sovereign rights over fisheries resources and fishing activities that occur within
their EEZs.15 Articles 56 (2) and 58 specify the rights of other states to navigation,
overflight, and laying of pipelines and submarine cables in the EEZs of coastal states,
but these rights have to be subject to the EEZ regime and coastal states’ sovereign
rights. Articles 61, 62, and 73 provide for the key management regimes for the
conservation and utilisation of fisheries resources.16 In exchange for this, the LOSC
12
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no. 50 (1990), pp.8-18; R. R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries Law (Dordrecht: Maritinus Nijhoff Publishers,
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sets out primary obligations for coastal states to:
• determine the allowable catch and harvesting capacity (Articles 61 (1) and 62
(2));
• prevent the overexploitation of fisheries resources (Article 61 (2));
• grant other states access to a surplus (Article 62 (2), and (3));
• use the best scientific evidence available (Article 61 (2)); and
• adopt laws and regulations for fisheries management (Article 62 (4), Article 73).
Hey characterised these requirements as being based on two pillars:
The first pillar is the interest of coastal states expressed by the fact that coastal
states have sovereign rights with respect to the exploitation of the fisheries
resources. This interest is safeguarded by the right of coastal states to decide on
the exploitation of, access to and conservation of the fisheries resources. The
second pillar is the interest of the community of states expressed in the
requirement of conservation and optimum utilisation of the fisheries resources.
This interest is safeguarded by requiring that coastal states adopt conservation
17
measures and grant other states access to a surplus.

Theoretically, the two pillars do (and should) co-exist within the framework of the
LOSC. In practice, the first pillar gives coastal states unlimited powers over the
resources in their EEZs, with the consequence that foreign fishing states have no active
role to play in the matter.18 Under such a circumstance, it is crucial for coastal states,
as the key players of the EEZ regime, to implement and fulfil these obligations. In this
sense, coastal states’ practice determines whether the LOSC has provided an effective
framework for the conservation and management of fisheries resources. To justify this,
it is necessary to examine the major requirements of the LOSC on coastal states.

obligation with respect to the utilisation of these resources. Coastal states are under no obligation with
respect to the maintenance and conservation of stocks under the continental shelf as opposed to the EEZ
regime.
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For a discussion from an economic perspective, see G. R. Munro, "Coastal states, distant water fleets
and EFJ: Some long-run considerations," Marine Policy 9, No. 1 (1985), pp.2-15.
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Determining the TAC
The LOSC requires coastal states to determine the allowable catch in their EEZs.19 The
determination of a total allowable catch (TAC) is one of the most important measures
widely employed to regulate fisheries, at both the national and international level. The
TAC prescribes how much fish may be taken from a particular stock over a specified
period. 20 It is often divided into quotas allocated to individual states (in an
internationally managed fishery) or individual vessels (in a nationally managed
fishery). The purpose of the TAC is to ensure that no more fish are taken from the
stock than is biologically justifiable in order to achieve the objectives of the fisheries
long-term yield.21 The TAC emphasises the biological factors in the design of fisheries
management objectives which “implies that through proper management, subject to
natural conditions, a given stock can be exploited at a certain level indefinitely.”22
The TAC can be very effective if it is properly set and observed, and it is a
commonly used procedure for advanced fisheries management. However, its
implementation requires large quantities of reliable data, which is usually difficult and
costly to obtain.23 Given the economic and administrative costs to implement such a
measure,24 the complexity and difficulty in setting up a TAC could discourage coastal
states from adopting it, thus undermining the effective implementation of the LOSC
obligation.

Preventing Overexploitation
The LOSC obliges coastal states to adopt conservation measures to ensure that the
fisheries resources of their EEZs are not endangered by overexploitation.25 Article 61
(3) specifies that such measures shall be designed to maintain or restore populations of
harvested species at levels to produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The
MSY refers to the maximum amount of fish that can be taken on a sustained basis
without diminishing the productive capacity of the species or adversely affecting
19
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Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, p.45.
23
Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, p.283.
24
See B. Kwiatkowska, The Regime for the Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea
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associated or dependent species.26 While it may appear that the LOSC has set up the
conservation objectives for EEZ fisheries and imposed a positive obligation upon
coastal states in this regard, a close examination will show that the ambiguities of these
provisions undermine its effectiveness.
First, according to Article 61 (3), the standard objective of fisheries
conservation is to produce the MSY. This provision states that such measures should be
“qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic
needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing
[s]tates, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any
generally recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional,
regional or global.”
Being a well-known concept prior to the LOSC era, the advantages and
disadvantages of the MSY from a biological point of view, had been well demonstrated
before the conclusion of the LOSC and became less popular in fisheries management
system. 27 Therefore the LOSC fisheries conservation objective is outdated and
questionable. This is particularly discouraging when considering the overexploitation
of the majority of fish stocks and the ongoing global fisheries crisis. According to the
UN, overexploitation of marine living resources has been identified as one of the three
greatest threats to the world oceans (together with pollution from land-based sources,
and the destruction of marine habitats).28
Second, the LOSC requires coastal states to take into account fishing patterns;
the interdependence of stocks; and generally recommends international minimum
standards.29 The LOSC does not provide a standard to quantify the “level” to produce
the MSY of the harvested species. 30 It can be argued that it is necessary to allow
coastal states certain flexibility in making management decisions, but these provisions
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See A.W. Koers, “International regulation of marine fisheries: some problems and proposals”, 4
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27
For details, see G. Waugh, Fisheries Management: Theoretical Developments and Contemporary
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have been criticised for giving them too much flexibility.31
When deciding conservation measures, the LOSC also requires coastal states
to consider relevant effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested
species, so as to provide for the maintenance or restoration of associated or dependent
species to levels above their reproductive capacity.32 To achieve this end, the LOSC
requires states to contribute and exchange available scientific information, statistics
and other relevant data on a regular basis through international organisations.33 It will
be shown in later discussion that this requirement is no more than a symbolic
obligation.34

Granting Access to the Surplus
Another obligation imposed on coastal states is to promote the optimum utilisation of
living resources in their EEZs.35 To discharge this obligation, Article 62 (2) of the
LOSC requires the coastal state to determine its capacity to harvest the fisheries
resources. Where a coastal state does not have the ability to harvest the entire
allowable catch, or when any surplus may exist in its EEZ, it is required to give other
states access to the surplus so that the resources will not be under-utilised.
This optimum utilisation requirement reflects the concern of distant water
fishing nations (DWFNs) that coastal states would drastically limit access to the
resources enclosed in their EEZs.36 This provision can be interpreted from different
perspectives, as there is no definition or criteria for the “optimum utilisation”. Judging
from the wording of “without prejudice to Article 61”, coastal states are free to take
any measures to achieve the objective of optimum utilisation.37
Coastal states may grant the surplus to other states under certain conditions,
through agreements or other arrangements.38 Coastal states may also refuse to grant
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any surplus to foreign fishing states by whatever reason listed in Article 61. 39 The
factors that a coastal state should consider are not exhaustive and they may choose
whatever “factor” necessary to prevent them from giving the surplus to foreign fishing
states.40 Hey takes the view that the provisions that limit the granting of access play a
role in concluding access agreements, but they do not vest a right in specific states to
participate in the fisheries of a foreign EEZ, that is, they only establish a right of
access for other states in general.41 Copes is of the view that these provisions only
apply moral pressure to coastal states.42 Attard further points out that the inadequacy of
the scientific data itself might be sufficient to prevent a coastal state from discharging
its duty, hence its power to determine the conservation measures required, the size of
the surplus, and the states it wants to grant access to that surplus.43
When foreign fishing vessels are granted a share of the coastal states’ surplus,
the conditions of such a grant are noticeably restricted under Article 62 of the LOSC.
Coastal states need to decide to whom it is granted, and what conditions are included
in exchange for the access. 44 In making this choice, coastal states must take into
account “all relevant factors” to maintain the stocks of harvested species at levels to
produce maximum sustainable yields (MSY), as qualified by economic, environmental
and other factors.45
In case a dispute arises over the setting up of the TAC or granting access to
foreign states, Article 297 (3) (a) of the LOSC imposes a further limitation on the right
of foreign states. This provision expressly excludes these issues from submission to
compulsory dispute settlement in accordance with the LOSC Part XV Section 2. A
39
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coastal state may refuse to grant surplus to foreign states and does not have to worry
about the compulsory dispute settlement procedures. As Burke argues, there are no
compulsory dispute settlement provisions in relation to coastal states’ power to
determine TAC or with regard to the power to determine its capacity to harvest.46

Using Available Scientific Evidence
The LOSC has an identical approach regarding scientific data. When making
management decisions, coastal states are required by the LOSC to use the “best
scientific evidence available.” 47 Following this general requirement, the LOSC
provision concerning data is found in Article 61 (5), where the available scientific data,
fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks are
required to be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis. Besides these provisions,
no specific requirement or standard is set in the LOSC regarding how much data and
information is “the best available” and on how it should be exchanged.48 As such, the
maximum requirement of the LOSC data was to “imply a responsibility” on the part of
coastal states to collect data if none is available.49
The LOSC does not place explicit duty on states to collect data or conduct
research to obtain the necessary data. 50 Even with the available data, there is no
guarantee of a cohesive effort in the calculation of an appropriate catch limit. Thus the
LOSC requirement on scientific data provides only symbolic guidance for states, and
little of substance in terms of enforceable instructions. This leaves coastal states with
great flexibility in making management decisions such as the determination of the TAC,
calculation of the harvesting capacity and surplus, and granting access to other states.51
However, there is no guarantee that the decision based on the “best scientific evidence
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available” may be sound enough to achieve the best conservation outcomes.52
For developing countries, the data requirements are even more difficult to
meet due to their limited financial and technical capacity.53 Without sound and reliable
data, these states are not able to determine the allowable catch in their EEZs. As a
consequence, some developing coastal states cannot give other states access to the
surplus, while some sell access rights to foreign fishing fleets regardless of the status
of the stocks, or the fact that they are unable to restrict the foreign vessels to an
allowable catch.54 This, in some cases, may lead to the overexploitation of fisheries
resources by foreign fleets, because they tend to maximise their catch without
considering the impact on the marine environment and its resource.55

Enforcing Laws and Regulations
Foreign fishing vessels have to observe a wide variety of conservation measures and
other terms and conditions when they are granted access to coastal states’ EEZs. The
conservation measures are supposed to be established by the coastal states and be
consistent with the LOSC. Article 62 (4) provides a long list of laws and regulations
which could be established to regulate foreign fishing. These include:
• fishing permits and resource fees;
• fishing quotas and species;
• areas and seasons of fishing;
• vessel and gear restrictions;
• reporting and data requirements;
• enforcement procedures; and
• training of personnel and transfer of fishing technology. 56
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When coastal states enact laws on these matters, they are only required to ensure these
laws are consistent with the general rules established by the LOSC. Such a requirement
simply imposes a moral obligation on coastal states to be reasonable in sharing any
surplus, and it is obvious that this obligation is subject to coastal states’ self interest.
However, as these laws and regulations give coastal states the freedom to interpret
them in whatever ways they wish and a free hand to control foreign fishing in their
EEZs, they have been the focus of much attention in the formulation of national
legislation. 57 These provisions have become the basis for international fisheries
cooperation in the management of stocks shared by the states concerned including
those access agreements.
In exercising sovereign rights over the living resources in the EEZ, the coastal
state is empowered to take a wide range of enforcement measures, including boarding,
inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings.58 The LOSC allows coastal states to impose
penalties on the foreign fishing vessels for violations of fisheries laws and regulations,
but it does not encourage imprisonment or any form of corporal punishment.59 The
coastal state has to release the arrested vessels and their crews promptly upon the
posting of a reasonable bond or other security.60 It is also obliged to notify the flag
state of any action taken or penalty imposed in this matter.61
Despite the LOSC prohibiting imprisonment or other forms of corporal
punishment for violations of fisheries laws and regulations, states’ practice on EEZ
enforcement has varied. Although no imprisonment is envisaged in the laws of coastal
states, it has been pointed out that the fines they impose are so high when compared
with the income of the fishermen that the fishermen are often imprisoned in default of
payment. 62

The LOSC Regime for Particular Migratory Species
The LOSC provides for states to take special measures for the conservation and
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management of some categories of migratory species. Migratory species are those that
undertake cyclical movements between distinct geographical areas. 63 Most species
migrate between two areas, and one is usually the area in which they breed. Many
species migrate between coastal areas and the open sea. Some breed in the ocean and
spend their adult life in inshore areas where they feed, while many others do the
reverse cycle, and they reproduce on the shore or in lagoons or shallow waters and
then migrate to feeding areas further out to sea. These species occur not only in EEZs,
but also, and more often on the high seas. Their migratory nature has made the
management by an individual state difficult. The LOSC singled out several categories
of these migratory species, particularly shared stocks, straddling stocks, highly
migratory species, anadromous stocks and catadromous species, and marine mammals.
Each will be considered in turn.

Shared Stocks
While there is no such term as “shared stocks” in the LOSC, it is often used in
literature to refer to the fish stocks migrating across EEZ boundaries and exploited by
more than one state.64 In this sense, it is similar to the term “transboundary stocks”,
which is also used in a narrow sense for stocks described in Article 63 (1) of the LOSC
to distinguish them from straddling stocks and highly migratory species.65 However,
“transboundary stocks” is sometimes also used in a broad sense to mean any fish
stocks that swim across jurisdictional boundaries of more than one state or between
coastal states’ EEZs and the high seas.66 This lack of definition often causes confusion.
To avoid this, the term “shared stocks” is adopted in this study to refer to the stocks
63

See C. Klemm, "The problem of migratory species in international law," in Green Globe Yearbook of
International Co-operation on Environment and Development 1994, ed. H. O. Bergesen and G. Parmann
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 67.
64
See, for example, the use of this term in the Norway-FAO Expert Consultation on the Management of
Shared Fish Stocks (http://www.fao/org/fi/NEWS/events/detail_event.asp?event_id=12162). It was held
in Bergen, Norway on 7-10 October 2002. See also Managing Shared Waters-Coastal Zone Canada
2002 held in Hamilton, Canada on 23-28 June 2002. For IUCN Report on Managing Shared WatersCoastal Zone Canada 2002 (http://www.iucn.org/wssd/index.htm). See also J. A. Gulland, Some
Problems of the Management of Shared Stocks -- FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (No. 206) (Rome:
FAO, 1980).
65
See for example, K. M. Sullivan, "Conflict in the management of a Northwest Atlantic transboundary
cod stock," Marine Policy 13, No. 2 (1989), pp. 118-136. See also O. Thebaud, "Transboundary marine
fisheries management. Recent developments and elements of analysis," Marine Policy 21, No. 3 (1997),
pp.237-253.
66
Hey describes all the stocks covered by Articles 63-67 as transbounary stocks: Hey, The Regime for
the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, p.45.
26

regulated in the LOSC Article 63 (1), that is, “the same stocks or stocks of associated
species that occur within the exclusive economic zone of two or more coastal states”.
With the establishment of the EEZ regime, shared stocks have become a
widespread issue, but the LOSC does not provide substantial guidance on how to
regulate these stocks. Article 63 (1) merely requires states to “seek”, either directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional organisations, to agree upon measures
necessary to coordinate and ensure their conservation and development.67 This is to be
done without prejudice to the other provisions of Article 63 (1) which does not oblige
states to reach agreement, nor does it mention the management objectives for such
stocks or allocation of the catch among the states concerned.68 The management and
conservation measures for such stocks are thus left to the coastal states concerned to
work out.69
In case there is no agreement reached, each state will manage that part of the
shared stocks occurring in its EEZ in accordance with its own domestic laws and
policies. The result may well be mismanagement of a shared stock and inequity in the
allocation of benefits from it. This is especially the case when one state takes strict
conservation measures with a view to maximising yield in the long term thus reducing
its catch substantially in the short term, while the other state fishes the stock heavily in
order to maximise short-term gain. Conflicts may arise from non-cooperative
management and the status of stocks may be threatened by resource competition. The
shared nature of this stock has made the management a challenging task among the
states concerned.70
As the LOSC provides only weak obligations with regard to shared stocks, in
practice the coastal states sharing the same stocks have become conscious of their joint
responsibility in seeking an agreement on conservation and management of such
stocks.71 States acknowledge the obvious advantage, and tend to reach a settlement in
67
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conformity with the LOSC. 72 In some cases, the provisions of Article 63 (1) are
incorporated into national legislation, but more often they are found in bilateral
agreements and regional arrangements. 73 Many agreements have been reached on
cooperative management, and states have been able to agree to a considerable extent
on the terms and conditions for such arrangements. 74 While these agreements are
widely different in their management measures, their forms and institutions fall into
three main categories.75
Some agreements take the form of a periodic arrangement negotiated under a
pre-existing framework treaty. A good example of this is the 1978 Treaty between
Australia and Papua New Guinea on Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries.76 Under
this agreement, the parties are to adopt management measures for the fisheries of the
protected zone in the Torres Strait, including the setting of TACs allocated between the
parties in fixed percentages (depending on the area concerned).
A more common practice is a reciprocal agreement followed by specific
arrangements providing for the joint conservation and development of the shared
stocks. In this type of arrangement, measures for the management of shared stocks are
taken by a bilateral committee set up especially for this purpose. Allocation is
determined by the committee that annually sets TACs for shared stocks and allocates
them in fixed percentages with the figure varying from one species to another.
Measures also include closed seasons, minimum fish sizes and gear regulations. Some
states adopt a large, joint fishing zone across the disputed waters. This approach is
illustrated by the Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement and Sino-Korean Fisheries
Agreement in Chapter 6.
Management measures can also be adopted by a regional fisheries
organisation. The main example of this arrangement is the International Baltic Sea
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Fisheries Commission, established by the 1973 Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the Baltic Sea and Belts.77

Straddling Stocks
Article 63 (2) of the LOSC provides that:
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, coastal
states and states fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree
upon measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area.

Stocks of fish that migrate between or occur in both the EEZ of one or more states and
the high seas are commonly known as straddling stocks. 78 Straddling stocks raise
various problems. The first is how such stocks are to be managed. There is a risk, for
example, that any management measures taken by a coastal state in its EEZ will be
undermined by the activities of vessels fishing on the high seas. A second problem is
how catches for straddling stocks are to be allocated between vessels fishing in the
EEZ and vessels fishing for those stocks on the high seas.79 The only provision made
by the LOSC is to require states concerned to seek agreement upon the measures
necessary for the conservation of these EEZ/high seas stocks in the “adjacent areas”
(the high seas) through appropriate subregional or regional organisations.80 Other than
this ineffectual obligation, as with the shared stocks, the LOSC does not provide any
substantive guidance on how the problems involved with regulating straddling stocks
are to be addressed.
Despite the limited scope of the obligations and without any detailed guidance
for coastal states to manage straddling stocks, it is clear that coastal states and other
states fishing for the straddling stocks on the high seas have to cooperate to ensure and
promote the long-term utilisation of these species throughout their migratory range, in
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both the EEZ and the high seas.81 In practice, states generally do acknowledge the
interrelationship that exists between both conservation and optimum utilisation of such
stocks within and beyond the EEZ.82
On the other hand, even the cooperation called for by the LOSC only relates
to measures taken on the high seas, and not in the EEZ. It should be noted that under
Article 116 (2), the freedom of fishing on the high seas is subject to the “rights and
duties as well as the interests of coastal states provided for, inter alia, in Article 63,
paragraph 2.” 83 Based on this provision, some coastal states claim their priority in
straddling stocks, and especially where there is no agreement, they may regulate
fishing for such stocks on the high seas. 84 This is accompanied by a noticeable
tendency by the coastal state to ensure the consistency of measures applicable to the
high seas with those adopted in the EEZ.85
State practice for straddling stocks in general presents three stages: the
acknowledgement of the importance of cooperation; agreement of cooperation reached;
and the measures adopted being consistent with those in EEZs. Based on this analysis,
it can be said that the development of the management of straddling stocks is in the
character of an emerging principle of customary law. Notwithstanding this significant
development, in most of the relatively few areas where straddling stocks exist in
commercially attractive quantities, there have been problems and disputes. The wellknown problematic areas include the North-West Pacific Atlantic (Canada and Spain),
the Bering Sea (Donut Hole), the Sea of Okhotsk (Peanut Hole), and Barents Sea
(Loop Hole).86 Concerns about the problems and disputes led the way to the adoption
of the Fish Stocks Agreement, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Highly Migratory Species
The LOSC also accords special protection for the so-called highly migratory species
(HMS) in Article 64.87 HMS migrate considerable distances crossing vast expanses of
oceans and seas. 88 In contrast to straddling stocks, the LOSC provides different
regimes for HMS. Article 63 (2) obliges states concerned to cooperate in developing
necessary conservation measures for straddling stocks only in the high seas, whereas
Article 64 calls for multilaterally agreed measures to manage HMS throughout their
migratory range, both within and beyond the EEZ.89
There is no specific guidance in the LOSC for the management of these
species, and not even a precise definition of HMS.90 Aside from merely calling on
states whose nationals fish for HMS both within and beyond the EEZ to cooperate to
ensure conservation and optimum utilisation of such stocks, Article 64, like Article 63,
is vague as to the rights and responsibilities of states.91 Again, this provision leaves the
question unresolved of what to do when the states concerned have not been able to
agree on conservation measures, or where disputes arise between coastal states and
states whose nationals fish for HMS on the high seas (referred to DWFNs).92
According to Birnie and Boyle, the lack of specific guidance in Article 64 was
an outcome of political compromise rather than the biological uniqueness of the
species.93 Article 64 was crafted by the United States of America (USA), who wished
to remove HMS as far as possible from coastal states’ control in the EEZs and make its
87
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management subject to international regulation.94 According to the USA interpretation,
coastal states should not be permitted, unless there is an agreement, to prevent foreign
vessels from fishing for HMS. 95 A commentary that accompanied President Bill
Clinton’s Transmittal of the LOSC to the US Senate offered the following justification
for a distinction between the two categories of stock:
Broadly speaking, “straddling” stocks such as cod in the Northwest Atlantic and
pollock in the Bering Sea, occur primarily in the EEZs of a very few coastal states.
Outside the EEZs, these stocks are fished in relatively separate areas of the
adjacent high seas. Accordingly, it seems reasonable for coastal states
“unilaterally” to determine conservation and management measures applicable in
its EEZ, while the high seas fishing states and coastal states jointly develop such
measures applicable in the adjacent areas.
Most HMS such as tuna and swordfish, by contrast, migrate through thousands of
miles of open ocean. They are fished in the EEZs of large numbers of coastal
states and in many areas of the high seas. No single coastal state could adopt
effective conservation and management measures for such a stock as a whole. As
a result, international cooperation is necessary for these stocks throughout their
96
range, both within and beyond the EEZ.

Whatever the case may be, there is no doubt that the migratory nature of these stocks
requires cooperative efforts from coastal states or regional fisheries organisations, and
that their effective management can be achieved only through concerted efforts by all
states involved in fishing them throughout their migratory range.97 The necessity for
international cooperation on the conservation and management of HMS is, however,
not intended to prejudice the sovereign rights of coastal states over all resources
including HMS such as tuna which are found within the EEZ.98
Compared with shared stocks, HMS, together with the straddling stocks, have
94
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given rise to serious international problems linked to the fisheries regime for the high
seas. 99 As a result, the issue was considered in June 1992 by the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which recommended the
convening of an intergovernmental conference under the UN auspices “with a view to
promoting effective implementation of the provisions of the LOSC on straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.”100 On the basis of this recommendation, the
UNGA convened the Fish Stocks Agreement.101

Anadromous Stocks and Catadromous Species
Anadromous and catadromous species are biologically adapted to fresh and salt water
at different stages of their life cycles. Anadromous species, for instance salmon, spawn
in rivers at a considerable distance from the coast, their juvenile then migrate to the sea
where they feed, grow, and spend their adult life before returning to breed in the river
where they were born.102 Unlike anadromous stocks, catadromous species follow the
reverse cycle.103 They breed in the open sea and their juvenile migrate to fresh waters
where they grow mature, then return to the sea to spawn. Eels are the best-known
example of this species. They spend most of their lives in rivers, and swim into the
open sea for breeding. The LOSC establishes special regimes in Articles 66 and 67 for
anadromous stocks and catadromous species as recognition of their special biological
life cycles.
The regime for anadromous stocks is centred on the fact that the state of
origin (that is, the state in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate) has the primary
interest and responsibility for such stocks.104 That state may claim interests in different
parts of the life cycle of these stocks. This gives the state of origin a naturally
99
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predetermined long-term interest in the viability of the stock and greater rights and
control over that stock, regardless of where the stock might go, or how far it might
spread throughout the high seas and EEZs. This places an emphasis on stocks rather
than location. States of origin may, after consulting other affected states, establish a
TAC for the anadromous stocks which originate in their waters beyond their EEZ.105
DeReynier notes that the use of the phrase “primary interest in and responsibility for”
suggests that other states may have an interest in such stocks, but this does not permit
the inference that coastal states’ sovereign rights within the EEZ have been diluted.106
Fishing for anadromous stocks is to be conducted only in waters landward of
the outer limits of the EEZ, and the taking of these species is prohibited in the high
seas. 107 Coastal states are allowed to enforce their relevant fisheries regulations
unilaterally within their EEZs.108 Other states are obliged to cooperate with the state of
origin if the stock is present in their EEZs, and to do so through regional organisations
where appropriate.109 This is evidently in recognition of the fact that states of origin
have incurred considerable costs in maintaining and restoring the species in question.
However, it remains debatable whether any state can enforce its fisheries regulations
against nationals of other states on the high seas.
Article 67 of the LOSC dealing with catadromous species provides that states
in whose waters these fish spend the greater part of their lives have management
responsibility. The regime for catadromous species contains three main components.
First, the responsibility for catadromous species management rests with the coastal
state in whose waters these species spend the greater part of their life cycle.110 Second,
harvesting of such species shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer
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limits of the EEZ. 111 Third, in the case of catadromous species straddling EEZs,
management is to be effected by agreements between the relevant states. 112 Such
agreements are to ensure rational management of the species, and take into account the
special responsibilities of the host state. 113 In reality, the effective management of
catadromous species would fall on the coastal state in whose waters the species spend
most of their lives, and in the majority of cases, that state will also have jurisdiction
over the river estuary and adjacent sea areas where the species breed.114
Compared to the regime for anadromous stocks, the one for catadromous
species is more general. Article 67 notably lacks reference to the conservation of
catadromous species, other than a duty to comply with EEZ management principles
where their harvesting takes place. This differs from the reference to “primary
responsibility” in the context of anadromous stocks, and would appear to exclude other
states from any role in the management process. In general, the LOSC constitutes a
virtual nationalisation for anadromous stocks and catadromous species for the benefit
of the coastal states concerned. These regimes have been used as a legal basis for the
conservation actions in prohibiting fishing in the high seas and large parts of the EEZs
of the range states.115

Marine Mammals
Marine mammals refer to animals living in marine waters and breathing air directly
including cetaceans (whales, dolphin propoises), pinnipeds (seals, walruses, and sea
lions), sirenians, and sea otters.116 Marine mammals in general have a long life, low
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reproduction, and a vast migratory range. 117 These characteristics make them
vulnerable to commercial fishing and special consideration and careful management is
required to maintain their status. Recognising their biological nature, the LOSC
provides stricter rules to protect them, both in EEZs and on the high seas.118
Article 65 of the LOSC expressly permits coastal states to adopt measures as
strict as they wish, “to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals”.
Whales are singled out in this provision where states are also required to work through
the appropriate international organisations for their conservation and management.119
However, Article 65 is incomplete as far as conservation is concerned, since it
excludes any reference to international enforcement, which presumably is left to flag
states. 120 Without a sound enforcement regime, the effective protection of marine
mammals is only hypothetical, and the difficulties of conservation are not likely to be
overcome without a battle.

Obligations of States Fishing on the High Seas
Beyond the EEZs of coastal states lie the remaining high seas. Article 86 of the LOSC
provides that the high seas comprise “all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in
the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.” Within this area, all states enjoy
certain freedoms, such as navigation and fishing.121 However, under the LOSC, the
establishment of EEZs of up to 200 nm have modified the definition of the high seas
and greatly reduced its physical extent.
Even though the LOSC substantially reduces the size of the high seas, it
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reaffirms the traditional principle of the “freedom of the seas”.122 As one of the main
components of “freedom of the seas”, the “freedom of fishing” on the high seas has
been preserved in the LOSC.123 However, the LOSC makes the “freedom of fishing”
on the high seas subject to a number of important, though general, additional
conditions. The states fishing on the high seas have the obligation to conserve fisheries
resources, to cooperate with coastal states and regional and international organisations
in the conservation and management of high seas stocks,124 and to discharge their flag
state responsibilities. By so doing, the LOSC substantially limits the freedom of
fishing on the high seas. The application and implementation of the high seas fisheries
regime has provided a source of debate over the past decades, and has been identified
as one of the key challenges facing the international community.125 At the same time,
these conditions have in fact extended coastal states’ jurisdiction over high seas fishing
activities.126
Major regimes regulating states fishing on the high seas including the
conservation of high seas fish stocks, cooperation for fisheries management,
122
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enforcement of flag state control, and settlement of disputes will be examined in turn
in the next section.

Conservation of High Seas Fish Stocks
The LOSC regime for high seas fisheries is established in Articles 116-120 of Part VII
Section 2. It emphasises that freedom of fishing on the high seas is restricted firstly by
those provisions regulating specific migratory species; secondly, by treaty obligations;
and finally, by provisions of this very section for high seas fisheries.127 The LOSC
imposes a general obligation on states to adopt conservation measures for their own
nationals, or to cooperate with other states in taking such measures.128 For states that
fish identical living resources or different resources in the same area, the LOSC
specifically requires them to cooperate in conserving or in initiating RFMOs for this
purpose.129
Article 119 of the LOSC provides specific requirements for the conservation
of high seas fisheries resources. These provisions require states to determine the TAC
and establish other conservation measures for the living resources of the high seas; and
to contribute and exchange available scientific information, catch and fishing effort
statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks through relevant
organisations.130 States whose nationals fish on the high seas are required to maintain
or restore populations of harvested species at levels to produce MSY as qualified by
relevant environmental and economic factors. 131 They are also obliged to take into
consideration the effects on the associated species of the targeted species, to make sure
their reproduction will not be seriously threatened.132 Article 119 (3) requires states
concerned to ensure that conservation measures do not discriminate in form or in fact
against the fishermen of any state.
From the above, it is clear that Article 119 of the LOSC represents a distinct
move towards the restriction of the freedom of fishing on the highs seas, at least
127
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theoretically. It can be argued that these conservation obligations imposed on states
reflect the development of a legal regime governing high seas fisheries; however, there
is no indication of how these obligations have been applied in any given situation.
Basically, high seas fish stocks are shared among high seas fishing states. In a shared
fishery, states concerned may have widely different opinions towards the conservation
measures to be employed.133

Cooperation for Fisheries Management
The LOSC continually emphasises cooperation, and it calls for cooperation on most
issues it addresses.134 Within its framework, cooperation on fisheries management is
strongly promoted to achieve the rational utilisation of fisheries resources.135 To give
further weight to cooperation, the LOSC establishes a legal framework, albeit general,
for the cooperative management of these resources. States are required to cooperate in
many aspects to conserve and utilise the living resources of EEZs and high seas.136 The
LOSC calls for regional cooperation in formulating and implementing conservation
and management strategies for fisheries resources, including cooperation in the
exchange of scientific information on HMS.137 It distinguishes between cooperative
obligations on the exploitation of particular species and the exploitation of “nonparticular” species in geographically defined areas, namely those occurring in enclosed
or semi-enclosed seas, or on the high seas, or migrating between EEZs and the high
seas.138 This framework incorporates the LOSC regimes for EEZ fisheries and for high
seas fisheries, and recognises that “the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated
and need to be considered as a whole.”139
133

Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, p.297.
Compared to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the LOSC has developed the framework for cooperation,
though this framework has been criticised as too general and a lack of operational guidance. See A. F.
Vysotsky, "Maritime regionalism and cooperation prospect in the Yellow Sea," in The Regime of the
Yellow Sea--Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the Changing Environment, ed. C. Park, D.
Kim, and S. Lee, East and West Studies Series (Seoul: The Institute of East and West Studies, 1990),
p.71.
135
The Preamble of the LOSC emphasises cooperation, and the first Paragraph states that to settle all
issues relating to the LOSC “in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation”.
136
The LOSC, Articles 61 and 62, and 118.
137
Such as the conservation of living resources, the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, and the promotion of marine scientific research and marine technology. See UN, The Law
of the Sea: Practice of States at the Time of Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
138
The LOSC, Articles 63, 116-120, 122, and 123.
139
Ibid., Preamble, Para. 3.
134

39

In a number of ways, the LOSC encourages cooperation on high seas fisheries
management. Article 117 requires states to cooperate in conservation measures. Article
118 requires states to enter into negotiations with respect to measures to conserve and
manage fisheries resources, and where appropriate, to establish regional or subregional
fisheries organisations. However, the LOSC does not provide any mechanism for
cooperation, or specify what form the cooperation might take. Oda describes Article
118 as “very imprecise” and the duty to cooperate as “rather abstract”.140 Freestone
takes a similar view, claiming the obligations are ‘lacking a considerable degree of
precision’.141
International practice on fisheries management has shown a noticeable trend
towards various types of cooperation, particularly where shared resources are
concerned.142 Nevertheless, an obligation to cooperate does not guarantee an agreed
arrangement or an effective regional fisheries organisation. The vagueness of the
LOSC cooperative framework leaves coastal states with significant flexibility to
interpret relevant provisions, and with considerable problems in applying cooperative
measures. The LOSC also lacks mandatory on cooperative management, which leads
to limited performance of regional fisheries organisations.143 An improved cooperative
practice should include the general acknowledgment of the necessity for cooperation in
achieving management goals; the wide acceptance of the right to access fisheries
resources by cooperation; and the extensive establishment of RFMOs to deal with
fisheries-related issues.144

140

See S. Oda, "Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," American
Journal of International Law 77 (1983), p.743.
141
D. Freestone, "The effective conservation and management of high seas living resources: towards a
new regime," Canterbury Law Review, 5 (1994), p.347.
142
See the cooperation between China and its maritime neighbours in Chapters 6 and 7.
143
The LOSC framework on cooperative management efforts, unaccompanied by any mandate, yields
no substantial advance over the opportunities for such cooperation in the past. The requirement of
cooperation has to be based on a balancing of interests among member states. This makes the function
of RFMOs largely reliant on voluntary compliance by member states, which were generally ineffectual
because member states could rarely agree on a formula that would limit their individual shares;
collective restraint by members was vulnerable to the intervention of ‘free-rider’ or non-members who
could enter and participate in the fishery without restraint. See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea,
p.301.
144
Regional cooperation allows the same management regimes integrated throughout the covered area,
helps to avoid cultural and ideological conflicts and improve the chances of achieving a successful
outcome to the negotiations between governments of different levels of economic development. Park,
Kim, and Lee, The Regime of the Yellow SeaIssues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the
Changing Environment, p.4.
40

Enforcement: Flag State Control
Pursuant to the sovereign rights of coastal states in the EEZ, a coastal state is
empowered to take a broad range of measures to enforce its fisheries laws against any
foreign fishing vessels, including boarding and inspections, observer placement, vessel
position report, and judicial proceedings.145 With respect to vessels fishing on the high
seas, the LOSC leaves the jurisdiction and enforcement in the hands of flag states.146
Given that the freedom of fishing in the high seas is guaranteed to all states,
the LOSC gives coastal states the right to grant their flags to vessels subject only to the
condition that there is a “genuine link” between the state and the vessel.147 The LOSC
does not use the term “flag state control” as such, instead, it requires flag states to
exercise control over vessels that fly their flags, 148 a regime that has long been
practised in the high seas context. Thus vessels exercising the freedom of the high seas
are generally free from any interference from third states.149 In the absence of any
agreement permitting other states to detain a vessel, no state other than the flag state
may regulate fishing vessels on the high seas.150
Article 117 of the LOSC provides that: “All states have the duty to take, or to
co-operate with other states in taking such measures for their respective nationals as
may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.”
However, states have rarely made any attempt to regulate fishing activities by vessels
flying their flags in a manner consistent with the LOSC, though they have shown a
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willingness to acknowledge their rights.151 In many cases, this is not always a matter of
unwillingness. For those flag states that are willing, practical issues of cost, distance,
domestic political and economic factors can also make the enforcement difficult. Some
states are simply unable to exercise their flag state responsibility to ensure compliance
with the conservation measures in place. Since the early 1990s, reflagging, or flag-ofconvenience (FoC), has become an emerging issue in many parts of the world.
Reflagging refers to vessels that deregister from member states of RFMOs
and reregister in non-member states in order to avoid application of conservation and
management measures enacted by the RFMOs.152 Vessel operators turn to reflagging
for a variety of reasons. Besides avoiding compliance with management measures,
another main factor is the negative economic implications or financial purpose for
lower operating costs or favourable tax conditions. Reflagging has been identified as
one of the most detrimental issues undermining fisheries management measures. It has
resulted in global concern about its serious impact on international management
efforts.153 Balton observes that the traditional rules of flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction
on high seas vessels create a barrier to the effective management of high seas
fisheries.154 Mack holds the view that one of the main reasons for the fisheries crisis is
that the LOSC does not establish international guidelines or mechanisms for
enforcement.155

Disputes Settlement
The LOSC has greatly increased coastal states’ maritime sovereignty, sovereign rights,
and national interests over fishing where one state’s interests and rights often overlap
or conflict with another. In such cases, states need to seek authority from the LOSC. If
a dispute arises concerning the interpretation or application of the LOSC fisheries
provisions, or from the exploitation and/or management of fisheries resources, the
151

See A. Tahindro, "Conservation and management of transboundary fish stocks: comments in the light
of the adopting of the 1995 Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks," ODIL 28 (1997), p.50.
152
See http://www.oceanlaw.net/text/index/glossary/htm.
153
The FAO’s effort in addressing reflagging has led to the adoption of the 1993 Compliance
Agreement, which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
154
D. A. Balton, "Strengthening the Law of the Sea: the new agreement on straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks," ODIL 27 (1996), p.132.
155
See J. R. Mack, "International fisheries management: How the U. N. conference on straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks changes the law of fishing on the high seas," California Western
International Law Journal 26 (1996), p.321.
42

LOSC Part XV (Settlement of Disputes) imposes a general obligation on states to
settle their disputes by peaceful means.156 Disputes concerning the particular categories
of species are also included.
Disputes regarding to the exercise of a coastal states’ sovereign rights or
jurisdiction are subject to a binding form of dispute settlement for which the LOSC
provides a set of options for states. 157 They may agree to settle the dispute by
themselves or by the conciliation procedures provided in Annex V. The compulsory
settlement options include: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, an
arbitral tribunal, a special arbitral tribunal, and the International Court of Justice.158
Each court or tribunal can render binding decisions.
Since the dispute settlement mechanism created under the LOSC is
compulsory, states are obliged to choose at least one of them when they sign and/or
ratify the LOSC. When states have not done so, they are deemed to have accepted the
mechanism of arbitration.159 However an important exception to this general rule is
allowed by Article 297 (3)(a):
Dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this
Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2,
except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to sovereign rights with respect
to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including
its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting
capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions
established in its conservation and management laws and regulations.

Through this provision, coastal states are not obliged to submit disputes relating to the
exercise of sovereign rights with respect to living resources in the EEZ to any form of
compulsory dispute settlement procedures. The exercise of the coastal state’s
discretionary power is also protected by the fact that the conciliation commission shall
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not substitute its discretion for that of the coastal state.160 However, a coastal state
would be obliged to submit certain specific disputes to conciliation—those arising
from an allegation found in Article 297 (3) (b):
Where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1 of this Part, a
dispute shall be submitted to conciliation under Annex V, section 2, at the request
of any party to the dispute, when it is alleged that: (i) a coastal State has
manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to ensure through proper
conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone is not seriously endangered; (ii) a
coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request of another State,
the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living resources with respect to
stocks which that other State is interested in fishing; or (iii) a coastal State has
arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, under articles 62, 69 and 70 and under
the terms and conditions established by the coastal State consistent with this
Convention, the whole or part of the surplus it has declared to exist.

These limitations and exceptions have left many “ambiguities which could be
interpreted by each of the different Parties to ensuring disputes for their own
advantage.”161 Consequently, the LOSC provisions for compulsory dispute settlement
regarding marine living resources do not provide a sufficient framework for fisheries
disputes.

Conclusion
As a landmark of the international community and a “Constitution of the Oceans”, the
LOSC is significant in many aspects, such as it has accommodated the competing
interests of all nations, and set up a universal legal framework governing all aspects of
ocean uses. A unique method was adopted by drafting its regime with an interrelated
and an integrated package, which embodies rights and obligations within a single
document. The intent of this “package” is to make it impossible for states to claim
rights without undertaking responsibilities.162
The LOSC fisheries regimes also reflect this approach and balance the rights
and obligations of states for the exploitation and conservation of fisheries resources.
By so doing, the LOSC fisheries regimes have brought a fundamental jurisdictional
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shift to the majority of world fisheries resources, and impacted states’ practice on
fisheries management.163
However, with respect to the conservation and management of fisheries
resources, the LOSC articulates clearly the primary rights and interests of coastal states,
but it expresses most of their obligations in a vague manner, and provides coastal states
a free hand with respect to the fish stocks existing in their EEZs, such as the discretion
of coastal states in setting up and allocating TAC, and the lack of standard for the use
of scientific data. This flexibility has resulted in non-specific standards for coastal
states to discharge their obligations. The management of stocks that migrate across
boundaries is more in the nature of a symbolic obligation than an enforceable
regulation, so the rational exploitation and effective management of these stocks are
largely left to the fishing states.164
The LOSC zoning approach allows states to exercise jurisdictions accordingly
and to carry out appropriate management measures in different zones. From the
perspective of law and diplomacy, the LOSC has effectively drawn a demarcation line
separating the EEZ and the high seas. From the perspective of fish, however, the
LOSC has not given enough consideration to the biological characteristics of various
species.165 Under the zoning approach, most fisheries resources are subject to coastal
states’ control, but fish have no respect for jurisdictional boundaries and keep on
crossing national boundaries at their will. Since it is impossible to confine fish to
human-made boundaries, fisheries management, in many respects, has to deal with
maritime boundary issues and international cooperation between/among coastal states.
Another deficiency of the LOSC zoning approach is that the fisheries regimes
applying to the EEZs and the high seas differ. The decisive difference is that there is no
overriding authority to curb overfishing on the high seas. The limited provisions of the
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LOSC regarding high seas fishing are not specific enough to protect fisheries resources.
The inconsistency and incompatibility of management measures has resulted in
conflict between coastal states and high seas fishing states, and has led to inefficiency
of fisheries conservation and management in many areas in the world.166 Attempts to
manage high seas resources in several regions through international commissions have
not been very successful.167
A particular area that suffered from this deficiency is the management of
straddling stocks and HMS, which are found within and beyond the EEZs. With the
EEZ becoming the norm for state practice, many DWFNs have found it more difficult
and costly to get access to coastal fishing grounds. This situation, combined with other
factors, such as advances in fishing technology, has led to a substantial increase in
fishing effort in many high seas areas that encompass straddling stocks and HMS. The
result is the dramatic decline of these stocks, and the management of these stocks has
become one of the most pressing issues in the post-LOSC era. In response to this crisis,
some coastal states have unilaterally claimed a special right in the area beyond the 200
nm limit to protect their interests in straddling stocks and HMS.168
The inherited weaknesses of the LOSC have made its fisheries regimes
subject to the political will and capacity of coastal states and high seas fishing states to
conduct management practice. In this sense, the LOSC has not been successful in
providing an effective framework to address the global fisheries crisis. The LOSC has
also stopped short of providing mechanisms for cooperation and enforcement in
establishing management measures for the high seas fisheries. Crucial developments
have taken place in the post-LOSC era to improve its fisheries framework. These will
be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 THE POST-LOSC FISHERIES INSTRUMENTS
Introduction
In the previous chapter it was found that the LOSC failed to provide an effective
regime for the conservation and management of fisheries resources. Since the early
1990s the international community, under the auspices of the UNGA and COFI, has
made considerable efforts to fill the gaps in the LOSC fisheries framework. These
efforts have yielded a number of legally binding and non-binding fisheries
instruments,1 including the Compliance Agreement adopted in 1993 by the FAO, the
Fish Stocks Agreement adopted in 1995 by the UN, the Code of Conduct adopted in
1995 by the FAO, and the IPOA-IUU adopted in 2001 by the FAO.2
This chapter will examine the aforementioned instruments (post-LOSC
fisheries instruments).3 The focus will be on their general principles and management
measures in order to illustrate the area of improvement to the LOSC fisheries regime
and their role in addressing the global fisheries crisis. It will be shown that these postLOSC fisheries instruments have addressed the LOSC weaknesses in different ways,
and have substantially improved the LOSC fisheries regime in many areas. They have
also improved the international fisheries management framework.

The Compliance Agreement
For a long time, high seas fisheries lacked an effective institutional framework and an
overarching jurisdictional authority that could take actions and impose management
measures on states.4 Agenda 21 states that:
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management of high seas fisheries, including the adoption, monitoring and
enforcement of effective conservation measures, is inadequate in many areas and
some resources are overutilized. There are problems of unregulated fishing,
overcapitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to escape controls,
insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and lack of sufficient
cooperation between States. Action by States whose nationals and vessels fish on
the high seas, as well as cooperation at the bilateral, subregional, regional and
global levels is essential particularly for highly migratory species and straddling
5
stocks.

To fill the gap of lack of an authority to manage high seas fisheries, regional fisheries
management organisations (RFMOs) emerged. 6 As the management measures of
RFMOs are binding only on member states and fishing vessels flying the flags of such
states,7 it became common for fishing vessels to deregister from member states and
reregister with non-member states to avoid control of their activities. 8 Reflagging
seriously undermines international conservation and management efforts. In the face of
the worsening and depressing reflagging issue, and in response to international concern
and urgent calls such as the Cancun Declaration9 and Agenda 21, the FAO took on the
Convention on the Law of the Sea and East Asia, ed. D. Kim, et al., East and West Studies (Seoul:
Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1996), pp.167-182.
5
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responsibility to address the reflagging issue and this led to the adoption of the
Compliance Agreement in 1993.10 It came into effect on 24 April 2002.11
As a binding instrument, the Compliance Agreement applies to “all fishing
vessels that are used or intended for fishing on the high seas.”12 However, vessels less
than 24 metres are excluded from the application of some detailed administrative
provisions, such as the maintenance of records and the issuance of authorisations to
fish.13 This exemption has been most controversial and has delayed the acceptance of
the Compliance Agreement by a number of coastal states, particularly in the South
Pacific Ocean, on the grounds that it creates a significant loophole in the application of
the agreement.14
The Compliance Agreement has two main elements: increased responsibilities
of flag states, and the exchange of information about high seas fishing activities. These
elements seek to ensure that all vessels operating on the high seas are properly
authorised and that national and international records of such vessels are maintained.
These two elements are discussed below.

Flag State Responsibility
The term “flag state responsibility” evolved from “flag state control” under the
LOSC,15 however the concept had never been spelt out in any agreement of global
application before the Compliance Agreement. 16 Article III of the Compliance
Agreement comprises eight provisions specifying aspects of a flag state’s obligations
10
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in controlling its vessels on the high seas. The first three contain the key requirements
and the most significant principles for a state to authorise fishing vessels to fly its flag.
First, a flag state is to ensure that its fishing vessels do not undermine the
effectiveness of “international conservation and management measures”.17 To this end,
it shall not allow its vessels to fish on the high seas unless it has authorised them to do
so.18 In other words, a state shall make sure its vessels fishing on the high seas are
properly registered with a licence.
Second, a flag state is not to authorise a vessel to fish on the high seas unless
it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities under the Compliance Agreement.19
States must actively oversee their vessels and decide on a case-by-case basis whether
to authorise any vessel to fish on the high seas. This provision puts pressure on the flag
state to improve its competence and authority in controlling its distant water fishing
vessels.
Third, states are not to grant an authorisation to any fishing vessel that
previously has undermined the effectiveness of international conservation and
management measures. 20 This provision limits the ability of vessels with a bad
compliance record to “shop around” for a new flag. Exceptions are allowed for the
legitimate change of vessels’ ownership.21 However, it might be difficult to distinguish
a “legitimate” reflagging from an “illegitimate” one, because an owner of a fishing
vessel would not announce his intent of reflagging as a means of avoiding
management measures.22
Article III (6) and (7) of the Compliance Agreement requires fishing vessels
to be properly marked in a way that permits ready identification, and to provide their
flag states with required information on their operations to enable the latter to fulfil
their obligations under the Compliance Agreement. This requirement may assist states
in monitoring high seas fishing operations and in detecting violations of agreed
17
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conservation measures. Such information includes vessels’ areas of operations,
catching and landing data. This is crucial for effective fisheries management, and
meaningful in increasing the transparency of high seas fishing.
Article III (4) to (8) and Article IV set down the requirements for enforcement
measures including sanction and penalties. The sanctions must be of “sufficient gravity
as to be effective in securing compliance with the requirements of the Compliance
Agreement and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from their illegal
activities.” For serious offences, the refusal, suspension, or withdrawal of the
authorisation can be applied to the fishing vessels in question.23

Cooperation for the Free Flow of Information
The lack of information about high seas fishing has long been an obstacle to effective
fisheries management.24 To resolve this issue, the Compliance Agreement promotes
the free flow of information on high seas fishing activities. Article IV of the
Compliance Agreement requires states to establish and maintain a record for their
fishing vessels authorised to fish on the high seas, and the information to be included
in this record is specified in Article VI. This obligation is reinforced by Article V
where international cooperation is emphasised and Article VI which is designed to
promote adequate flow of information for high seas fisheries by providing specific
requirements.
International cooperation is required for the purpose of enhancing high seas
fisheries management through the collection and distribution of relevant data. The
Compliance Agreement sets down the requirement in Article V to assist the flag state
to achieve its obligations. Article V (1) requires states to exchange information on
fishing vessels’ activities, which would help them to identify the fishing vessels flying
their flags that are reported to have engaged in activities undermining international
conservation and management measures.
Article V (2) requires port states to notify flag states of fishing vessels
believed to be undermining international conservation and management measures, and,
if appropriate, to investigate whether such activities are indeed contrary to the
Compliance Agreement.
23
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Article V (3) requires parties to seek agreements to promote the objectives of
the Compliance Agreement. Cooperative actions among all parties, including port
states, are crucial to ensure the free flow of information and that fishing vessels abide
by the terms of the Compliance Agreement. Each flag state is to shoulder the
responsibility for its high seas fishing vessels and to cooperate in exchanging
information.25
The Compliance Agreement also requires states to provide detailed records to
the FAO on the vessels they authorise to fish on the high seas.26 Flag states are obliged
to inform the FAO promptly about violations by their fishing vessels, including action
taken against those vessels that undermine the effectiveness of international
conservation and management measures. 27 The FAO is required to circulate this
information to other parties and RFMOs. Such information could be used by a coastal
state to exclude a vessel with a poor record from its EEZ. Thus this information is
expected to play an important role in detecting unauthorised fishing on the high seas.28
Parties are to exchange information they have about the activities of the vessels that
violate management measures. Other states may draw a flag state’s attention to
violations by its vessels and may also provide a report to the FAO. The FAO may then
circulate this information to other contracting parties, provided that the flag state
concerned has an opportunity to comment on the allegations.29

Prospects for Implementation
The Compliance Agreement represents improvements on the general provisions of the
LOSC regarding high seas fisheries. It marks a distinct move away from the freedom
of fishing on the high seas, and provides, for the first time, regulations on high seas
fishing.30 The Compliance Agreement also sets out, for the first time, exactly what the
responsibilities of flag states are regarding their fishing vessels. The Compliance
Agreement also, for the first time, makes provisions for a databank on all vessels
authorised to fish on the high seas. The operation of the databank, though it relies
25

The Compliance Agreement, Article VI (1).
Parties are required to regularly update or amend the information about their authorised fishing
vessels. See The Compliance Agreement, Articles VI (1), (2), (3) and (5).
27
Ibid., Article VI (8) (a).
28
See Edeson, "Legal aspects of the collection of fisheries data," p.6.
29
See The Compliance Agreement, Article VI (8) (b).
30
Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management: The Evolution of Ocean Governance, p.276.
26

52

heavily on the circulation of information supplied voluntarily by parties to the
Compliance Agreement, should prove useful in the management of the high seas
fisheries.31
However, certain criteria will need to be met if control over reflagging is to be
effective. First, all states that are involved in high seas fishing have to be party to the
Compliance Agreement. Unless this happens, vessel owners will simply shift their
place of registration to a state not party to the Compliance Agreement.
Second, the Compliance Agreement requires flag states to impose strict
measures on vessels prior to authorisation and to improve the monitoring of their
vessels. This is vital for the effective implementation of the Compliance Agreement;
however, this obligation is rather demanding and challenging. Therefore, the success of
the Compliance Agreement will be linked to the willingness and capacity of flag states
to take effective action in implementing management measures.
Third, the authorisation process will need to be transparent and to be
monitored at the international level to ensure vessels that breach international
conservation measures cannot shop around for new flags.
As of July 2004, the Compliance Agreement has 29 states party to it.32 These
ratifications represent an increased acknowledgement about the essence of the issues
the Compliance Agreement addresses, and the general acceptance of the management
measures of the Compliance Agreement for high seas fisheries. However, they are
mostly coastal states, but not DWFNs. This would suggest that further commitment is
needed from the DWFNs. Only when these major fishing states become party to it can
the Compliance Agreement be expected to become more effective in the control of
high seas fishing vessels and the conservation of high seas fisheries resources.
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Coastal states may be in a stronger position to take effective compliance control, because most vessels
that operate on the high seas also operate for part of the time in coastal state waters. To date, no
assessment is available of the operation on this account.
32
The 29 states that had ratified the Compliance Agreement include Argentina, Australia, Barbados,
Benin, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Egypt, European Community, Georgia, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mexico, Myanmar, Namibia, Norway, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Seychells Sweden, Tanzania,
United States of America, Uruguay. See http://www/fao.org/Legal/treaties/012s-e.htm (accessed 22
September 2004).
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The Fish Stocks Agreement
The finalisation of the LOSC started a rush to establish EEZs.33 In exercising their
primary rights and jurisdiction over EEZ resources, coastal states promulgated
stringent regulations and imposed access fees on foreign vessels fishing in their
EEZs. 34 Many foreign fishing vessels, unwilling to cope with the regulations and
access fees of coastal states, had to look for new fishing grounds outside the EEZs, and
most ended up on the high seas.35 The introduction of EEZs, therefore, had the effect
of increased fishing by DWFNs on the high seas. These displaced fishing vessels
substantially increased the high seas fishing effort, and the capture from the high seas
increased from 5% of the world total catch to 8%-10%.36 Although it may be argued
the increased capture from the high seas fishing was partly due to the advances in
fishing technology, the EEZ regime and the displaced distant water fisheries fleet takes
the larger account of this increased figure.
The intensified fishing effort increased the pressure on the high seas fish
stocks and resulted in acute overfishing in many parts of the world.37 Fish stocks of
commercial value beyond national zones—especially straddling stocks and HMS,
which migrate beyond coastal state jurisdiction—were most often subject to
overfishing by high seas fishing fleets.38 As a consequence, conflicts arose between
coastal states and DWFNs: the targeted species for high seas fishing vessels are mainly
straddling stocks and HMS to which coastal states claimed the primary rights, whereas
DWFNs insisted on the free fishing rights on the high seas.39 The increase in fisheries
33

Many coastal states declared 200 nm EEZs prior to the conclusion of the LOSC, and on 10 December
1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 119 states signed the LOSC.
34
See Moore, Coastal state requirements for foreign fishing, vol. 21(Rev.3), FAO Legislative Study
(Rome: FAO, 1988).
35
See J.P. Levy and G.G. Schram, UN Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks—
Selected Documents 1996 (Doc. A/CONF/164.INF/4 dated 15June 1993).
36
The problems have been taken up in regional fisheries organisations, such as the North Atlantic
Fisheries Organisation. They were also reviewed in several forums including the International
Conference on Responsible Fishing held in Cancun in May 1992. The conference adopted the
Declaration of Cancun, containing an agreement “to promote, within the legal framework provided by
the LOSC, effective international cooperation towards the achievement of rational and sustainable
management and conservation of the living resources of the high seas.” See UN, The Law of the Sea:
Practice of States at the Time of Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (New York: UN Publication, 1994).
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1976 to 8.5 million tonnes in 2000. See SOFIA 2000, Part 1, Box 3.
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See Chapter 1 for discussions on straddling stocks and HMS.
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This has resulted in the famous turbot conflict in 1995 between Canada and Spain. See C. C. Joyner
and A. Gustedt, "The 1995 turbot war: lessons for the Law of the Sea," IJMCL 11 (1996), pp.425-458.
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conflicts and the depletion of high seas resources forced the international community
to seek solutions.40 This effort eventually gave birth to the Fish Stocks Agreement on 4
December 1995. 41 The Fish Stocks Agreement came into force on 11 December
2001.42
The Fish Stocks Agreement consists of a preamble, 13 parts, 50 articles, and 2
annexes. It aims at achieving long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling
stocks and HMS. To this end, it provides details on the LOSC provisions on straddling
stocks and HMS and lays down strict conservation and management measures as well
as a list of principles, including broad environmental concepts such as sustainability,
and biodiversity.43 Some follow directly from Articles 61, 62 and 119 of the LOSC.
The Fish Stocks Agreement emphases some important existing management
measures such as the development of selective and environmental safe fishing gear and
techniques (Article 5 (f), (g)); enhancement of the RFMOs’ functions in cooperation
(Articles 8-10); emphasis on flag state responsibility (Article 18, 19); and exchange of
information on fishing activities (Article 5 (j)). The Fish Stocks Agreement also
introduces a few new management concepts,44 such as the precautionary approach;45
compatibility of management measures;

46

and a cooperative framework for

conservation and its enforcement. 47 Through these stipulations, the Fish Stocks
Agreement has improved the LOSC fisheries framework, and developed international
See also G. Hewison, "Balancing the freedom of fishing and coastal state jurisdiction," in Developments
in International Fisheries Law, ed. E. Hey (1999), p.185.
40
Proposed solutions focus on: striking a balance between the rights and interests between coastal states
and high seas fishing states; improving the efficiency of the high seas enforcement system to protect the
fisheries resources more effectively; the rights and obligations of high seas fishing states and that of
other states. See Hewison, "Balancing the freedom of fishing and coastal state jurisdiction," pp.161-192.
41
The full text is available from: http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/index.htm. For the conferences that led
to the finalisation of the Fish Stocks Agreement, see Anderson, "Current development: public
international law."
42
The Fish Stocks Agreement has 52 ratifications as of 16 July 2004, and most of them are coastal
states. See http://www/un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
43
See The Fish Stocks Agreement, 1995 Article 2. The Fish Stocks Agreement covers species classified
in Annex I of the LOSC and associated or dependent stocks. However, it does not apply to anadromous
stocks or marine mammals, even though their sustainability is a cause of concern. The catadrumous
species is regulated in practice only within EEZs.
44
Hayashi concludes that the Fish Stocks Agreement improves the LOSC in four major aspects:
facilitating implementation; strengthening provisions; developing rules and principles; and introducing
new concepts and principles that supplement the LOSC. See M. Hayashi, "The 1995 UN fish stocks
agreement and the law of the sea," in Orders for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, ed. D. Vidas and
W. ∅streng (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p.38.
45
The Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 5 (c), 6, and Annex II.
46
Ibid., Article 7.
47
Ibid., Article 5 (e).
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fisheries law particularly for high seas fisheries.48 Some of these major management
measures are examined below.

Precautionary Approach
The Fish Stocks Agreement introduces the precautionary approach in Article 5 (c), and
focuses on it in Article 6 and Annex II. Annex II of the Fish Stocks Agreement deals
specifically with the guidelines for the application of precautionary reference points.
The precautionary approach originates from the Rio Declaration,49 and it is accepted as
the proper course of decision-making in handling situations where adequate scientific
information is absent.50
States are called on to implement the precautionary approach for the
conservation and management of fisheries resources.51 They are required to collect and
share the best scientific information available and to improve techniques in handling
risk and uncertainty. This requirement is a major attempt to remedy the defects in the
LOSC provisions regarding the “best scientific evidence available”. More importantly,
“[t]he adoption of this approach represents a major shift in fisheries management, as it
reverses the burden of proof between conservation and exploitation objectives.” 52
Where the burden of proof traditionally fell on those who seek to impose management
measures, it may now be placed on those who benefit from a particular practice: the
beneficiaries will have to prove that their practices will not threaten stocks or the
48

The Fish Stocks Agreement contains principles on the ‘cutting edge’ of fisheries management. See E.
Hey, "Global fisheries instruments adopted in the Post-UNCLOS III period," in Developments in
International Fisheries Law, ed. E. Hey (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.4. See also S.
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(A/CONF.164/35, 1995), p.1.
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the UNCED besides Agenda 21. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states: “[i]n order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.”
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the living marine resources of the world’s oceans and seas.” For an analysis, see D. Freestone and E.
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Law International, 1996), p.260.
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environment.53
States are also called on to apply the guidelines of Annex II to determine
stock-specific reference points on the basis of collected data. 54 To this end, detailed
guidelines to adopt the approach, such as guidelines on reference points; the status of
both targeted and not-targeted species; new exploratory fisheries; and management
measures on an emergency basis, are provided within the Fish Stocks Agreement.55 By
requiring states to adopt the precautionary approach, and offering them comprehensive
guidelines on how to apply this approach, the Fish Stocks Agreement has significantly
improved the LOSC framework applicable to fisheries management.56
However, there is some contention about the distinction between a
precautionary approach and a precautionary principle. 57 Debates arise over the
implementation of the precautionary approach, such as what exactly it should entail,
the extent of its application, the degree of the precaution, the standard for the
precautionary effort, and the cost of application.58 Concerns are also expressed about
the overuse/abuse of the precautionary approach on fishing practices.59 These debates
reflect the wide scope of the precautionary approach; at the same time the debates
suggest that the implementation of this approach has certain limitations.60

Compatibility of Conservation Measures
Another important achievement of the Fish Stocks Agreement is the requirement for
compatibility on conservation and management measures for straddling stocks and
HMS within areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas. In recognition of
53
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the unity of straddling stocks and HMS, the Fish Stocks Agreement applies to both
EEZs and the high seas.61
Article 3 of The Fish Stocks Agreement extends the application of the
conservation measures for straddling stocks and HMS contained in Article 6 and 7 to
stocks within areas under national jurisdiction. 62 This requirement, crystallised in
Article 7 (1) and (2), ensures that any conservation and management measures
established by coastal states will not be undermined by states fishing on the high
seas.63 It undoubtedly legitimises the extension of coastal states’ sovereign rights to the
high seas regarding specific fish stocks.64 This extension significantly improves the
effect of the Fish Stocks Agreement, though its provisions are to be interpreted and
applied in a manner consistent with the LOSC. 65 To achieve compatible measures,
coastal states and DWFNs are required to cooperate.66 This cooperation is to take into
account any existing agreed measures, the biological unity, characteristics of the stocks,
the respective dependence of coastal states and high seas fishing states, and the impact
of management measures on the resources as a whole. 67 As these guidelines retain
coastal states’ sovereign rights, they have the potential to limit the Fish Stocks
Agreement in achieving a holistic approach to the conservation of the straddling stocks
and HMS.
Under the Fish Stocks Agreement, states are required to endeavour to agree on
61
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compatible measures. Articles 7 (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) provide procedures in case no
agreement can be reached between states concerned, as well as a requirement
regarding the exchange of information on management measures.68 The requirement
for compatibility of conservation measures is a considerable improvement in providing
guidance to states’ practice and it represents a significant development in the
international fisheries legal framework.69

Flag State Responsibility
Regarding the requirements on flag state responsibility, the Fish Stocks Agreement
improves the existing regime of the LOSC, incorporates the principles of the
Compliance Agreement, and further develops them in a number of ways. First, the Fish
Stocks Agreement abandons the exemption, contained in the Compliance Agreement,
on fishing vessels less than 24 metres from the application of management measures.70
It stipulates flag state responsibility in a much stronger manner. Article 18 (2) makes it
clear that a state is to authorise its flag to a vessel “only where it is able to exercise
effectively its responsibilities” on the vessels (emphasis added). Second, the Fish
Stocks Agreement also articulates flag state responsibilities by setting up specific
requirements to enhance the management of high seas fisheries, including:
• to ensure vessels flying their flags do not conduct unauthorised fishing within
areas under the national jurisdiction of other states (Article 18. (3) (b) (iv));
• to record and report their catches and vessel information (Article 18 (3)(e));
• to verify the catch of targeted and non-targeted species through measures such as
observer programs, inspection schemes (Article 18 (3)(f));
• to regulate fishing vessels by licensing, authorisation or permits;
68
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• to implement observer schemes (Article 18 (3) (g) and (ii));
• to comply with bycatch reduction measures (Article 18 (3), (g), (i));
• to prohibit transhipment of catch so as to prevent vessels from undermining
management measures (Article 18 (3), (g), (h)); and
• to adhere to an agreed system of monitoring, control and surveillance (Article 18
(4)).

Cooperation for Conservation
Cooperation, as the most important stipulation in the Fish Stocks Agreement regime, is
given great attention throughout this instrument. A cooperation framework is essential
to achieve the objective of the agreement. To give effect to cooperation, the Fish
Stocks Agreement set out general principles and key rules in Article 8. Cooperation
between coastal states and DWFNs can be undertaken directly or through appropriate
RFMOs, and states are provided with two options to participate in cooperation. They
are encouraged to become members of, or parties to, RFMOs, or agree to apply the
measures of the organisation.71
The Fish Stocks Agreement makes it clear that states are entitled to have
access to a fishery only if they are members, or participants, of a relevant organisation
or arrangement, or they agree to apply the conservation and management measures of
the relevant organisation.72 The effect of this provision is to exclude those states which
are not members of the existing RFMOs, or do not agree to apply their measures, from
fishing straddling stocks and HMS in the areas concerned, thus limiting their freedom
to fish on the high seas.73 The Fish Stocks Agreement makes sure that the terms of
participation shall not preclude any state with a real interest in the fisheries concerned
from being members or participants.74 This is significant in preventing states with a
real interest from being excluded from membership of regional organisations and in
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achieving effective management throughout the particular region.75
In a case where there is no existing RFMO or arrangement, states are required
to establish one, and guidelines as to its scope and the functions of both new and
existing organisations are spelt out. The Fish Stocks Agreement also provides a set of
rules detailing minimum requirements of the functions of such RFMOs, factors that
need to be taken into account when determining the rights of new members and
standards of transparency for the organisations and arrangements.76 The functions and
responsibilities of RFMOs include determining the allocation of the allowable catch
and fishing effort.77
The Fish Stocks Agreement provides guidance to implement the “duty to
cooperate” for stocks regulated by Articles 63 (2) and 64 of the LOSC. By requiring
states to cooperate and strengthening the role of RFMOs by means of membership and
access, the Fish Stocks Agreement has greatly improved the effectiveness of the
conservation and management of these two types of stock. These new rules are
tangible steps towards the objectives and principles set out in the LOSC, and they have
improved international fisheries law.

Cooperation in Enforcement
In regards to compliance with, and enforcement of, conservation and management
measures adopted by RFMOs or an arrangement, the Fish Stocks Agreement clearly
recognises the primary role of flag states in the enforcement process. The obligations
of implementation and enforcement it imposes on flag states are similar to, but rather
more detailed than, those of the Compliance Agreement.
Article 19 requires flag states to enforce conservation and management
measures regardless of where they occur.78 States are required to act promptly and
efficiently on any investigation and to take judicial proceedings against alleged
violations. 79 The action includes physical inspection, documentation, report of
violations, and detention of the vessel in question upon sufficient evidence until all
75
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outstanding sanctions have been complied with.80 The subsequent sanctions are to be
“adequate in severity to be effective in securing compliance and to discourage
violations wherever they occur and shall deprive its offenders of the benefits accruing
from their illegal activities.”81 Further, the Fish Stocks Agreement requires other states
to cooperate with flag states in enforcement.82 This is, again, an obvious improvement
in the enforcement of conservation measures.
In the high seas area covered by RFMOs or arrangements, schemes are to be
established where one member can board and inspect vessels of any state party to the
Fish Stocks Agreement regardless of whether or not the state is a member of the
RFMO.83 The Fish Stocks Agreement requires that boarding and inspection must be in
accordance with procedures established by RFMOs.84 If a vessel has engaged in any
activity contrary to regional conservation and management measures, the inspecting
state may secure evidence and promptly inform the flag state. 85 The latter shall
investigate without delay and, if the evidence so warrants, take enforcement action, or
authorise the inspecting state to investigate.86 In the later case, the inspecting state
needs to communicate to the flag state the results of the investigation, or take further
enforcement action specified by the flag state.87
If violations occur, the inspectors may remain on board and secure evidence
and, if appropriate, bring the vessel to the nearest port.88 The agreement also provides
that where a vessel on the high seas is reasonably believed to have engaged in
unauthorised fishing in an EEZ, the flag state shall investigate the matter at the request
of the coastal state and may authorise the latter to board and inspect the vessel.89
The Fish Stocks Agreement, like the Compliance Agreement, provides for
80
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port states control, but goes further by specifying that a port state may inspect vessels
voluntarily in its ports and may prohibit landing of catches taken in a manner that
undermines the effectiveness of conservation and management measures.90 In general,
port states have not only a right but also a duty to take action to promote the
effectiveness of such measures.91
The Fish Stocks Agreement provides a new enforcement regime based on
information sharing, assistance in making prosecutions and cooperative investigations.
This regime is significant in a number of aspects:
• it represents an important step forward in ensuring that flag states and their
vessels comply with international standards and enforcement measures;
• it elaborates the concepts of flag state responsibility and duty to cooperate, and
gives non-flag states, in the context of regional agreements, a range of authority
to board and inspect vessels of other states that are parties to the agreement;92
• it has greatly enhanced coastal state responsibility for EEZ enforcement; and
• it also considerably strengthens the coastal states’ role in enforcing conservation
and management measures for fishing vessels on the high seas.93
Overall, the Fish Stocks Agreement spells out the broad rights and obligations under
the LOSC Articles 63 (2), 64, and 116 to 120, and recognises the “interests” of coastal
states in Article 116 (b). It sets out a wide range of detailed measures for the
conservation and management of straddling stocks and HMS—it has been commented
that it “provides the flesh on the bone” of the LOSC provisions,94 “the most detailed of
their kind yet found in an international legal text.”95 Reflections of these comments are
found in Articles 5, 6 and 7 where the Fish Stocks Agreement provides the most
90
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specific requirements on the obligations of states and international standards for
fisheries management.96
As well as elaborating on and supplementing the LOSC regimes on straddling
stocks and HMS, the Fish Stocks Agreement goes much further by stipulating a range
of new principles.97 In this sense, it represents a significant development in fisheries
management. However, whether the agreement will lead to improved management of
straddling stocks and HMS and satisfy the interests of coastal states will depend on
whether both RFMOs and coastal states can adopt measures that are compatible.
To date, the Fish Stocks Agreement has 52 ratifications.

98

Like the

Compliance Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement is dependent for its success on
wide ratification by high seas fishing states, as well as by relevant coastal states. If it is
widely ratified and accepted not only by coastal states, but also DWFNs, it should
improve the effectiveness on cooperation and enforcement. It should also reduce the
“free rider” problem and make it difficult for a state to opt out of measures adopted by
RFMOs.99

Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
The concept of “responsible fisheries” was formally raised in April 1991 at the FAO
COFI.100 However, the Code of Conduct originated from a call from the Declaration of
Cancún on the FAO to draft an international code of conduct for responsible fishing.101
The Declaration of Cancún emphasised “[t]he vital need for fishing to continue and
develop within a comprehensive and balanced system under the concept of responsible
fishing”. 102 The Code was adopted by the FAO on 31 October 1995 as a globally
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applicable, non-binding instrument for responsible fisheries.103 The elaboration of this
voluntary code takes a holistic approach to promoting responsibility in fisheries by
urging structural change in the fisheries sector. It provides the umbrella for the FAO
fisheries program and a reference point for the work of national fishery administrations.

Non-binding Guidelines
Although the Code of Conduct is not legally binding, it has a close relationship with
the LOSC and other international fisheries instruments. 104 First, the Code is to be
interpreted and applied in conformity with the LOSC.105 Second, it contains provisions
that have already been made binding in the Compliance Agreement.106 Third, the Code
is also to be interpreted and applied “in a manner consistent with” the relevant
provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement, in accordance with other applicable rules of
international law, and “in the light of” certain declarations and instruments.107 This
interrelatedness enables the Code to draw support from various binding instruments: it
supplements other fisheries-related instruments and provides a policy framework for
responsible fisheries.108
The Code encompasses all aspects of fisheries management within its 12
articles and 2 annexes.109 It has very broad and comprehensive scope dealing not just
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with high seas fisheries but with all aspects of fishing.110 The Code provides a range of
principles and standards for responsible fisheries to ensure the effective conservation,
management, and development of fisheries resources.111
The advantage of being a non-binding instrument is that the Code does not
have to wait for ratification as legally binding instruments do. As Moore points out, the
non-binding status of the Code serves well its purpose to present a series of principles
for responsible fisheries that can be drawn upon in the formulation of national
legislation as well as binding international agreements and less formal arrangements.112

General Principles for Responsible Fisheries
The Code has 10 objectives that seek to lay down global standards, and comprehensive
principles to promote responsible fisheries in areas under national jurisdiction and on
the high seas.113 Its main articles deal with fisheries management (covering objectives,
framework and procedures, data gathering, the precautionary approach, management
measures and implementation), fishing operations (including duties of flag states and
port states, the encouragement of sustainable development, protection of the marine
environment, the maintenance of biodiversity, and the safety of fishermen),
aquaculture development, the integration of fisheries into coastal zone management,
post-harvest practices and trade and fisheries research.
To achieve its objectives for responsible fisheries, the Code sets out 19
general principles in Article 6, and deals with them in six discrete parts throughout
Articles 7 to 12. These principles contain many important qualifications and
restrictions that to some extent deserve more independent chapters.114 These principles
110
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are set to:
• conserve aquatic ecosystems to ensure effective fisheries management;115
• promote sustainable fisheries for present and future generations;116
• prevent overfishing to ensure that levels of fishing are commensurate with the
sustainable development of fisheries resources;117
• encourage bilateral and multilateral cooperation for better management;118
• apply the precautionary approach to fisheries management;119
• control destructive fishing gear and practices;120
• establish effective mechanisms for monitoring, control and surveillance
(MCS);121
• ensure fishing vessels’ authorisation is consistent with international law;122
• promote effective management of fisheries resources throughout their range of
distribution with compatible measures;123 and
• prevent fisheries disputes.124
The Code addresses all issues related to fisheries and creates a broad structure and
multiple objectives. Its “sweeping fashion” has been criticised as having a lack of
priority and specificity, as the Code treats all its objectives as being equally important.
However, it provides sufficient flexibility for states to incorporate its guidelines and
principles according to their circumstances. First, the achievement of the principles and
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and Related Matters (FAO COFI/2001/Inf. 10) FAO, 26 February-2 March 2001, available from
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standards of the Code requires appropriate technical and financial resources, which
vary from state to state due to different economic situations. Second, administrative
consideration and political will towards international fisheries instruments are also
vastly different.

Significance for Application
Although the Code is not a binding instrument, it embodies broad international
consensus and establishes a framework for the resolution of fisheries problems
worldwide. It represents the most complete and up-to-date expression of the principle
of sustainable fisheries development, and it is likely to have a substantial impact on
fisheries management at both international and national levels.125 If it is agreed that the
LOSC provides a comprehensive legal framework for the utilisation and governance of
the oceans, then it is fair to say that the Code offers comprehensive non-binding
guidelines for the utilisation and management of fisheries resources.
The Code has crystallised the concept of “responsible fisheries” and made it a
widely adopted norm in fisheries management. This is evidenced from conference
reports and references from various kinds of documents concluded since the adoption
of the Code. Recognising the impact of fishing activities on ecosystems, it provides a
holistic approach to fisheries management by incorporating an ecosystem-based
approach as well as providing basic principles and guidelines.126 These principles and
guidelines help states to develop policies for fisheries management and, indeed, they
have influenced states’ national plans of action, including the improved
environmentally friendly fishing technologies and practices.127 Doulman observes that
the Code “provides the umbrella for the FAO fisheries work program and a reference
point for the work of national fishery administrations.”128
The Code also sets up an operative mechanism within its framework. It
authorises the FAO to monitor its application and report the effects and developments
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to the COFI.129 This ensures the explicit interpretation and adherence to the principles
of the Code.130 Since 1997, the FAO has made an effort to implement the Code and to
promote coordination amongst its members, for example, by publishing a series of
“Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries”.131 These guidelines are crucial in
supporting the Code, and in assisting states to overcome practical difficulties. The FAO
also encourages cooperation among RFMOs, and holds regional workshops on matters
related to the Code. 132 By conducting surveys among governments and RFMOs
worldwide, the FAO has been monitoring the overall progress in the application of the
Code and has identified areas for improvement.133

IUU Fishing and the IPOA-IUU Measures
Since 1997 the FAO has launched a series of programs to support the implementation
of the Code. One aspect of this program has been the approval and adoption of a group
of four International Plans of Action (IPOAs). 134 These IPOAs were designed to
address specific issues contained in the Code. They flowed directly from the Code as
non-binding instruments and they contributed to fisheries policy framework.
The four IPOAs concern management of fishing capacity, management of
sharks, interaction between seabirds and long line fisheries, and illegal, unregulated,
and unreported (IUU) fishing. Among the four, the most recent and influential one has
been the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IPOA-IUU). It was concluded by the FAO
Committee on fisheries COFI in March 2001 and was endorsed by the 120th Session
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of the FAO Council in June 2001.135

IUU Fishing: Causes and Consequences
“Illegal”, “unreported” and “unregulated” fishing are not new phenomena, though the
terminologies are only recent.136 Illegal fishing violates either domestic or international
law and it often goes undeterred due to a lack of will or capability of states in
enforcing existing rules. 137 It covers fishing without an authorisation, and fishing
which is contrary to the conditions of a valid authorisation.138 Illegal catch reduces
stock size, decreases catches of authorised fishing, and diminishes economic benefits
for legitimate fishermen and their states.139
Unreported fishing is a failure to report or to misreport the taking of fish to
relevant national authorities or RFMOs.

140

Unreported or misreported catch

undermines the accuracy of stock assessments, which are fundamental in determining
TACs. This results in the failure of fisheries management and the overexploitation of
fish stocks.
Unregulated fishing refers to the taking of fish in areas where no management
schemes exist and where fishing is conducted in a manner not consistent with
international fisheries instruments.141 It also refers to the taking of fish by vessels of
states that are not members of RFMOs.142 In situations where fishing activities are not
effectively regulated, the “tragedy of the commons” may manifest itself. In this
135
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scenario, fishermen tend to exploit stocks as quickly and thoroughly as possible based
on the belief that anything left behind will be taken by other fishermen. 143 The
consequence is the collapse of fish stocks.
A variety of reasons are identified as contributing to IUU fishing. In areas
under national jurisdiction, IUU fishing mainly results from inadequate laws, lack of
effective enforcement, and economic incentives. Beyond national jurisdiction it has a
more complex nature and is hard to summarise. In general, it is due to the open access
of high seas fishing; the largely unregulated fish trade;144 the failure of states to give
effect

to,

or

comply

with,

international

fisheries

instruments;

inadequate

implementation of flag state responsibility; and lack of effective cooperation.145 The
improvement of fisheries management regimes and effective enforcement of these
instruments are critical to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.
IUU fishing has a detrimental impact on sustainable fisheries. First, IUU
fishing covers a wide scope as it occurs in both the national and international contexts.
It occurs in zones under national jurisdiction by small-scale and industrial fisheries,
and on the high seas by distant water fisheries vessels. It devastates the management
measures of coastal states in national legislation. IUU fishing also undermines regional
management regimes established by fisheries agreements and threatens the
sustainability of fish stocks. Lastly, it challenges the management effort of the
international community and jeopardises the capacity of international fisheries
instruments.
Second, IUU fishing often results in the collapse of fish stocks and the loss of
social and economic opportunities. This is because the undetected fishing effort by
IUU fishing causes inaccurate fisheries statistics, poor quota setting, and uncertainty
when assessing the status of fish stocks to make management decisions.146 Overfishing
has been identified as a major issue internationally, and integral to this is the concern
about the level of IUU fishing which causes as much damage to fish stocks as
143
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overfishing itself.147 IUU fishing is regarded as the major threat to sustainable fisheries.
According to the FAO, IUU fishing accounts for as much as 30% of the total world
catch.148 To a certain extent, IUU fishing adds considerably to fish mortality that is
never observed. IUU fishing substantially increases fishing effort, undermines
management measures, increases the cost of management, and diminishes the
confidence of stakeholders and legally abiding fishermen, thus causing long-term
damage to fishing communities.149
Third, IUU fishing can lead to a deterioration of relationships between
bordering states. This is because IUU fishermen tend to use states’ boundaries to avoid
being detected or arrested, and to avoid the legal consequences, thus causing tension to
bilateral relations and possible conflict over resources.150 With the emergence of EEZ
in more and more states, the negative impact of IUU fishing has become more
evidenced, and will be discussed further at a later stage in other chapters.

IPOA-IUU Measures
As its title implies, the IPOA-IUU has a single objective: to prevent, deter and
eliminate IUU fishing. To this end, it provides a “toolbox” for all states with a wide
range of measures dealing with all forms of IUU fishing in all fisheries in areas within
and beyond national jurisdiction.151 The IPOA-IUU calls for states and RFMOs to take
steps to combat IUU fishing and it incorporates a series of operational principles.
These

principles

cover

participation

and

coordination,

transparency,

non-

discrimination, and a phased implementation.152
As a “toolbox” dealing with IUU fishing in its various manifestations, the
IPOA-IUU also provides many other measures for states to select according to their
147
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respective situations.
control;

154

measures;

155

153

Such measures include the development of port state

the expansion of World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade-related
capacity-building of the RFMO approach; 156 and the enhancement of

support to developing countries. 157 Recognising that critical, high-priority issues
require particular attention and prompt action, the IPOA-IUU identifies a number of
problem areas of IUU fishing and offers specific measures to address them,
particularly the enhanced flag state responsibility and effective monitoring, control,
and surveillance.158 These measures pinpoint the most current fisheries issues, and they
therefore merit a closer look.
Flag State Responsibilities
As discussed above, the lack of effective control over many fishing vessels by some
flag states is one of the primary causes of IUU fishing, which is linked in many, but
not all instances, to the problem of reflagging.159 The IPOA-IUU calls upon all flag
states to strengthen their responsibilities, ranging from vessel registration, record
153
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keeping, and enforcement, to complex MCS programs such as a satellite-based vessel
monitoring systems (VMS).160
IUU fishing quite often occurs in waters under the control of coastal states, is
conducted by vessels registered in the coastal states themselves, and in particular, is in
the form of underreporting or misreporting of catch. In other cases, foreign vessels fish
without the permission of the coastal state, or fish in violation of the terms of access
granted to them by the coastal state.161 Consequently, coastal states are called upon to
take action against IUU fishing in their EEZs and to refuse vessels with a record of
IUU fishing the right to operate in their waters.162 States are required to impose strict
authorisation on their vessels fishing on the high seas, or in waters under the
jurisdiction of other states, to ensure they comply with international fisheries laws and
regulations.163 Paragraph 47 particularly suggests a broad range of conditions, not all
of which will be applicable in all situations.
States are encouraged to act through regional mechanisms to develop
innovative ways to combat IUU fishing, 164 and to this end a range of actions are
suggested in the IPOA-IUU. 165 These include quota allocations, placement of
observers, licensing systems, limits and restrictions on seasons, gear, stricter rules for
the use of logbooks, and in-port catch recording.166 The IPOA-IUU requires states to
apply international instruments such as the Code of Conduct, the Compliance
Agreement, and the LOSC to regulate fishing practices. It also encourages states to
take measures to prevent reflagging, though it stops short of dealing with the
requirement of “genuine link”.167
Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
The adoption of MCS in fisheries enforcement has been recommended because this
approach takes into consideration biological, marketing and other relevant information

160

IPOA-IUU, Paras. 34-50. Note that many requirements of IPOA-IUU originate from the Compliance
Agreement.
161
See FAO, Stopping Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing FAO, 2001, available from
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/X6729e/X6729e00.HTM (accessed 6 March 2003).
162
IPOA-IUU, Para. 51-51.8.
163
Ibid., Paras 47-50.
164
Ibid., Para. 80.
165
Ibid., Paras 24.4 and 80.9.
166
Details of RFMOs approach to combat IUU fishing are listed throughout Paras 78 to 84.
167
IPOA-IUU, Para. 38.
74

when it is in operation.168 More importantly, IUU fishing often takes place in areas not
covered by MCS.169 Without the assistance of MCS, it is difficult for states to detect
and counter IUU fishing. To solve this problem, the IPOA-IUU provides a wide range
of MCS approaches for states to combat IUU fishing including the VMS, observer
programs, catch documentation schemes, electronic logbooks, inspections of vessels in
port and at sea, and denial of port access.170 Along with the adoption of these measures
by more and more states, it is generally agreed that MCS has played an important role
in reducing the level of IUU fishing, and improved to some extent the efficiency of
fisheries management. 171 However, the application of the MCS operation is quite
challenging due to its high cost, sophisticated technology, and requirements for the
training of personnel.

Implementation of the IPOA-IUU Measures
The adoption of the IPOA-IUU is a significant step towards a particular objective, that
is, to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. The seriousness of IUU fishing makes
the IPOA-IUU a far-reaching instrument in nature and scope to combat IUU fishing.172
The IPOA-IUU provides a series of principles and strategies with important
elements to help states to implement them. It calls upon all states to develop and adopt
national plans of action to achieve the objective of the IPOA-IUU; further, states
should review their national plans of action at least every four years and report to the
FAO on steps they have taken to implement their plans and the IPOA-IUU. 173 The
phased implementation strategy, backed up with detailed measures, appears realistic
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An International Network for Fisheries-Related MCS Activities has been created and countries can
have quick access to certain types of information from its website: http://swr.ucsd.edu/enf/mcs/mcs.htm
(User name: mcs; Password: mcsnet). See also, J. M. Davis, "Monitoring control surveillance and vessel
monitoring system requirements to combat IUU fishing", paper presented at AUS: IUU/2000/14.
172
See Bray, "Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing," pp.115-135.
173
IPOA-IUU, Paras 85 and 25.
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and operational. As an essential part and with the detailed reference of the Code,174 the
IPOA-IUU has been given substantial support in its implementation. FAO members
are encouraged to put these IPOAs into effect through national plans of action.
Progress is varied, but properly implemented, it should play an important role in
combating IUU fishing.175
The international community, through the FAO, the UNGA and the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), has participated in the battle in controlling
IUU fishing. The FAO has responded by providing members with tools needed for the
management of fishing capacity and technical support for the implementation of the
IPOA. It will keep the issue of IUU fishing under review and report progress of the
IPOA-IUU to its members on a biennial basis.176 The IMO has considerable experience
in matters relating to flag state and port state control over environmental and safety
standards on ships.
To enhance flag state responsibilities to control IUU fishing, a joint ad hoc
working group was established between the FAO and the IMO in October 2000.177 It
adopted a Checklist for Flag State Control and Criteria for Inspections of a Foreign
Fishing Vessel by a Port State.178 The primary actions controlled by a flag state include
allocation of flag and registration, the authorisation to fish, records of fishing vessels,
position reporting, and catch data reporting.179 Criteria for a port state inspection cover
certificate of registration, logbooks, authorisation to fish, origin of catch, and fishing
gear inspection.180 This joint effort is expected to provide a more effective control over
IUU fishing.

Conclusion
The global fisheries crisis and excessive fishing capacity have made it extremely
difficult for the international community to protect the remaining fisheries resources
both within and outside EEZs. The growing pressure on fish stocks and the mounting

174

IPOA-IUU is further commitment by all states to implement the Code. See IPOA-IUU paras 4 and 7.
Some countries have worked out their national plans of action according to the IPOA-IUU such as
the US and Chile, but many have not.
176
See IPOA-IUU, Paras 88-93.
177
See FAO, Joint FAO/IMO Ad Hoc Working Group.
178
Ibid., Appendix 2 and 3
179
Ibid., Appendix 2.
180
Ibid., Appendix 3.
175
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concern from the international community has led to the convening a series of fisheries
instruments in the post-LOSC era. The four major fisheries instruments, namely, the
Compliance Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Code of Conduct, and the
IPOA-IUU have been selected for analysis in this chapter. They represent both legally
binding and non-binding instruments in an effort to implement the LOSC fisheries
regimes, remedy its deficiencies, address the global fisheries crisis, and ultimately
achieve sustainable fisheries.
Through an analysis of the general principles and major management
measures of these instruments, the chapter has shown that they have substantially
improved the LOSC fisheries framework, particularly regarding the highs seas
fisheries. Innovative concepts, such as the precautionary approach and compatibility of
management measures, and enhanced flag state control, have been introduced to
improve the effectiveness of fisheries management. These measures have enhanced the
overall capacity of international fisheries instruments, and thus improved the
effectiveness of management.
However, improvements in the international fisheries legal and policy
framework do not imply that these principles and measures have been implemented to
their full potential. Regional and national regulations, or institutions in some cases,
have to be created to make them effective. More importantly, they need support from
individual states to implement or incorporate them so to achieve their objectives. As
international agreements and regimes, it is up to each state to decide whether it is in
their interest to be obligated by these instruments and to what extent they adopt them.
Thus they can only be effective when all states are willing to be so bound, and
provided that adequate resources are made available for implementation.
The success of fisheries management relies on a continuation of participation
and cooperation of all states with substantial effort made to implement international
fisheries instruments in a sustained and complete manner. It remains to be seen
whether states overcome political, economical, legal and technical barriers to
implement these instruments so as to achieve sustainable fisheries management.
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CHAPTER 3 CHINA’S FISHERIES AND FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT
Introduction
The last two chapters examined the LOSC fisheries regime and management measures
of the major post-LOSC fisheries instruments. It has been shown that general
principles and guidelines for fisheries management have been set forth by these
instruments, but achieving their management objectives will rely on individual states
implementing them at a national level. Following on from this observation, the
succeeding chapters of this study will analyse China’s management practice and
determine to what extent international fisheries law and policy has been implemented
and incorporated, and how much further China has to go to achieve this ultimate goal.
This chapter will set up the context for such an analysis.
The chapter starts with an overview of China’s fisheries industry and its
significant social and economic role in the national economy. This is followed by a
brief account on the legislative structure and administrative organisation for China’s
fisheries management. By reviewing the development of China’s fisheries and the
progress of its management practice, the chapter points out two critical problems
facing the Chinese fisheries: overexploitation of fisheries resources and deterioration
of the fisheries ecosystem.
It will be shown that China has favourable natural conditions to develop a
fisheries industry, and the industry plays an important role in the country’s national
economy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, China has been the world’s largest fish
producer. However, the rapid development of the fisheries economy has not been
accompanied by successful fisheries management. This has resulted in the
overexploitation of fisheries resources and the deterioration of the fisheries ecosystem.
The chapter identifies the key factors contributing to the problems confronting China’s
fisheries, which include institutional defects, fishermen’s poor legal awareness, and
insufficient monitoring and surveillance of fishing vessels.
The chapter concludes that the depletion status of fisheries resources and the
deteriorating situation of the fisheries ecosystem present the greatest challenge to
China in its effort to achieve sustainable fisheries. With the largest fishing population
in the world, China has to face the challenge to address the problems facing its
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fisheries. It needs to take concrete steps to implement international fisheries
framework so as to improve the effectiveness of its fisheries management.

The Fisheries Sector and Institutional Framework
China is situated in the eastern part of the Asian continent with a land territory of 9.6
million square kilometres, which ranks it as the third largest state in the world.1 From
north to south, China borders an internal sea, the Bohai Sea, and three semi-enclosed
seas, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea (see Map 3.1
China’s Bordering Seas).

Favourable Natural Conditions
The Bohai Sea is located at the north of China and is connected to the Yellow Sea. It
is a shallow bay with an area of 77,000 square kilometres, and forms a large spawning
and feeding ground for migratory species from the Yellow Sea and the East China
Sea.2 It is estimated that 40% of the fish stocks in the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea and the
north area of the East China Sea originate in the Bohai Sea.3
The Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are located to the east of China. The
Yellow Sea has an area of 380,000 square kilometres with an average depth of 44
metres and a maximum depth of 152 metres.4 It is connected to the Sea of Japan via
the Tsushima Strait, the Kyushu Islands, and the Ryukyu Islands. The East China Sea
borders the Kyushu and Ryukyu islands to the east. It has an area of 770,000 square
kilometres and it is more open than the Yellow Sea. 5
There are no strict boundaries between the Yellow Sea and the East China
Sea except for an imaginary line from the estuary of the Yangtze River to Cheju Island,
which roughly separates the two seas from each other. China shares the fisheries
resources of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea with North Korea, South Korea,
and Japan. Cooperation among them for the shared resources is inevitable and
1

For a general introduction to China, see http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/china/home.html.
S. Xia, C. Zhao, and S. Feng, China Fishery Divisions: A Survey and Division on China's Fishery
Resources (in Chinese), vol. 1 (Hangzhou: Zhengjiang Science and Technology Publisher, 1987), p.6.
3
Some scholars are of the opinion that the Bohai Sea is part of the Yellow Sea. However, the Chinese
fisheries authorities have separate statistics for the Bohai Sea and the Yellow Sea fisheries. The concept
of the Yellow Sea in this study does not include the area of the Bohai Sea unless otherwise stated.
4
The name of the Yellow Sea comes from its watercolour due to huge quantities of sediment
discharged by the Yellow River. See http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/bering/pages/seas/ecs.html.
5
S. Xia, C. Zhao, and S. Feng, China Fishery Divisions: A Survey and Division on China's Fishery
Resources (in Chinese), p.6.
2
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essential.
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The South China Sea, as its name suggests, is situated at the south of China’s
mainland. It is the largest among the three semi-enclosed seas with an area of 3.5
million square kilometres, and it connects to the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait
at the north.6 In the South China Sea, the Gulf of Tonkin is one of the most productive
fishing grounds where China and Vietnam jointly exploit the fish stocks. This
6 Ibid., p.23.
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necessitates a cooperative mechanism to manage the shared resources. This
cooperative framework established by a bilateral fisheries agreement between China
and Vietnam is discussed in Chapter 7.
China has a coastline of more than 18,000 kilometres, more than 6,500
offshore islands, and an island coastline of over 14,000 kilometres.7 These coastlines,
together with numerous bays and gulfs with shallow and smooth seabeds, provide
China with productive fishing grounds. These fishing grounds, covering 818,000
square nm, are about one quarter of the world’s total.8
Located in medium to low latitudes, China’s fishing grounds range across
tropical, subtropical and temperate zones which provide favourable natural
environments and resource conditions for marine life of some 20,000 species to
reproduce and grow. 9 These abundant resources and ideal fishing grounds have
stimulated the development of China's fishing industry.
Since ancient times, the Chinese people have developed a fisheries industry
relying largely on the fish stocks close to their coasts. Almost two thirds of the catch
comes from the bordering seas, particularly the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.10
China’s major fishing methods include trawling, seining, gill-net fishing, set-net
fishing, and long-line fishing. 11 In the order of the magnitude of production, the
different types of fishing operations are trawlers 52.2%; set-nets 5.4%; gill and drift
nets 12.3%; purse-seine 5.4%; lines and hooks 33.3%; and miscellaneous fishing gear
8.1%.12

Significant Socio-economic Roles
As a developing country with a population of 1.3 billion, China faces an enormous
task to feed more than one quarter of the world’s population on 7% of the world’s

7

See J. Song, "Great potential for the exploitation of China's islands," Ocean Development and
Management (in Chinese), 3 (1996), p.5.
8
One nautical mile equals 1.852 kilometres. For the areas of fishing grounds of China’s bordering seas,
see http://www.lib.noaa.gov/china/fishing.htm.
9
See S. Xia, C. Zhao, and S. Feng, China Fishery Divisions: A Survey and Division on China's Fishery
Resources, p.23.
10
Davis, China and the Law of the Sea Convention: Follow the Sea (Lewiston, USA: The Edwin
Mellen Press, 1995), p.27.
11
W. Guo and S. Huang, "A discussion on the problems and countermeasures of fishing capacity
control in China's marine fisheries," Journal of Shanghai Fisheries University (in Chinese) 10, No. 2
(2001), p.135.
12
Ibid.
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arable land.13 China's overriding national policies call for economic expansion to meet
the basic and growing needs of its huge population. In the last two decades China has
experienced tremendous economic growth, 14 but the limited terrestrial resources
hinder its further development.15 With a soaring increase in population and gradual
reduction of land resources, China has turned to the ocean for marine resources to ease
the pressure on insufficient land-based resources.
China has 34 provinces including four municipalities under the direct
administration of the central government, five autonomous regions, and two special
administrative regions (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). 16 Of these
provinces, 12 are coastal provinces and municipalities (see Map 3.2 China’s Coastal
Provinces). These coastal provinces cover an area of 1.3 million square kilometres,
which accounts for 14% of the country’s land mass in total, but they support 44.7% of
its population, and generate 60% of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).17
In the early 1990s, China embarked on a “Blue Revolution” to develop the
“Blue Economy”, and this practice has continued into this century.18 The fisheries
industry accounts for more than half of the marine industries and thus forms a vital
part of the “Blue Economy”.19

13

China is a country characterised by a shortage of arable land. China has only 13% of arable land,
which has been disappearing in recent years due to economic development and industrialisation. As a
result, many farmers have lost their farmlands and some gone to fisheries industry. See China Agenda
21 (1992) Para. 14.38. The full text is available from http:\\www.acca21.edu.cn/indexe6.html.
14
From 1979-1998, China's overall economic expansion averaged a notable 8% per year, whereas in
coastal regions, the average growth rate of the marine economy maintained over 12% during the 1990s,
jumping from 8 billion Yuan in 1980 to over 285 billion Yuan by the end of the 1990s. In 1990, the
gross output of marine industries was RMB 43.8 billion Yuan, accounting for 1.15% of the gross
national product (GNP). See ‘China issues marine economy blueprint’, China Daily, available from
http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-05/28/content_166774.htm (accessed 9 September 2003).
15
See R. C. Hsu, Food for One Billion: China's Agriculture Since 1949, Westview Special Studies on
China and East Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); S. Singh, Continuity and Change in China’s
Maritime Strategy, available from http://www.fao.org/DOCKEP/005/Y2257E/y2257e.htm.
16
The 12 coastal provinces and municipalities include: Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing (by custom), Tianjin,
Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. See China Facts &
Figures-China 2002-china.org.cn (http://www.10thnpc.org.cn/English/shuzi-en/en-shuzigq/htm/s.htm)
(accessed 22 August 2003).
17
The total population in coastal area was 535.88 million as of the end of 2000: calculated from
‘National Conditions’, China Facts & Figures 2002-china.org.cn.
18
“Blue Economy” refers to the development of marine-related industries. See Tang Min, ‘Blueprint
released for raising blue economy’, see http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/bw/2001-8-21/28126.html
(accessed 16 November 2001).
19
For statistics on marine industries including fisheries, see SOA, Statistical Gazette of China on 2003
Marine Economy, see http://www/soa/gov.cn/hygb/2003hyjj/index.html (accessed 22 March 2004).
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Map 3.2
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An Important Component of the National Economy
The rapid growth o f China’s fisheries industry is a result of many factors, such as
technology development, institutional reforms, price and market liberalisation, and
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improved processing capacity. More importantly, fishing is notable for the extent of
its integration into China’s social structure and for its perceived potential for
expansion. Agriculture, as the foundation of the economy, contributes 35% to the
country’s GDP, and fisheries production accounts for 10% of the total value of
agriculture.

20

The industry also contributes to the national economy through

processing, trans-shipment, and wholesale/retail of fish products. The fisheries
industry in China is a vital component of the national economy and it plays a
significant socio-economic role.21
China, like many other developing countries, sees its fisheries industry as a
mechanism to enhance food security and contribute to foreign exchange. Fish products
are a significant source of protein for China’s large population. The fisheries industry
is regarded as important in improving the living standard of the Chinese people,
stimulating China’s rural development, and promoting social and economic
prosperity.22
China's fisheries industry has increased drastically over the past three decades
and has become a major component of the country’s economy.23 In the early 1980s,
fish consumption per capita in China was only 4.6 kilograms, but in 2003 it increased
to 36.1 kilograms.24 Since 1990, China has been the largest producer of fish products
in the world, and its output of fisheries products is roughly one-third of the global
production (see Table 3.1 China’s Marine Aquatic Production).25 The contribution of
20

See FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese) (Beijing: China Agriculture Press, 2001),
p.220. Note that this study uses mainly the official statistics from China’s fisheries yearbooks, but there
are figures from other sources without verification of their accuracy, as the whole point of the study is
not to emphasise the economic layout of the fisheries industry.
21
See D. Chen, "China fisheries review," Modern Fisheries Information (in Chinese) 17, No. 1 (2002),
pp.5-10.
22
The output of marine capture fisheries used to account for 80%-90% of the total fisheries output.
According to China Fisheries Yearbook 1995, 91.7% of the output of marine capture fisheries came
from coastal fishing, and the distant water fisheries were only 8.3% of the total. Mainly due to the fast
development of marine and freshwater aquaculture and the growth of freshwater capture fisheries,
recent years saw the figure go down steadily. In 2000, marine capture fisheries achieved “zone growth”
(14.77 million tonnes), a reduction of 1.5% than in 1999.
23
See SOA, China Ocean Agenda 21 (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 1996), Paras.1.5, 1.10, 1.13, and
1.15.
24
Since the mid-1980s, China's marine aquaculture has developed rapidly, with a large increase in
species and the expansion of breeding areas. The output of such products rose from 1.926 million
tonnes in 1987 to 7.91 million tonnes in 1997, with their proportion in the total output of the marine
harvest rose from 27% to 36%. See China, The Development of China's Marine Programs (Beijing:
Information Office, the State Council, 1998), p.7; FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2003 (in Chinese)
(Beijing: China Agriculture Press, 2003), p.1.
25
China’s annual fisheries product has taken first place from 1990 onwards, reaching around 43 million
tonnes in 2000 and accounting for more than 30% of the world total. See FAO, SOFIA 2002.
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the fisheries industry to China’s foreign currency is also a significant component of
the national economy.26 In 2000, China’s total value of fisheries products reached
US$3.83 billion.27

T a b l e 3.1

C h in a ’ s M a r in e A q u a t ic P r o d u c t io n

Item (unit: ten thousand tonnes)

2002

2001

2000

Total Fisheries Output

4 565.2

4 382.1

4 278.9

Marine Aquatic Products

2 646.3

2 572.2

2 538.7

Marine Catches

1 433.5

1 440.6

1 477.5

Source: compiled from China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese), p.214;
China Fisheries Yearbook 2003 (in Chinese), p.211.
Employment Opportunities
Another important role of China’s fisheries industry is its contribution to social
employment. In a country like China with its large population, employment is a
crucial issue to the government and also a major public concern. The development of
the fisheries industry has helped to create a secure and stable social system. Over
decades, the industry has formed a relatively complete system. This system includes
aquaculture, fishing, processing, marketing, fishing vessel and fisheries machinery
industries, science and technology, education, fishing port superintendence, and
fisheries management. The development of such a system has created employment
opportunities on an extensive scale.
In the mid-1980s China undertook economic reform

followed by

industrialisation in the 1990s. This resulted in the loss of large areas of farmlands
throughout the country. The higher incomes available in the fishing industry have
attracted many agricultural workers who lost their farmlands. In 2002, the per capita
income o f fishermen was 8,667 Yuan (RMB), and the per capita national income was
5,051 Yuan (RMB).29 In the year 2002, the labour force in the fisheries industries
totalled 13.13 million, of which about 50% were full-time fishermen (see Table 3.2
26 For China’s fisheries in international trade, see FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese),
TO.240-243.
See China's Immense Fisheries (htto://www.usembassv-china.org.cn/sandt/ptr/Fisheries-prt.htm~)
(accessed 3 September 2003). See also FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese), p.5.
The per capita income o f fishermen increased from 626 Yuan (RMB) in 1985 to RMB 4,725 Yuan in
2000. See FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese), p.239.
29 See FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2003 (in Chinese), p. 1.
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Fisheries Population and Labour Force).30 The development of fisheries has generated
income for the rural population in China’s coastal areas and promoted rural industries.
Along China’s coastline, millions of people engage in fishing. Fisheries are often the
only source o f income for them, and they have a high dependency on the fisheries
industry. In 2002, there were 1,004 fisheries townships, 9,770 fisheries villages, and
4.9 million fisheries households.31

Ta b l e 3 .2

F is h e r ie s P o p u l a t io n a n d L a b o u r F o r c e

Item (unit: million)

2002

2000

1999

Population

20.44

19.40

18.34

Labourers:

13.13

12.94

12.57

Full-time Labourers

6.60

6.29

6.05

Part-time Labourers

6.53

6.65

6.52

Source: China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese), p.221;
China Fisheries Yearbook 2003 (in Chinese), p.243.

To sum up, fisheries in China contribute significantly to income, employment, foreign
exchange, and the nutritional needs of the people. The growing importance of the
fisheries industry mirrors the improvement in the Chinese economy. However, the
growth in fisheries production is still not meeting the demands of China’s large
population and rapidly improving living standard. China has to promote the long-term
sustainable utilisation of its fisheries resources.

Legislation and Administration
Fisheries law and policy is an integral part of the Chinese legal system. To understand
the status o f fisheries’ laws and administrative structures in China, it is necessary to
take a brief look at the Chinese legal system.
Status of Fisheries Laws and Legislative Authorities
Chinese laws have a fairly strict hierarchy based on legislative authority (see Table 3.3
30 FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese) p.221. See J. Yang (Director o f FMB), The
Development and Prospects o f the Chinese Fisheries, Keynote Speech on the Third World Fisheries
Congress, 2000, Beijing. See also China’s Immense Fisheries, December 2002, (accessed 3 September
2003), see http://wwwusembassv-china.org.cn/sandt/ptr/Fisheries-prt.htm.
31 FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2003 (in Chinese), p.243.
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Hierarchy of Chinese Laws).32 The top level of this hierarchy is the basic law — The
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982 Constitution), adopted in
December 1982 by the National People's Congress (NPC), China's highest legislative
body.33 The 1982 Constitution is the supreme national law, and it is the foundation for
all other laws.34 It also provides a legal basis for the profound changes in China's
social and economic institutions and significantly revises governmental structure and
procedures.35
TABLE 3.3 HIERARCHY OF CHINESE LAWS
Origin of the Law

Types of Law

Hierarchy

NPC

The Constitution

1

Integrated Law

2

Specialty Law

2

State Council

Law and Regulations

3

Ministries

Regulations/Measures/Rules

4

Law and Regulations

4

Regulations/Administrative Rules

4

NPC and its Standing Committee

Provincial NPCs and their
Standing Committees
Provincial governments and
Municipalities of large cities

There are no specific references in the 1982 Constitution to fisheries management.
However, references to conservation of natural resources and protection of the
environment are found in Articles 9 and 26. Article 9 provides that the state must
“ensure the rational use of natural resources and protect rare animals and plants.
32

See http://www.china-laws-online.com/china-WTO/evolution-of-chinese-legislation.htm for a brief
introduction to the Chinese law-making procedures.
33
China’s governmental structure is based on the 1982 Constitution. Its Article 57 provides that the
NPC is the highest organ of state power. Its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the NPC.
The 1982 Constitution reflects Deng Xiaoping's determination to lay an institutional foundation for
domestic stability and modernisation. For a discussion, see J. Chen, Chinese Law: Towards an
Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development, vol. 3, The London-Leiden Series on Law,
Administration and Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999).
34
The 1982 Constitution Article 5 reads in part: “No law or administrative or local rules and regulations
shall contravene the Constitution.”
35
See ChinaA Country Study (http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/lawtran1.htm) (accessed 14 October
2003).
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Appropriation or damaging of natural resources by any organizations or individuals by
whatever means is prohibited.” Article 26 (1) requires the state to “protect and
improve the ecological environment in which people live and to prevent and control
pollution and other public hazards.” These provisions provide the institutional basis
for fisheries laws and regulations.
The second hierarchy of laws is the integrated management laws, such as the
Law of the PRC on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Law of the PRC on
the Integrated Management of the Coastal Zone, and the Law of the PRC on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. These laws are drafted and approved
by the NPC and its Standing Committee. 36 They function as national legislation
through which the position of the Chinese government is publicized. This level of law
also includes specialty laws that regulate specific activities of various industries. The
Fisheries Law of PRC, issued in 1986 and amended in 2000, belongs to this
category.37 It is the highest national law governing all aspects of fisheries development
and management in China.
The third level is laws and regulations promulgated by the State Council in
accordance with the 1982 Constitution. 38 Typical laws of this kind include the
implementation regulations of the laws at the second level, such as the Implementation
Measures for the Fisheries Law of the PRC. 39
The regulations, management measures, and administrative rules originating
from various ministries are at the fourth level. Provincial NPCs and their Standing
Committees, provincial governments, and municipalities of large cities also have the
power to adopt regulations, measures, and rules, which have the same authority as the
ministerial laws.40

36

The 1982 Constitution Article 2 provides that: “[a]ll powers in the PRC belongs to the people. The
organs through which the people exercise state power are the NPC and the local people’s congresses at
different levels.” Article 57 also states that the NPC’s main functions include formulation of laws,
delegating authority, policy formulation, and supervision of other governing organs.
37
The Fisheries Law of the PRC (1986) in SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations, 3rd ed.
(Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2001), pp.43-52 (in Chinese); pp.264-280 (in English).
38
The 1982 Constitution Article 89 (1) provides that the State Council exercises the functions and
powers to “adopt administrative measures, enact administrative rules and regulations and issues
decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution and the statutes.”
39
The Implementation Measures for the Fisheries Law of the PRC in SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws
and Regulations, 3rd ed. (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2001), pp.177-185 (in Chinese); pp.488-501 (in
English).
40
See ChinaA Country Study, see http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/lawtran1.htm (accessed 14 October
2003).
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Fisheries laws and regulations, as an important component of the Chinese
laws, have characteristics of its own. The State Council and/or the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) adopt regulations subordinate to the national fisheries law
according to the requirement of fisheries management practices.41
Governments at different levels such as provincial, autonomous regional and
municipal are authorised to adopt regulations to deal with specific issues in areas of
fisheries management.42 They can lay down implementation measures of national laws
according to the circumstances of their respective administrative regions. The fisheries
authorities at all levels can draw up local measures and rules to strengthen fisheries
management. It is within this complicated legal system that China’s fisheries are
managed.43
Organisation of Fisheries Administration
The implementation of the intent and objectives of fisheries law and policy depends
on its actual enforcement. Enforcement, as an integral part of legislation, is vital to
achieve the objectives of law and policy and should be accorded equal importance as
the making of laws.44 To enforce fisheries law and policy, the Chinese government
established a fisheries enforcement system as an integral part of the fisheries
institutional framework (see Table 3.4 Organisation of Fisheries Administration).45
The Fisheries Management Bureau and the Fishing Port Superintendence
Bureau (FMB) are authorised by the central government to oversee fisheries affairs
across the nation and they are in charge of important fishing grounds and fishing
ports.46 The FMB was established in 1982, and transferred to the MOA in 1986.47 Its
major functions include:
41
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Journal of Zhejiang College of Fisheries (in Chinese) 14, No. 3 (1995), p.202.
45
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See The Fisheries Law of the PRC (1986), Article 6.
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Aquatic Products whose primary function was fisheries development support. See Provisional
Measures of Fisheries Administrative Management, State Bureau of Aquatic Products, 1979, FMB,
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• supervision and management of fishing operations, fishing vessels, and fishing
ports including resource conservation and environmental protection of fishing
grounds;
• maintenance of orderly fishing operations and implementation of fisheries laws
and regulations;
• protection o f fishermen’s legitimate rights and their interests;
• coordination of the settlement of fisheries disputes; and
• maintenance of navigational safety and order of fisheries communications.48

T a b l e 3 .4

O r g a n is a t io n o f F is h e r ie s A d m in is t r a t io n

Source: adapted from China Fisheries, Special Edition, 2002.
48 Articles 1 and 3, Provisional Measures o f Fisheries Administrative Management, State Bureau o f
Aquatic Products, 1979, in FMB, Complete Collection o f Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese),
p.426. See also Y. Xu, "Review on some theoretical problems o f fishery supervision and
administration," Journal o f Zhejiang College o f Fisheries (in Chinese) 14, No. 3 (1995), p.202.

Three coastal fisheries management bureaus operate under the state FMB for the
supervision of the Yellow/Bohai Seas, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
The system also involves local fisheries management bureaus (LMBs) established at
coastal provinces and other administrative agencies set up at fishing ports. 49 The
LMBs are also answerable to the relevant departments of local governments. The
responsibilities of these coastal FMBs and LMBs include:
• conservation and management of fisheries resources within local coastal areas;
• implementation of fisheries agreements signed by China with foreign states;
• issuance of fishing licences;
• inspection of fishing vessels including fishing permits, gear, and operation;
• prosecution of illegal fishing activities;
• protection of the fisheries ecosystem; and
• supervision of the safety and orderly operation of fishing ports.50
It can be seen that China’s fisheries management is a mix of central government and
local government responsibility. With administrative coordination separated according
to relevant provisions of the national fisheries law and its implementation regulations,
the central and local governments divide up their responsibilities into resource zones
and fleet sectors. The central and local governments carry out fisheries law
enforcement in close cooperation with each other. By the year 2000, China had about
1,700 fisheries management and fishing ports superintendent agencies nationwide,
comprising 30,000 fisheries officials equipped with 1100 enforcement patrol vessels.51
Because of the three semi-enclosed seas, China’s fisheries laws and policies
have also included regulations established to deal with bilateral fisheries relations.52
As an integral part of the administration management, the FMBs have the
responsibility to implement the bilateral fisheries agreements China signed with its
maritime neighbours.
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50
See S. Lu, The Marine Legal System (in Chinese) (Beijing: Guangming Daily Publishing House,
1992), p.155.
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52
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Industry groups in fishing enterprises and the state-owned fishing companies
assist the fisheries enforcement agencies in detecting violations. However, the
industry groups have no administrative authority, and the effectiveness of their joint
enforcement is not clear. Police forces are also used to prosecute violations of fisheries
regulations. The state-owned marketing companies are also involved in the
enforcement of regulations by refusing to purchase illegal catches.53

Fisheries Management Practices: A Trial Process
China’s favourable natural environment and abundant fisheries resources have
endowed it with one of the world’s most ancient marine cultures. 54 The Chinese
people started fishing in the East China Sea as early as the Xia Dynasty (21st century
BC—16th century BC), and relied mainly on fish to sustain life.55 This experience
provided them with rich knowledge of the biological characteristics of fish stocks and
enabled them to fish rationally.56
However, improvement in fishing techniques and the economic incentives
presented to fishermen to maximise their catch has resulted in the overexploitation of
many fish stocks. This has required laws and policies to be introduced to regulate the
taking of fish and the conservation of resources. China started its fisheries
management in the 1950s. A series of legislative practices and management efforts
were made from the 1960s to the 1970s until the formal establishment of a fisheries
legal system in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, increased international cooperation has
stimulated China to harmonise its fisheries law and policy according to international
standards. During this long course of management practice, the fisheries laws and
regulations of China reflect the policy deliberations based on resources status, and
social and economic circumstances. To understand the conceptual changes of fisheries
management in China better, a brief review of this process is necessary.
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For the history of Chinese fisheries, see: Z. Cong and T. Li, The Fisheries History of China (in
Chinese) (Beijing: China Science and Technology Press, 1993).
55
H. Zhao, "Recent developments in the legal protection of historic shipwrecks in China," ODILJ 23
(1992), p.305.
56
See Z. Zhang, "Policies for fisheries reproduction protection in ancient China," Shandong Fisheries
(in Chinese) 47, No. 4 (1993), pp.45-46.
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Post-war Recovery and Early Management Efforts (1949-1978)
In the early years after 1949, the new Chinese government had to address major issues
of economic recovery. China’s fisheries policy, during the 1950s, encouraged the
introduction of new fishing techniques to develop the industry.57 This policy directly
fostered the first fisheries economic boom, which expanded fleet size and fishing
capacity.58 Abundant fish stocks in China’s coastal waters provided a solid foundation
for successful industrial development.
The early signs of decline of particular species in some inshore areas were
recognised in the late 1950s and measures were adopted to protect the resources. The
first formal instrument concerning resource management was the Executive Order on
Restricted Fishing Zones for Motor Trawlers in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the
East China Sea issued by the State Council in 1955.59 This was followed by a series of
administrative regulations issued by the State Council and the coastal FMBs. Major
regulations promulgated during this period included:
• Draft Measures on the Reproduction Protection of Aquatic Resources;60
• Supplementary Regulations on Restricted Zones of Motor Trawler in the Bohai
Sea, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea;61 and
• Provisional Regulations on the Reproduction Protection of Aquatic Resources.62
These regulations represent a turning point in China’s fisheries management—the
beginning of resource management. Since then, fisheries’ policy focus gradually
shifted from development support to the promotion of both development and
resources conservation. Resource management became a subject of legislation.
Unfortunately, these regulations could not be effectively enforced because of the ten-
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year “Cultural Revolution”. 63 Consequently, China’s fisheries management was
hindered, the formation of fisheries law and policy was left in its infancy, and fisheries
resources continued declining.64

Return to Normality and Legislative Progress (1978-1992)
The “Cultural Revolution”, which ended in 1976, destroyed all sectors of the Chinese
economy and it took the government years of effort to return it to normality. Two
main policies impacted significantly on all walks of life, including the fisheries
industry. The first was an open-door policy initiated in December 1978, which
stimulated fishing technology along with fisheries management.65 The second was an
economic reform at the beginning of the 1980s, which introduced a price relaxation
and financial reward system.66 The 1978 economic reform included:
• the introduction and implementation of a responsibility system with the
household or vessels as the basic accounting unit;
• the shift from a government controlled trading system to a free market system;
• the recognition of private/individual sector and fish farming industries; and
• the gradual relaxation of price controls for aquatic products.67
The relevant regulations during this period emphasised China’s favourable conditions
for fisheries and promoted fast development of this sector as an important and
inseparable component of the national economy.68 Fishermen’s income was raised and
the industry was expanded.
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Administrative Regulations
The open-door policy and economic reform accelerated China’s fisheries in all areas
and the contribution of the sector to China’s overall economic growth increased
substantially. This in turn stimulated more investment in the fisheries industry,
including technical assistance from the outside world. During the course of this
development, the damaging impact on the fisheries resources from improved fishing
technology and more efficient fishing operations became more evident. This situation
necessitated fisheries law and policy to be established to manage fishing operations.
Regulations, as an important tool to address fishery problems, were
promulgated to provide effective fisheries management. Some administrative
regulations were set up with specific standards for fishing activities, such as minimum
allowable sizes for particular fish or shellfish, and restrictions on fishing
zones/seasons, and fishing methods. These regulations reflected a concern about the
availability of fish stocks and thus they focused more on the protection of fish stocks
in their reproduction season.
In February 1979, the State Council issued the Regulations on the
Reproduction Protection of the Aquatic Resources (Reproduction Protection
Regulations). 69 This regulation was China’s first formal instrument regarding the
conservation of fisheries resources in China.70 The implementation of this regulation
was enhanced by the Implementation Measures of the ‘Regulations on the
Reproduction Protection of the Aquatic Resources’. The Reproduction Protection
Regulations stipulated the minimum size of the species allowed to catch,
specifications of fishing gear, designation of closed zones/seasons, and penalties for
violations. 71 Conservation zones were also created to conserve fish stocks during
spawning, breeding, and wintering seasons.72
Specific management measures were also introduced to limit the juvenile
catch and to control closed zones/seasons to allow the restoration of fish stocks. Some
conservation zones for hairtail and the large yellow croaker in the Yellow Sea and the
East China Sea were also established, thus the juveniles of these commercial species
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were placed under protection.73
1986 Fisheries Law
Since the early 1980s, China has fast-tracked fisheries management and laid down
regulations concerning different aspects of fisheries as well as gradually developing a
legal system to deal with fishing practices. However, China’s guiding principle for
fisheries was not clear, because there were different opinions regarding the policy for
fisheries development. For a time, marine fisheries were regarded as more important
than inland fisheries, output as more important than quality, and development as more
important than management. 74 In order to define a guiding principle for fisheries
development and bring the sectoral regulations into a legal system, the Chinese
government decided to draft a comprehensive fisheries law.
On 20 January 1986, the Fisheries Law of the PRC (1986 Fisheries Law) was
adopted by the Standing Committee of the NPC and it was put into effect on 1 July
1986. 75 As an overriding legal basis for fisheries, the 1986 Fisheries Law sets out
guidelines and principles for all aspects of fisheries including aquaculture, capture
fisheries, resource utilisation and conservation, protection of fishermen’s lawful rights
and interests, and improvement of the fisheries economy.76 The 1986 Fisheries Law
was also designed to increase fisheries production to meet the needs of the country
and the people.77 As the first comprehensive law, the 1986 Fisheries Law marked the
establishment of a fisheries legal system in China.
In order to implement the 1986 Fisheries Law effectively, the State Council
adopted the Implementation Measures for the Fisheries Law of the PRC
(Implementation Measures for Fisheries Law) in October 1987.78 The Implementation
Measures for Fisheries Law set out specific regulations to enforce the provisions of
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the 1986 Fisheries Law. It also defined China’s internal waters.79 In order to regulate
fishing operations and to better manage fisheries resources, the Implementation
Measures for Fisheries Law classified marine fishing grounds according to the
distance from the coast to inshore fishing grounds and offshore fishing grounds. 80
Based on the classification of the inshore and offshore fishing grounds, the
administrative areas were thus defined. Local governments are given responsibility for
fishing activities within the waters enclosed by a trawler restriction line and inshore
fishing grounds, while the central government is responsible for offshore fishing
grounds.81 A set of rules applying to various fishing operations in inshore and offshore
fishing grounds was also created. This management framework has been the basic
structure of China’s fisheries management.

Transitional Period towards Sustainable Fisheries (1992 onwards)
Since 1992, China’s law and policy for fisheries management has undergone apparent
changes due to the changed situation at both domestic and international fora. In 1992,
China’s most influential figure Deng Xiaoping made an important speech on his trip
to Southern China. He pointed out that socialist ideology and market economy were
not necessarily incompatible, thereby signalling China’s change to a market economy.
China started another round of reform, which was not confined to the economic area,
but affected all aspects of Chinese society. This motivated China to open its door
wider to the outside world and resulted in increased participation by the Chinese
government in international affairs, including involvement in global fisheries issues.82
Outside China, the LOSC was accepted by more and more states and
79
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presented a general trend in governing ocean-related activities. China ratified the
LOSC in 1996. This provided the impetus to adjust its domestic legislation to
implement the LOSC obligation.83 The global fisheries crisis attracted considerable
attention from the international community, and triggered the negotiation and
conclusion of several important international fisheries instruments in the post-LOSC
period. Fisheries issues became the most popular topic in international fora.
Sustainable development, as a guiding principle for resource management, became
well established.
Stimulated by these changes, China participated widely in international
organisations and conferences, which resulted in an obvious impact on China’s
domestic legislation. China studied the laws of other countries and drew on their
useful experiences including legislative intent, legal concepts, and legal values to
improve its management practice.84 Accordingly, China has taken a series of actions to
respond to international requests by updating a series of regulations governing various
aspects of fishing activities.85 These instruments established a new legal system for
China’s fisheries, and brought China’s framework for fisheries management in line
with global practice (these actions will be discussed in the next two chapters).
Foremost among these actions, China has adopted sustainable development as a
national strategy, which has brought about a profound impact on China’s fisheries
management.
The term “sustainable development” was popularised by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987.86 It is defined as
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.” 87 Sustainable development is the
integration of economic growth, social equity, environmental management, and
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cultural values.88 According to the WCED, sustainable development can be secured
only through international cooperation and agreed regimes for surveillance,
development, and management in the common interest.89
Sustainable development is a big step by humankind towards the
understanding of the interrelationship between the environment, resources, and socioeconomic development.90 A state is part of sustainable development in the context of
the overall global and international community. 91 China’s participation is important to
the global effort in achieving sustainable development. China has managed reasonably
well to meet the basic food supply and nutritional needs of its people, and the nation
as a whole regards economic growth as a means of achieving higher living standards
for the growing population. However, China’s economic development is still lagging
behind the developed world due to its large population, low per capita resources, and
limited science and technologies. Upon realising that its future development lies in
coordinating the relationship between economic and social development and the
conservation of resources and environment, China adopted sustainable development as
its basic national strategy to reconcile the tension between resources depletion and
economic growth.92
To promote a sustainable development strategy in areas of natural resources
development, China, following in the wake of UNCED Agenda 21, 93 formulated
China Agenda 21, an overall, cross-century policy framework.
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framework, the sustainable development of marine living resources is one of the key
objectives, and actions and specific activities are designated to achieve long-term
sustainable utilisation of China’s marine living resources. 95 To implement these
actions and activities, China Ocean Agenda 21 was adopted in 1996 as a strategic
guideline to promote sustainable development of marine resources including
fisheries.96
China Ocean Agenda 21 covers sustainable development of marine industries,
conservation and utilisation of marine living resources, marine environmental
protection, and international marine affairs.97 To improve the marine environment and
fisheries resources, China Ocean Agenda 21 identifies projects for immediate
implementation based on importance, urgency, and feasibility.98 Priority is given to
endangered species and ecosystem protection. However, to implement the sustainable
development strategy in China’s fisheries industry is not easy. It presents a great
challenge to fisheries management because of its critical weaknesses in resources
conservation and marine environmental protection. The next section will identify the
major problems that challenge China’s sustainable fisheries management.

Major Problems Confronting China’s Fisheries
The fisheries sector in China, as discussed earlier in this chapter, has made a
significant contribution to the national economy and provided employment
opportunities in the past decades. Such an achievement is largely due to the favourable
natural conditions that provide abundant resources and productive fishing grounds,
together with China’s extensive labour force in rural areas. It is also further stimulated
by an increasing domestic demand for aquatic products and growing international
trade in fish products. 99 However, the rapid growth of China’s economy has put
enormous pressure on resources. China’s fisheries management has not been
95
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successful in the conservation of fisheries resources and protection of the fisheries
ecosystem during the rapid economic growth of the past years following political and
economic reform. The expansion of the fisheries industry has come at a high cost to its
resources and the environment.100

Overexploitation of Fisheries Resources
China’s fishing operations are conducted mainly along its coastal waters by many
small fishing vessels, thus the fish stocks in these waters have been depleted, and the
fisheries ecosystem has also been deteriorated. The first signs of overexploitation
appeared in the 1960s when there was an apparent drop in average productivity.101
Since then, landings have gradually shifted to a higher proportion of juvenile and lowvalue species. This shift resulted from the overexploitation of high-value traditional
species and a redirection of fishing effort to low-value species. 102 Many fishing
vessels are no longer economically viable, and in order to maximise their catches,
fishermen use fine mesh nets that catch everything.103 Despite lower productivity and
poor economic gains, investment in fishing has not stopped and many vessels
belonging to small fishing enterprises and individuals have been mechanised.104
At the same time, the number of China’s fishing vessels has grown
dramatically, thus substantially increasing fishing effort.105 According to Porter, China
has the highest fleet overcapacity in the world. 106 In the past decades China’s
expanded fishing capacity, including an increase in fishing gear, the development of
100
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fishing methods with high productivity, the drastic expansion of motorised fishing
vessels, and increasing numbers of people engaged in fishing and dependent on the
resource, has led to the continuous decline of fish stocks and habitat degradation.107
In 2000, China carried out the first national census on marine fishing
vessels. 108 The results of this census indicated that China had 244,300 registered
motor vessels, totalling 5.41 million gross registered tonnes (GRT), with a total power
of over 12 million kilowatts. 109 This increase in numbers and fishing capacity has
gone far beyond biologically and economically sustainable levels of fish stocks,110 as
the expansion has particularly occurred in China’s inshore waters where overfishing in
the past decades has exhausted most of the commercial stocks in these once fertile
waters. 111 Most inshore fishing grounds of high productivity have disappeared or
moved far away from the coast.112
Besides the continuing expansion of fishing vessels and the large number of
small vessels, the destructive fishing operations have also made the situation worse,
particularly with regard to the loss of conventional species.113 The dominant fishing
operations in China are trawling, fixed netting, and purse seining, with trawling
accounting for more than 50% of China’s total catch. 114 These methods have
comparatively high productivity but low selectivity of targeted stocks.115 Trawling, for
instance, is known to cause the indiscriminate catching of juvenile fish as well as
other non-targeted species, and it also causes severe damage to the habitat of fish
stocks.116 Other destructive fishing methods, such as the use of poison and explosives,
107
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and fine-mesh nets, all have a negative impact on fish stocks, and they destroy fish
habitats.
To identify the main causes of the serious decline in fisheries resources and to
improve the effectiveness of fisheries regulations, China implemented a series of
projects for fisheries resources and ecosystems.117 They included the survey on the
status of inshore and offshore fisheries resources, research on the physical, chemical
and biological properties of China’s main fishing grounds, habitats, migration patterns,
feeding mechanisms, reproduction and over-winter behaviour of major species. These
projects confirmed the interrelationship between overexploitation and the depletion of
fish stocks, and marine pollution and the deterioration of the fisheries ecosystem. The
intensive exploitation of coastal fish stocks has put China’s fisheries at a crucial stage,
where the availability of resources has become a significant factor threatening the
long-term sustainability of the fisheries industry.118

Deterioration of Fisheries Ecosystem
While vast benefits are gained from fisheries in China, their integrity is threatened
because of the many decades of intensive fishing. Alongside overexploitation, China
has experienced environmental problems that have resulted in the deterioration of the
fisheries ecosystem.
Destructive fishing operations damage fisheries habitat. Marine pollution also
degrades a healthy marine ecosystem. The issue of marine pollution in China went
unnoticed until the 1970s. Since then, rapid industrialisation has made pollution the
focus of concern for the last 25 years. The growing economy and dense population of
coastal areas have all contributed to deteriorating marine ecosystems. 119 Highly
populated, industrial cities produced heavily polluted waters made up of organic
matter and petroleum into the marine environment. 120 It is estimated that China
117
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discharges annually more than 6.4 billion tonnes of polluted water into the marine
environment. 121 The area of polluted seawaters in 2001 was about 173,390 square
kilometres,122 approximately 30,000 square kilometres of which is considered severely
polluted.123 The polluted water constitutes a serious threat to the survival of fish stocks.
There are various other economic activities in the coastal area aside from
fishing. These activities include tourism, development projects such as ports and
harbours, and human settlements. These accelerated onshore industries and coastal
construction activities have increased pollution and put great pressure on the marine
environment. According to the 2003 Report on Marine Environment of China, the
overall marine pollution in China was reduced as a consequence of improved
monitoring and surveillance.124 However, China still has 142,000 square kilometres of
polluted seawaters.125 Red tides occurred 119 times in about 14,550 square kilometres,
which shows an increase over the previous year.126 The pollution has pushed many
fish close to extinction.127
Other sea-use industries also have a negative impact on fisheries. For
instance, the sea-salt industry has four large industrial areas along China’s coastal
provinces (Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, and Jiangsu). When the salt fields receive tides,
they destroy large quantities of fish seedlings.128 Petroleum exploitation also has a
detrimental impact on fisheries resources, because it greatly increases the amount of
oil sludge in the seas, and the occurrence of oil gushing from wells results in severe
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damage to fish stocks.129 It takes a long time and much effort to recover the damage
from these sea-use industries, thus a degraded marine environment imposes a longterm threat to fisheries sustainability.

Key Factors Contributing to the Fisheries Problems
Many factors have contributed to the problems confronting China’s fisheries. The
primary culprits include excessive fishing effort, surplus fisheries labour, and a lack of
adequate management of resources. A more detailed statement of the factors include:
• continual increases in fishing effort due to population growth, migration to
coastal areas, and use of more efficient gear;
• few viable other sources of income to fisheries household and communities;130
• continued use of habitat-destructive fishing practices;
• degradation of coastal habitats from various causes, including pollution; and
• an overall lack of effective management that address issues across sectors and in
the context of a holistic management approach.131
These factors, either alone or combined, result in the decrease of fish catch and the
degradation of the marine environment. Coupled with habitat destruction and landbased pollution, overfishing has resulted in the continuous decline of fisheries
resources and the serious deterioration of the fisheries ecosystem. The underlying
cause of such a worrisome situation is the ineffectiveness of fisheries law and policy
and inadequate enforcement. This situation in turn is caused by the institutional
defects, poor legal awareness of the laws by fishermen, and the insufficient
monitoring and control of fishing vessels.

Institutional Defects
Although China’s fisheries industry started fairly early, its management in a real sense
129

See Zou, "The establishment of a marine legal system in China," p.40.
China faces employment pressure from the fisheries labour surplus (overcapitalisation and
oversupply of labour), and there are too many vessels and too many fishermen chasing a declining fish
stock. This issue is associated with China’s fishing capacity control, and it was intensified by the
jurisdictional shift of fishing grounds with the advent of the EEZ regime. For this reason, it will be dealt
with in Chapter 6 in the context of China’s implementation of its bilateral fisheries agreements.
131
Only in recent years has China started a coastal zone management program. However, it is not
possible to evaluate the outcomes of this program due to the unavailability of information.
130

105

began rather late. China’s first national fisheries law was only adopted in 1986. The
last two decades have seen immense expansion of China’s fisheries together with
mushrooming fisheries laws and regulations, but the implementation of these laws and
regulations has not been satisfactory due to institutional defects.132 The institutional
defects stem from two aspects: one is China’s limited legislative capacity which
affects the enforcement of fisheries law and policy; the other is the complex fisheries
administration which results in overlapping authority and implementation gaps.
China’s fisheries legislation lacks a comprehensive management doctrine,
and is not adequate to embrace the complexity of fisheries management. Many
fisheries laws and regulations tend to be enacted to resolve urgent issues or immediate
needs arising from the exploitation of fisheries resources. Thus many of the laws are
sectorial, single-purpose regulations. They are adopted without systematic
organisation and detailed investigation, and there is a lack of harmony with other
regulations.133 This has affected, to a large extent, the enforcement of these laws and
regulations.134
Some fisheries laws and regulations were enacted in the days when
sustainable development was not an important policy driver. As such they do not
reflect the principles and concepts of current fisheries management, nor do they reflect
the new principles advocated by international fisheries instruments. They tend to
regard economic, social and environmental factors as separate and unconnected to
fisheries management. China has taken economic development as its priority, and it is
still seeking a balance between the conservation of resources and the development of
the national economy. The lack of an integrated and holistic approach to legislation
has reduced the effectiveness of China’s fisheries laws and regulations.
Fisheries management in China is based on the distribution of resources. In
spite of the huge marine space under its jurisdiction and its large fisheries resources,
China has no ministry of fisheries or independent fisheries authority. The Fisheries
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Management Bureau (FMB), as China’s highest authority for fisheries, is under the
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), which also has responsibility for the grains and crops,
forestry, and animal husbandry sectors. The FMB is ranked lower administratively
than other ministries. The FMB does not have policy-making power, it can only raise
issues and draft regulations. These limitations become especially evident when
international cooperation is concerned. While the FMB has a Division of International
Cooperation, it lacks the capacity to handle international fisheries-related matters.
China needs to unify its fisheries administration into one ministry.135
The organisational structure of China’s fisheries administration appears far
more complex than it should be and results in inadequate enforcement. Subordinate to
the state FMB, China’s fisheries administration is divided into three coastal FMBs that
are responsible respectively for the Bohai/Yellow Seas; East (China) Sea, and the
South (China) Sea.136 Further down in this system are the local fisheries management
bureaus (LMBs), which manage the majority of China’ fishing vessels and their
owners by implementing fisheries laws and regulations. They are part of the national
fisheries administrative agencies and also part of the local governmental units. The
dual bureaucracies can cause problems when conflicts arise between economic
development and resource conservation. Officially, the LMBs are responsible for
fisheries management, but there is pressure within the government to increase fisherybased income and employment, especially by increasing the industrial fishing fleets.
Thus management objectives often have to be sacrificed for development demands.
What has further weakened the LMBs’ mission is that they are funded mostly
by local governments rather than by the state FMB. Their strengths and weaknesses
are related to the work of local government. Actions taken by them to implement
fisheries laws are motivated and/or constrained by their position within the local
government. Thus it is the operations of the government that influence the
implementation of fisheries law and policy. In many cases the development of the
fisheries industry has a higher priority than the conservation of resources. This
situation may get worse if the LMBs do not get enough funding from government.
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The LMBs may collect fees and fines from fisheries violations to support their daily
operation. While such an incentive exists, it is questionable whether LMBs can be
sufficiently impartial regulators. This may give rise to the situation where fishermen
violate the laws without too much concern about the legal liability as long as they are
prepared to pay the fines, or they are on good term with LMBs.137
Ranked above local governments and LMBs are the coastal provincial
governments. They also play a role in fisheries management as they share a significant
element of power through facilitating decision-making and enforcement. This
structure was created to separate the managerial functions of the national FMB from
local governments and LMBs, and to enable them to implement fisheries law and
regulations in accordance with the various situations of coastal provinces. However,
this management pattern does not strengthen fisheries management, because it is not
compatible with the mobile nature of fish stocks. Each coastal province considers the
exploitation of fisheries resources from its own particular interest, and the advantages
or potential of management measures cannot be effectively implemented in an
integrated manner. Conflicts over fisheries often arise between neighbouring
provinces. As a consequence, confusion, lack of information, and poor motivation at
provincial and local levels often occur. A typical feature of China’s fisheries
administration is the overlapping of authority and “implementation gaps” existing
simultaneously in management processes.

Poor Legal Awareness
Apart from the institutional defect analysed above, a poor legal awareness on the part
of fishermen is another important issue affecting the enforcement of fisheries laws and
regulations. In China, the natural resources belong to the state, and ‘law’ is perceived
by many Chinese people as tools to protect the interests of the state or the officials
who implement the law.138 Chinese people lack an in-depth understanding of law, and
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they tend not to trust or regard laws highly.139 This preconception is typically reflected
in the fisheries sector. Fisheries resources are considered common property, or the
property of governments. Fisheries laws and regulations are enacted to legitimate the
power of the state in controlling fisheries resources. There are no clear guidelines
defining the relationship between governments and economic entities.140 Fishermen
have a marked lack of understanding of the intention of fisheries law and regulations.
Confusion exists between the ownership and the right to exploit resources. This results
in the irresponsible exploitation and utilisation of resources.
As a socialist country, China’s fisheries management is governmentdominated. Fisheries policy-making and enforcement processes are controlled by the
government at different levels, thus constituting a command-and-control management
system. This system, combined with the common property nature of fisheries
resources, leaves the fisheries institutional framework inadequate to support effective
management. The framework provides fishermen with little motivation to comply with
laws but strong incentive to maximise short-term gains and bypass the regulations.
The only concern of fishermen is being caught and fined. Even if this happens, the
penalties are not grave enough to discourage them from committing further violations,
and they can easily recover their losses.141
There have been some efforts to improve fishermen’s awareness of the laws
and regulations, such as running of management programs and training courses for
fishermen. However, this approach is not without its own difficulties. Fishermen do
not always see the long-term benefits of effective resource management, and therefore
non-compliance with regulations and conservation measures is common.
As a result of economic reforms and the shift to a market economy, China has
provided private enterprise access to the natural resources through contracts or a
licensing system. This is particularly evident in the marine capture fisheries sector. In
contrast to public investment, the private sector plays an increasing role in the
fisheries industry. The increased private investment has resulted in the number of
fishing vessels owned by the private sector being three times more than state-owned
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vessels. 142 Under decentralised management, fishermen have the right to make
decisions about production and marketing. This often results in a lack of overall
planning and structuring of fishing effort, methods, and the distribution of fishing
capacity. This has also created management problems as small-scale and individual
fisheries are difficult to incorporate into a strategy for sustainable fisheries.
To resolve the side effects of decentralised management, fishermen’s
organisations and fisheries associations have been established. 143 They act as
coordinators for fish production, processing, and marketing activities and provide
services such as training and capacity building, and delivering information to
fishermen. However, the influence of these fishermen’s organisations is limited.

Inadequate Monitoring and Surveillance
As discussed above, China’s fisheries institutions have weaknesses in the enforcement
of fisheries law and policy.144 Limited physical capacity, such as insufficient personnel
and the lack of financial support to conduct field inspections and land-based
monitoring, further worsen the situation.
First, China’s vast seas and large amount of fishing grounds make monitoring
and surveillance inadequate. China still employs field inspections to monitor and
control fishing vessels, but the workforce of FMBs is hardly sufficient for the number
of fishing vessels and the areas to be patrolled. For instance in Jiangsu Province, there
are only four enforcement vessels at the provincial level, totalling 940 GRT, and 30
vessels at city or county level, all poorly equipped and under-motorised to manage a
province with a catch of over 500,000 tonnes.145 The enforcement vessels are not only
slower than the fishing vessels they supervise, but also lack the operating funds
required to sustain their normal operations. 146 The FMBs have been frustrated by
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difficulties in their enforcement and frequent violations by fishing vessels.147
Second, China’s large number of small fishing vessels makes the monitoring
and surveillance inadequate. China had a total of 487,297 motorised vessels, of which
348,896 are less than 20 horsepower.148 Most of them are not equipped with a Global
Positioning System (GPS), and cannot be detected by a land-based remote monitoring
system.149 They are free to enter fishing grounds at will and are widely scattered over
virtually all the inshore and offshore fishing grounds. They do not need landing
facilities so landing points for them are variable. Even for those that do need landing
facilities, China’s numerous small harbours make it easy for them to avoid being
caught by fisheries inspectors.150
Third, China’s unregistered fishing vessels make the monitoring and
surveillance inadequate. Besides China’s large number of fishing vessels, there are
vessels that are not legally registered, and they tend to conduct illegal fishing
whenever or wherever they can. 151 According to the first national fishing vessels
census in the year 2000, of China’s total fishing vessels, 28% lacked all the three
required documents (vessel inspection certificate, vessel registration certificate, and
fishing permit).152 These vessels are known as “three-‘no’s” vessels because they have
no name, no required documents, and no homeports.153 Another 21% lacked at least
one document. Of these problematic vessels, 72% are small crafts less than 12
metres.154 Destructive and illegal fishing is often conducted by these registered and/or
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unregistered small fishing vessels, 155 and this presents a serious challenge to the
effective enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations.

Conclusion
As one of the major fishing nations in the world, China’s fisheries sector has
contributed to its economic development, employment opportunities, and food
security.
China’s fisheries management reflects a long and slow process of policy deliberation
intended to cope with various situations including specifically the political,
economical and social environments. Such a management practice presents a complex
mixture of biological, economic, social, and political issues.
A review of China’s fisheries management has shown that the concepts and
practices applied to its fisheries have undergone two notable changes. One is the shift
from its exploitation-oriented fisheries to a conservation-and-exploitation oriented one.
The other is the incorporation of new concepts and management approaches. Most
notably, China has adopted sustainable development as a national strategy which has
been implemented into fisheries management practice.
However, there are obstacles confronting China’s fisheries and they are
seriously challenging its sustainable development. Driven by economic incentives and
population pressures, the development of China’s fisheries industry has come at a high
cost to its resources and marine environment. Institutional defects and inadequate
enforcement have left the objectives of fisheries law and policy largely unrealised.
The ineffectiveness of fisheries management threatens the long-term utilisation of
China’s fisheries resources.
The important role of the fisheries industry in the national economy and the
depletion of resources status require China to address its fisheries crisis. China has
taken steps to bring its management in line with the LOSC and international fisheries
instruments. China’s effort in this regard is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 CHINA’S DOMESTIC ACTIONS ON RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
Introduction
The last chapter concluded that China, in an effort to address its fisheries crisis, has
taken steps to bring it fisheries management in line with international fisheries
instruments. It is necessary for China to improve the compatibility of its national
fisheries law and policy with international requirements. This chapter will analyse
China’s legislative harmonisation and policy adjustment regarding the conservation
and management of its fisheries resources.
It will be shown that in the face of the seriously depleting resources and a
deteriorating ecosystem, China has to make a strenuous effort to address the problems
so to achieve long-term fisheries development. Along these lines China has taken the
conservation of fisheries resources as a theme for policy-making. The chapter presents
a series of China’s domestic actions to illustrate this point.
China’s action is seen from two aspects: one is to make its existing fisheries
laws and regulations compatible with international requirements; the other is to
introduce new management concepts and principles. China’s legislative harmonisation
and policy adjustment regarding the conservation of fisheries resources, fishing
capacity control, and the protection of the fisheries ecosystem are considered in detail.
It will be shown that in many areas, the amended Chinese fisheries law, together with
its updated policy have incorporated the requirements of international fisheries law
particularly the LOSC fisheries regime and the principles of the Code of Conduct.
By highlighting China’s domestic actions in addressing its management
problems, the chapter also points out the implementation gaps existing in China’s
management practices. It is concluded that limitations and inadequacies still exist in
China’s management practice, and great effort is needed to overcome these constraints.

Legislative Harmonisation and Policy Adjustment
Before the emergence of the EEZ regime, the general perception was that the depletion
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of fisheries resources was due to the lack of coastal states’ control over fish stocks.1
The EEZ regime was thus considered a big step in improving fisheries management,
because coastal states would take proper measures to conserve and manage fisheries
resources to achieve the objective of long-term utilisation of fisheries resources.2 This
is the case in China.
The establishment of the EEZ regime provides China with the impetus to
improve its fisheries management in a centralised system. This system is seen to be
contributing to a more rational and conservation-minded management practice. China
has made a move away from its previous practice, that is, more attention and effort has
been given to resources management and ecosystem protection. To improve the
compatibility between its domestic and international legal and policy framework,
China amended its national fisheries law and promulgated new regulations and rules to
address the issues concerning the conservation of its fisheries resources. By so doing,
China absorbed many up-to-date requirements promoted by international fisheries
instruments into its domestic practice.

Amendment of Fisheries Law
The Chinese fisheries management has unique characteristics due to the political,
social, and economic circumstances in which it is embedded, and its management in
principle and practice are typical of its developing nature as shown in Chapter 3.
China’s first national fisheries law was brought into being in 1986. As a consequence
of the 1986 Fisheries Law and its implementation regulations, China’s fisheries
management improved markedly along with the rapid development of its industry.
By virtue of this development, a series of regulations, measures, rules, and
technical standards governing different aspects of fisheries incorporating international
requirements were brought into being. 3 They encompass fisheries administration,
resource conservation, aquaculture enhancement, post-harvest processing, fishing
vessel control, fish trade, and environmental protection. The concept of resources
1
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conservation started to take a more prominent position. The use of destructive fishing,
such as explosives and poisons, were prohibited. Management measures regarding
closed zones/seasons, banned or restricted fishing gear and fishing methods, and
minimum mesh sizes were adopted. Other fisheries management measures were
enacted to protect fisheries resources, as well as fishing grounds.
However, after more than one decade, the 1986 Fisheries Law became
outdated, because it could not address the new issues surfacing from the changed
circumstances, brought about by economic reform, the open-door policy, and
transformation from socialism to a market economy.4 Specifically, the overall policy
guidance of the 1986 Fisheries Law promoted the development of fisheries. This
national law did not provide severe enough penalties in punishing the problems of
unsustainable use of fisheries resources and lack of compliance with the law, which
has resulted in a failure to deter illegal and unregulated fishing.5 As the conservation of
fisheries resources and the marine ecosystem has become a growing concern for
fisheries management, China had to make a move to address these issues.
Since the adoption of the 1986 Fisheries Law, China has enacted a series of
regulations to implement the national fisheries law, covering almost all aspects of
fisheries management. 6 Most of these laws and regulations were adopted before the
endorsement of the EEZ by China, and the EEZ concepts were not included in the
legislation. The 1986 Fisheries Law did not stipulate the fulfilment of China’s
responsibilities as a signatory to recent international conventions and agreements:
notably the LOSC and the Code of Conduct. It is also acknowledged that with the
establishment of the EEZ, the conservation of fisheries resources and the marine
ecosystem has become more urgent and difficult due to the vast sea areas covered.
More importantly, obligations of a contracting party, or signatory to international
conventions and agreements, need to be implemented by domestic legislation.7
In order to adapt to these changes and legalise the international requirements,
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China substantially amended its 1986 Fisheries Law in 2000.8 The amended version of
the national fisheries law came into effect on 1 December 2000 (Amended Fisheries
Law), and its implementation law is yet to be enacted.9 As the Amended Fisheries Law
covers all aspects of fisheries management, key provisions and major amendment
improvements will be discussed where relevant.

Licensing System and TAC Regime
The implementation of a licensing system is to limit the input of fishing effort and to
improve the management of the fishery so that it is more productive and more
efficiently utilised.10 Licensing systems provide information on the participants in the
fishing industry, i.e., number of fishermen, fishing area, effort, incomes, and other
information needed to manage the fishery. An integrated licensing system backed up
by other management measures helps to promote the rational utilisation of fisheries
resources. Since the advent of the EEZ regime, licensing systems have been widely
used as an effective measure to regulate open access to fisheries.
China first introduced a licensing system in 1979 when resources were on the
downturn. The licensing system called an end to open access to China’s fisheries.
Since the adoption of the 1986 Fisheries Law, China has extended the application of
the licensing system to all its fishing vessels.11 When the fish stocks in China’s fishing
grounds became increasingly low, conflicts over the exploitation and management of
the resources became more prevalent.12 To improve management, China updated its
licensing system in 1989 through the Measures on the Management of Fishing
Licences (1989 Measures).13
The 1989 Measures provided detailed regulations to implement the licensing
system.14 A licence authorises a fishing vessel to fish either in coastal waters, offshore
8

The 1986 Fisheries Law was amended in accordance with the Decision on the Amendment of the
Fisheries Law of the PRC adopted at the 18th Meetings of the Standing Committee of the NPC on 31
October 2000. The Decision consists of 25 amendments to the 1986 Fisheries Law.
9
It is expected to be completed in 2004 according to FMB’s agenda for fisheries legislation: available
from http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=1451 (accessed 15 March 2004).
10
See Moore, Coastal state requirements for foreign fishing; Moore, "Enforcement without force: new
techniques in compliance control for foreign fishing operations based on regional cooperation."
11
See 1986 Fisheries Law, Article 16.
12
The Provisional Measures on the Issuance of Fishing Licences was adopted by the State Bureau of
Aquaculture Products in 1979 (void). FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999)
(in Chinese).
13
See FMB, Complete Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese), pp.192-194.
14
The 1989 Measures, Articles 7, 8, 9, and 10.
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or on high seas with specified methods and to target only specified species. In order to
control fishing effort, the licences also limit a fishing vessel’s engine power and
regulate the use of certain fishing gear and methods, as well as setting the minimum
mesh size and percentage of juvenile bycatch.
The 1989 Measures classified fishing licences into three categories.15 These
included marine fishing licences (inshore and offshore fishing); inland water fishing
licences; and specially approved fishing licences. An offshore fishing licence does not
allow fishing in inshore fishing grounds, and the type of licence issued cannot be
altered.16
The 1989 Measures were amended in December 1997 to keep the licensing
system up to date. However, some management regulations were not changed, such as
the offshore and high seas fishing licences which were subject to the approval of the
State Council.17 This management approach was not efficient in controlling China’s
high seas fishing vessels; 18 nor was it consistent with the flag state responsibility
requirements under the Fish Stocks Agreement.19 This inadequacy was remedied by the
Amended Fisheries Law in 2000, which developed the licensing system from two
aspects.20
First, the Amended Fisheries Law extends the area that the licensing system
covers. Fishing activities conducted in China’s EEZ and joint fishing zones under
China’s bilateral fisheries agreements are also subject to the licensing system.21 This
jurisdictional extension matched the substantial regime change brought by the EEZ and
the bilateral agreements China signed with its neighbouring states. 22 To give more
weight to these changes, the Amended Fisheries Law adds two new requirements to the
licensing system.23 One is to require that fishing be conducted in conformity with the
15

Ibid., Articles 2 and 6.
Ibid., Article 17.
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Ibid., Article 7.
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See Y. Chen, "Explanation on the Draft Amendment to the Fisheries Law of the PRC," p.618.
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20
See The Amended Fisheries Law, Article 23.
21
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22
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23
The Amended Fisheries Law retains the basic conditions of the old version to license a fishing vessel
but it emphases that the licence holders must “conduct their operations in accordance with their licences
regarding the types of fishing, areas, seasons, mount of catch, fishing gear allowed to use, and they must
also abide by the regulations concerning the conservation of fisheries resources”. Documents needed for
a fishing vessel to apply for a license include: a vessel inspection certificate; a vessel registry certificate;
and other requirements laid down by fisheries authority under the State Council. See The Amended
Fisheries Law, Article 24.
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fishing quota specified in the license.24 The other is to require large and medium-sized
fishing vessels to fill in logbooks.25 The emphasis on fishing quota and logbooks has
improved the consistency of China’s fisheries management with international
requirements; particularly the collection of fishing data which is one of the basic
obligations under the post-LOSC instruments.26
Second, the Amended Fisheries Law introduces the concept of total allowable
catch (TAC) to China’s fisheries management.27 Based on the principle that the TAC
should be set strictly lower than the reproduction of the fish stocks, the fishing quota in
China’s jurisdictional waters is to be set by the MOA and approved by the State
Council.28 As an output control approach, the TAC has been used successfully in many
parts of the world to control fishing effort. The adoption of the TAC regime improved
China’s fishing licensing system by combining the traditional input control approach
with an output control approach. This is an obvious effort by China to implement its
coastal state obligations under the LOSC regime to determine the allowable catch of
the living resources in the EEZs.29 However, the determination of the TAC is based on
stock assessment and scientific surveys of the carrying capacity of the resources, which
requires considerable scientific and policy expertise including means of allocation and
detailed procedures for implementation.30 China has not yet enacted any regulations to
put the TAC into practice.31
China updated its licensing system again in 2002 by ministerial Regulations
on the Management of Fishing Licences (2002 Measures).32 While retaining the basic
management measures under the 1989 Measures, such as control of the number of
fishing vessels, engine power, and fishing gear, the 2002 Measures introduced some
24

Ibid., Article 24. The fishing quotas for the licence shall be issued by the LMBs.
Ibid., Article 25.
26
See The Compliance Agreement, Articles IV, V, and VI; The Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 14 (1).
27
The Amended Fisheries Law, Article 22 regulates that “[b]ased on the principle that fishing effort be
lower than the recruit of fish stocks, the State defines the total allowable catch of fisheries resources and
implements the total allowable catch system.”
28
Ibid.
29
See Chapter 1 for relevant discussion.
30
For factors affecting China’s TAC and recommendations, see Z. Han and S. Liu, "A discussion on the
adoption of TAC regime in China," China Fisheries Economics (in Chinese) 6 (2001), p.38.
31
China’s trial TAC regime with certain species is conducted in the Bohai/Yellow Sea and the East
China Sea. See FMB, "Analysis of China's fisheries economy in the first half year of 2001," China
Fisheries (in Chinese), 8 (2001), p.7. See also “Speeding up and recovering fisheries resources: An
interview of the Deputy Director Hecheng Zhang, FMB under MOA on ‘the Implementation Opinions
on the Control of Marine Fishing Vessels during 2003-2010’”, China Fisheries News, 3 December
2003, available from http://www.agri.gov.cn/gndt/t20031203_142718.htm (accessed 15 March 2004).
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new management approaches such as vessel quota control.33 The determination and
allocation of a quota, including the number of fishing vessels and engine power, is to
be strictly controlled nationwide.34 The quotas for offshore and distant water fisheries
are set by the state FMB.35 Building, rebuilding, and purchasing of fishing vessels is
strictly controlled by quotas to ensure the number of vessels and the engine power do
not exceed the designated quota.36 Quotas are adjusted when fishing vessels are sold
between provinces, but the overall quota is to be maintained.37
The 2002 Measures apply not only to China’s waters, but also to its nationals
and their vessels fishing in the joint management zones under bilateral agreements and
on the high seas.38 This is consistent with obligations under the post-LOSC fisheries
instruments. 39 The 2002 Measures classify four kinds of fishing grounds and seven
types of licences.40 Several new types of licences were introduced, including licences
for foreign fishing vessels and auxiliary fishing vessels. 41 Each type of licence
stipulates the areas, seasons, total catch, and permitted fishing gear to be used. Licence
holders must conduct fishing operations in accordance with the type of licence
issued. 42 Fisheries authorities at various levels are responsible for the approval of
fishing licences. Licences for larger trawler and purse seiner, fishing under agreements
with other states, and licence for foreigners are subject to the approval of the state
FMB.43
In order to prevent corruption, the issue and approval of fishing licences are
subject to an issuer guarantee regime. 44 This regime requires the issuer to be
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responsible for the authenticity of the content of the document and the licence. 45
Issuers are recommended by local governments and approved by authorities either at
provincial or ministerial level. Misconduct by the issuer may result in punishment such
as a warning, suspension, or cancellation of issuer certification.46
The licensing system has played a significant role in China’s fisheries
management. The latest amendments better suit the changed circumstances and
resource status, and particularly reflect some requirements under the international
fisheries framework. 47 By reducing the incentive to overfish, the licensing system
promotes the sustainable use of fisheries resources.48 However, the implementation of
the licensing system has resulted in a “licence of convenience” (LoC) in some
provinces. The LoC, in many aspects, is quite similar to the Flag of Convenience. The
owner of the vessel registeres his fishing vessel in a place other than his hometown to
avoid higher taxes and stricter management measures, or to get more quotas and
profit.49 The LoC indicates the loopholes in the 2002 Measures, and it undermines the
effectiveness of the licensing system. It is necessary for fisheries authorities to close
these loopholes and bring the LoC under control.

Resource Fee Collection Regime
In the face of declining fisheries resources, China has introduced a resource fee
collection regime to recover the cost of resource management and protection and
finance the maintenance and restoration of fish stocks. In January 1988, the MOA and
the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the Regulations on the Collection of
Proliferation and Maintenance Fee for the Chinese Prawn of the Yellow Sea and the
45

In January 2003, the MOA announced A List of Authorised Issuers, Gazette of the MOA of the PRC,
No. 245, available from http://www.agri.gov.cn/blgg/bgg/t20030209_52771.htm. The authorised issuers
total 57 nationwide including state and provincial levels. Of which, 6 issuers are responsible for the state
and coastal FMBs, and 51 for provincial FMBs.
46
See 2002 Measures, Articles 40, 41, and 42.
47
For instance, to manage fishing vessels according to the length of the vessel is a common international
practice. The licensing system defines the fishing rights of the vessel. When fishing rights are clearly
defined and understood and observed by users, they are not merely on paper. See Endeavouring to
establish and implement new licensing system, 2004, http://www/cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=1240
(accessed 22 March 2004).
48
According to MOA, the new versions of fishing licence, combining the three required certificates into
one, have been put into effect since 2004. See Circular on the Replacement of New Fishing Licences,
available from http://www/agri.gov.cn/zcfg/t20040107_153739.htm (accessed 22 March 2004).
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(accessed 22 March 2004).
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Bohai Sea.50 This was followed by the Measures on the Collection and Management of
the Proliferation and Maintenance Fee of Fisheries Resources (Resources Fee
Measures), which was issued by the State Council. 51 The Resources Fee Measures
aimed to recover the cost of resource restoration and the operating costs from the
management end. It stipulates that the taking of marine living resources, both wild and
artificially restored, within areas under China’s jurisdiction must comply with the
Resource Fee Measures and be liable to a resource fee.52
China began to collect resource fees nationwide in January 1989 through the
issuing and renewing of fishing licences.53 Anyone who did not pay the fee was not
given a licence and the annual renewal was cancelled. The annual fee was based on the
GRT of fishing vessels and type of fishing licences issued, and it ranged from 1%-3%
of the fishermen’s average annual income depending on the type of fishing over a three
years period.54
When circumstances changed, the Resource Fee Measures had to be adjusted.
In October 1989, the Provisional Measures on the Collection of Resource Proliferation
and Protection Fee of the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea, the East China Sea and the
South China Sea was adopted. This was modified again in December 1997 (1997
Resources Fee Measures). 55 Through this amendment and implementation, the
resource fee collection regime has become an important and effective tool of China’s
fisheries management.
The 1997 Resource Fee Measures specified the application of the measures,
the adjustment to the fees from various types of fishing according to vessels engine
power and fishing grounds.56 It is worth mentioning that the fees collected from the
vessels that fish in inshore grounds are higher than those fishing in the offshore
grounds, which would suggest an administrative manipulation of fishing effort by
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discouraging vessels from inshore fishing, as the fish stocks were already depleted.57
According to the 1997 Resources Fee Measures, the use of the resource fee
proceeds is limited to fisheries programs: 70% for resource proliferation and 30% for
resource maintenance. 58 This emphasis is to ensure that the fee collected from the
sector is used for fisheries, especially for the restoration and maintenance of the fish
stocks. The cost for the restoration and protection of migratory species in large area
accounts for 10% of the fee, and the other 90% is used for fish stocks living in coastal
and offshore areas.
The levy is used to establish hatcheries and release fingerlings, thus it
improves the status of fisheries resources. More than 10 resource restoration stations
have been established in the coastal area, and billions of fingerlings have been released
into the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea. The Chinese prawn
accounted for the largest amount of these fingerlings and their population has grown
significantly in the southern part of the East China Sea. A number of artificial fish reefs
were built in coastal waters to improve the ecosystem for fish stocks.
The resources fee collection regime started with a single species (Chinese
prawn) and later developed to cover all fish stocks. This indicates its positive outcomes
and acceptance in China’s fisheries management. The implementation of such a regime
in China’s social and cultural context where the cost of labour is low, serves as a
financial disincentive and ultimately results in reduced fishing effort.

Closed Zones/Seasons and Summer Moratorium
Another important management approach practised in China is the closed
zones/seasons control.59 Under this approach, designated fishing grounds are closed for
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specified periods to allow fish to grow and spawn without the disturbance of fishing.60
From a biological point of view, it is a conservation measure for the species whose
spawning and breeding seasons fit in with the closure. From a management perspective,
the implementation is relatively easy since there are no complex decisions to be made
such as fishing quotas and labour. For these reasons, the closed zones/seasons
approach has been carried out in China since the 1950s and has become the most
popular management method.61
In 1955 the necessity for the conservation of fisheries resources was
recognised in China’s coastal fishing grounds. This led to the setting up of a trawler
restricted line and some restricted fishing zones and closed zones/seasons by the State
Council through the promulgation of the Executive Order on Motor Trawler Restricted
Zone in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea.62 The trawler restricted
zone was set up with a line linking 17 coordinates close to China’s coast, and motor
trawlers are not allowed to fish at the western side of this line. Since then, trawling has
been banned within all the coastal waters, and China has been using closed zones,
closed seasons, or a combination of both as management tools to regulate its fishing.63
The closed zones/seasons control approach was adopted in the 1975 SinoJapanese Fisheries Agreement where five closed zones and two conservation zones
were set up to protect juvenile fish of some important species.64 Since the 1980s, more
and more conventional species such as the Chinese prawn, large and small yellow
croaker, and herring have been protected in conservation zones in which fishing is
banned during reproduction seasons. Some coastal provinces also set up seasonal
conservation zones for fish stocks to spawn and breed.65
The closed zones/seasons control improved, to a certain extent, the resources
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status, especially some commercial species, but it did not stop the depletion of
resources. Since 1995, a series of updated regulations were issued to adjust the closed
zones and seasons.66 From 1998 and each subsequent year, the fishing closure was
extended both in area and duration, including a large section of the South China Sea
(north of 12ºN). By virtue of these regulations, the closed zones have been extended to
cover the majority of China’s fishing grounds and lasted up to three months, mostly in
summer, thus the name “summer moratorium” being given to these measures. The
summer moratorium is an enhanced closed zones/seasons control to protect fish stocks
from excessive fishing capacity.67 Existing fishing bans during the summer moratorium
are listed below (see Map 4.1 China’s Summer Moratorium):
• Trawling is banned all year round in the Bohai Sea.
• Trawling and seining are banned in the area to the north of 35ºN of the Yellow
Sea from noon 1 July to noon 16 September.68
• Trawling and seining (except shrimp beam-trawling) are banned in the area
between 26º30’ and 35ºN from noon 16 June to noon 16 September.
• Trawling and seining are banned in the area to the south of 26º30’N of the East
China Sea from noon 1 June to noon 1 August.
• Fishing other than gilling, angling, and cage fishing is banned in the area to the
north of 12ºN of the South China Sea (including the Gulf of Tonkin) from noon 1
June to noon 1 August.69
• Light-fishing is banned from the boundary of Fujian Province and Guangdong
Province to the coordinates of 22º30’N; 23º30’N and 117ºE; 120ºE, from noon 1
June to noon 1 August. All the fishing bans applying to the East China Sea and
the South China Sea also apply to this area.
66
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• Fixed-net fishing is banned for at least two months of the year, and the specific
closed seasons can be set up by respective coastal provinces (municipalities
under central governments, and autonomous regions).70

Map 4.1

China’s Summer Moratorium
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70 FMB, "China Summer Moratorium," China Fisheries (2002), p.24.
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The summer moratorium is considered “a concrete and effective measure for China to
manage fishing effort and to achieve sustainable development.”71 It was reported as
being successful in achieving economic, ecological and social outcome and in helping
to curb the depletion of fish stocks.72 Considering China’s large number of fishing
vessels and population engaged in fishing, this has not been an easy task.73 During the
2-3 months of closed seasons, more than 117,000 fishing vessels nationwide have to
stay in port, leaving about 1.2 million fishermen idle.74 A special allowance from the
government enables fishermen to maintain their livelihoods during the summer
moratorium.75 However, the recovery of fish stocks from the summer moratorium has
not been as great as predicted due to some negative impacts.
First, the closures and restrictions on fishing by the summer moratorium do
not cover the spawning seasons of all commercial species, especially the migratory
stocks. Thus the bans cannot protect those species whose spawning season occur other
than in the closed seasons.76
Second, the summer moratorium does not reduce the number of vessels, nor
does it reduce the overall fishing capacity. After the summer moratorium, fishing
becomes more intense as fishermen try to catch as much fish as possible in the
shortened period of time using more efficient gear. An immediate, massive, and
sweeping fishing effort often depletes the recovered fish stocks in a very short time
and exerts great stress on the resources.77 Fishing effort as a whole is still much higher
than the reproduction of fish stocks and overfishing still exists as the main threat to the
sustainability of fish stocks.
Third, enforcement of the closed season is costly and ineffective.
Enforcement is often the heart of regulation, but it is costly where there is the need to
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patrol closed zones.78 During the closed season, fishermen and vessels are unemployed
and the overall costs to fishermen increase. The relatively plentiful resources and a
short-term increase in profitability lure some vessels to conduct illegal fishing in
closed zones/seasons. 79 This presents a great challenge for fisheries authorities in
detecting illegal fishing and improving the monitoring, control, and surveillance of the
closed fishing zones.

Fishing Capacity Control
Marine capture fisheries were the most important in China prior to the mid-1980s.
They used to account for 80%-90% of China’s total fisheries output, of which 91.7%
came from coastal fishing. Distant water fishing output was only 8.3% of the total.80
When the depletion of fish stocks in China’s marine fisheries became noticeable,
efforts to address the issue began. In April 1979, a government report on the state of
the fisheries pointed out that the expansion of bottom trawling had depleted the
resources, inducing the collapse of several species. 81 The report called for a
stabilisation of overall fishing effort at the existing levels, and the replacement of
trawling by gill net and other gear.
In May 1981, another government report on outstanding fisheries problems
identified over-capacity as the overriding issue.82 This report called for the suppression
of capacity growth through measures such as reducing inshore fishing effort, diverting
larger motor vessels to offshore fishing grounds, and transferring surplus fishing
vessels’ crew to processing and aquaculture.83 In 1983, a similar statement was issued
78

See Waugh, Fisheries Management: Theoretical Developments and Contemporary Applications,
p.144.
79
Failure in detecting and punishing illegal fishing during the summer moratorium could result in the
failure of the fishing ban in the whole area. See Y. Niu, "Improving, with experiences from the past and
determination for the future, the implementation of the summer moratorium in the Yellow/Bohai Sea,"
Fisheries Administration (in Chinese) 2 (2002), p.5.
80
China's marine aquaculture has developed rapidly since the mid-1980s. The shift in emphasis was the
result of policy adjustment in response to stocks to overexploitation of wild to aquaculture. With a large
increase in species and expansion of breeding areas, the output of aquaculture products rose from 1.93
million tonnes in 1987 to 7.91 million tonnes in 1997, with their proportion in the total output of the
marine harvest rising from 27% to 36%. See China, The Development of China's Marine Programs, p.7.
81
The State Council Approved the Report on National Fisheries Working Conference Submitted by the
State Bureau of Aquatic Products, see FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999)
(in Chinese).
82
The Statement of State Council on the Approval of Report on Some Fisheries Problems Submitted by
the State Bureau of Aquatic Products, May 1981, see FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and
Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese).
83
Ibid.
127

calling for a stop to the growing catches, stricter control over the increase in fishing
vessels, the protection of inshore resources through artificial restocking, and the
development of offshore fishing and distant water fisheries.84
Such an effort was made more earnest when fisheries resources continued to
be depleted. Ironically, the resource depletion has not been halted and the status of fish
stocks is far from satisfactory. 85 Calls by scientists for effective control of fishing
capacity were not given enough attention due to China’s overall policy emphasis on
economic development. 86 The rapid development of marine fisheries has achieved
tremendous success in increasing employment and improving food security, but the
expansion of fisheries has also caused mounting problems. China’s fisheries have
started to suffer from resources depletion and environmental degradation due to too
much fishing effort and destructive fishing operations.87 The introduction of the private
sector through fisheries reform during 1985-1992 and the relaxation of price control
over fisheries products have also contributed to this situation. The promotion of
fisheries development in the 1986 Fisheries Law also had a strong impact on the
increase in fishing effort and catches.
When the concept of sustainable development gradually established its
position worldwide, the issue of fishing capacity control was pushed to the top of
China’s fisheries management agenda.88 China refined its existing regulations on the
limitation of the access to fisheries resources. These regulations cover specific
requirements on fishing licences, the power of fishing vessels, fishing methods, and
mesh sizes.89 China also updated its traditional management measures to counter the
threats to fisheries resources imposed by its large population and the impact of rapid
economic growth. 90 These regulations emphasise control over fishing vessels to
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conserve fisheries resources.
A range of new policies was initiated to coordinate the development of the
fisheries industry. In 1997, China announced a “double control” policy as part of the
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), which aimed at limiting both the number and the
power of fishing vessels.91 In 1999, China issued Guidelines for Fisheries Industrial
Structural Adjustment.92 This guideline included:
• a stop to issuing permissions for building new fishing vessels except for distant
water fishing purposes;93
• a comprehensive crackdown of illegal fishing vessels;94
• a prohibition on foreign vessels fishing in China’s coastal waters;95
• the gradual establishment of a mandated vessel scrapping regime; and
• the strict prohibition of non-fisheries labourers from taking jobs in marine
fisheries.96
Along the same line, national policies, such as the fishing vessel reduction scheme and
the transferring of fishermen to other industries, have been implemented with
supporting programs. 97 In 1999 China opted for a ‘zero growth’ policy for marine
capture fisheries to control the irrational increase of fishing effort so as to conserve the
resources and achieve sustainable fisheries development.98 The “zero growth” policy
stipulated that FMBs and governments of coastal provinces at all levels are to take
appropriate measures to ensure that the annual marine catches do not exceed the 1998
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level. In other words, no growth is allowed in marine capture fisheries.99
The “zero growth” policy was further promoted into a “minus growth” policy
in 2000. In that year, China’s output of marine capture fisheries was 14.78 million
tonnes, which was 20.16 million tonnes less than that of 1999 (a drop of 1.35% for the
first time) (see Table 4.1 Output of China’s Marine Catch: 1996-2002).100 In 2002, the
“minus growth” policy achieved a further 2.1% reduction (excluding distant water
fisheries).101
The policy redirection through “zero growth” and “minus growth” is a
departure from the decades of ever-increasing output of China’s marine capture
fisheries. It is a critical policy adjustment, i.e., a strategic shift from a quantifiedexpansion industry to quality-and-efficiency motivated fishery. 102 It gave a clear
message to fishermen and the whole society that fishing effort has to be controlled,
resources have to be conserved, and fisheries have to pave the way for sustainable
development. 103 In an effort to control fishing capacity effectively, the FMB had
fishing licences nationwide reissued.104
TABLE 4.1 OUTPUT OF CHINA’S MARINE CATCH: 1996–2002
Please see print copy for Table 4.1
Source: FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001, p.215; China Fisheries Yearbook 2003
(in Chinese), p.211.
At the same time, to ease the pressures on capture fisheries and to release the excessive
fishing capacity in China’s coastal fishing grounds, China has promoted aquaculture,
distant water fisheries, and fish product processing industries as alternative
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employment. 105 These efforts reduced to a certain extent the pressure on China’s
coastal resources, but they were not effective enough in stopping the depletion of
resources, and they did not reduce the overcapitalised fishing capacity.106 As China
needs to fuel its economic development,107 its fisheries policies still aim to develop
fisheries, regardless of seriously depleted fish stocks and a deteriorating marine
environment.108

Adoption of New Management Approaches
As an outcome of enhanced communication with the outside world and active
involvement in international events, China has introduced many new management
concepts and approaches since the 1990s.109 They aim to strengthen China’s fisheries
management and to make its law and policy compatible with international fisheries
framework. The most important among them are the adoption of an ecosystem
approach and the promoting of responsible fishing practices.

Fisheries Ecosystem Approach
The importance of marine environment was identified in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21
where it is described as “an essential component of the global life-support system and
a positive asset that presents opportunities for sustainable development.” 110 The
ecosystem concept was most clearly reflected in the Fish Stocks Agreement with the

105

China emphasised fisheries development through structural adjustment, a shift of fishing effort from
inshore to offshore, and expansion of the post-harvest sector. See FMB, “To establish and implement a
new licensing system,” China Fisheries, see http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=1240
(accessed 15 March 2004).
106
China’s conservation and management practices affect global efforts to achieve sustainable fisheries.
For discussions on this account, see R. Watson and D. Pauly, "Systematic distortions in world fisheries
catch trends," Nature 414, No. 29 (2001), pp.534-536. Among the 20 fishing states whose fleets land
80% of the total marine catch worldwide, China takes the first place: Anon, The global fisheries crisis.
See http://www.archive.greenpeace.org/comms/cbio/nsea.html (accessed 18 March 2004).
107
In 2001, China’s per capita of GDP was only US$940. This suggests that China will retain its focal
task of economic development for the years to come. See World Bank, The Economist Intelligence Unit,
see http://ecropa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/china/intro/index.htm (accessed 14 July 2003).
108
See The State Council Approved the Opinions of MOA on Further and Fast Development of
Fisheries, Para.3, 1997, FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese).
109
The ecosystem approach was first adopted in China Ocean Agenda 21, see K. Zou, "Towards
sustainable management of China's marine fishery resources: Law and enforcement," Asia Pacific
Journal of Environmental Law 2, No. 3 & 4 (1997), pp.293-318, p.311.
110
See Agenda 21, Para. 17.1.
131

emergence of the precautionary approach as a guiding principle.111 In recent years, the
ecosystem approach has been accepted as an integral part of fisheries management and
it is embodied in the legislative objectives of many states. 112 However, to adopt a
successful ecosystem-based approach to manage fisheries has not been easy, as it must
be integrated with clear objectives to be effective.113 With seriously depleted fisheries
resources and degraded environment, China has made notable effort to implement the
ecosystem approach.114
In comparison with other marine laws and regulations, the laws and
regulations on marine environmental protection are more complete and systematic. The
principal law in this field is the Marine Environment Protection Law (MEPL).115 As
China’s first national law on marine environment protection,116 the MEPL is based on
the objectives of China’s Environmental Protection Law (EPL). 117 The principal
objectives of the MEPL are to protect the marine environment, conserve marine
resources, maintain ecological balance, and promote sustainable economic and social
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development.118
As a basic law in protecting the marine environment, the MEPL provides
detailed regulations to prevent the marine environment from being damaged or
polluted. 119 It specifies scientific standards on marine environmental quality, which
indirectly improve the condition of the fisheries ecosystem.120 The MEPL specifically
addresses the conservation of marine living resources, and it proposes the
establishment of marine nature reserves to protect high-value marine resources and the
ecosystem. 121 The MEPL also outlines a coordinated system between various
governmental agencies to control marine environmental pollution.122
China, in the past decades, has also adopted other national laws such as the
Law of PRC on the Use of Sea Areas (Sea Areas Law) to enhance the management of
the marine environment.123 The Sea Areas Law was adopted in October 2001 and was
put into effect in January 2002. It seeks to use property rights and a quasi-exclusive
ownership approach to manage the principal sea uses and resources in China’s internal
waters and territorial seas.124 The Sea Areas Law promotes the rational utilisation of
China’s seas by bringing them under one umbrella with an integrated management
approach. Its framework classifies sea uses by granting licences according to their
functions. Users of the seas need to apply to a central registry for a licence to get the
registered right of sea use.125 Thus a fundamental system is set up with the objective of
strengthening the use of China’s sea areas and protecting the lawful rights and interests
of the users.126
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In an effort to protect the fisheries ecosystem, China has allocated some
project funding to address marine environmental deterioration. A series of measures
have been taken to strengthen the ecological environment of spawning, feeding, and
wintering grounds of fish stocks, and the ingress and egress of migrating species.127
China has also established professional standards to protect the ecological environment
of fishing grounds including:
• Water Quality Standards for Fishing Grounds;
• Regulations on the Supervision and Control of the Environmental Sanitation of
Shellfish-farming Areas;
• Shrimp-farming Drainage Standards;
• Regulations for the Administration of Aquaculture Environment; and
• Technological Rules for Monitoring Fishing Grounds.128
A network for the protection of the fisheries ecosystem, including 27 monitoring
stations nationwide and 59 marine protection zones, has been established by the state
and coastal provinces.129 China has also developed a national system of marine nature
reserves, and each marine reserve is divided into core, buffer and experimental
zones.130 These conservation zones cover gulfs, islands, estuaries, coasts, coral reefs,
mangrove swamps, coastal lagoons, marine natural history sites, seaweed beds and
wetlands which have been declared, covering a total area of 12,900 square
kilometres.131 To give effect to these measures, China has promulgated the Procedures
for the Administration of Marine Reserves based on the guiding principle of
“conservation first, appropriate exploitation and sustainable development.”132
China’s environmental laws, administrative regulations, and technical
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standards address the issues affecting fisheries ecosystems from two aspects. First,
they strengthen the management of fisheries to prevent overexploitation and
destructive fishing operation and, second, they emphasise the interrelated nature of the
ecosystem and the survival of fish stocks to protect the marine environment. 133
Through these regulations, a better ecosystem that sustains fisheries is expected to be
established.

Promoting Responsible Fishing Practice
The Amended Fisheries Law extends China’s jurisdiction over fishing activities to its
EEZ, and emphasises the conservation of fisheries resources. It particular, it
incorporates the guidelines and principles of the Code of Conduct, and it improves
enforcement through enhanced legal liability and increased severity of penalties.134 As
discussed in Chapter 2, the purpose of the Code of Conduct is to help countries to
develop or improve their fisheries in order to reach long-term sustainable utilisation
and management of fisheries resources. 135 The Code is holistic in approach while
offering many specific solutions that are easy to implement, and its principles are
universally acceptable and applicable. However, the Code is a non-binding instrument,
and its effective implementation can only be achieved by states through national
fisheries policies and legislation. In this way, the guidelines and principles of the Code
closely align with the interests of national government for sustainable fisheries.
Although sustainable development has been promoted in China since the
1990s, 136 the concept of “responsible fisheries” is still not an established practice.
Instead, illegal and irresponsible fishing is still common. The inadequacies of China’s
fisheries management has led to a production-oriented industry that encouraged
maximum catches and increased harvest capacity.137 This in turn has resulted in the
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uncontrolled expansion of the fishing fleet, the destructive use of the fragile ecosystem,
the overexploitation of fish stocks, and damage to the fisheries ecosystem.138 Through
the amendment of the 1986 Fisheries Law, China aims at building up a norm for
responsible fisheries and to eliminate illegal and destructive fishing practices by
strengthening legal liability against violations.139
Illegal and destructive fishing present a major threat to sustainable fisheries,
and the Amended Fisheries Law particularly increases punishment to address this
threat. It strictly bans fishing by methods such as the use of explosives, poisons, and
electricity.140 The Amended Fisheries Law specifies the maximum amount of fines and
punishment for illegal and destructive fishing including:
• confiscation of illegal catch and unlawful income, and imposition of a fine of no
more than RMB 50,000 Yuan (US$ 6,000);
• in serious cases, confiscation of fishing gear and cancellation of a fishing licence;
• in particularly serious cases, confiscation of the fishing vessel; and
• criminal liability according to China’s Criminal Law.141
The Amended Fisheries Law authorises fisheries authorities at state and provincial
levels to designate criteria for specially protected species. These criteria include the
allowable catch of such species, restricted fishing zones/seasons, banned or restricted
fishing gear and methods, minimum mesh sizes, as well as other measures for the
general protection of these species. 142 The inclusion of a wide range of offences
addresses the threats affecting the sustainability of fisheries resources. At the same
time, the severe penalties help to achieve responsible fisheries in China.
Another important improvement of the Amended Fisheries Law regarding
legal liability is to allow the violation at sea to be prosecuted after the vessel has
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returned to port.143 For violations at sea, if the evidence is sufficient but administrative
sanctions cannot be defined or implemented on the spot, the fisheries officials can hold
the fishing licences or detain the fishing vessels. 144 In such cases administrative
sanctions shall be decided and imposed after the vessels are back at port. The change
from on-site prosecution to post-prosecution takes into consideration the characteristics
of the fishing industry and is more practical and efficient.
The Amended Fisheries Law regulates cases where fishing is conducted in
violation of the provisions for restricted fishing areas and closed seasons; banned
fishing gear or methods; and not having a fishing licence. It also includes regulations
on the damage to fisheries waters and fisheries ecological systems; accidental pollution
of fisheries resources; illegal fishing or survey by foreign fishermen and fishing
vessels in waters under China’s jurisdiction; and the abuse of rights by fisheries
officials.145 These provisions on legal liability enhance the authority and influence of
the conservation and management measures. They set up a legal basis for responsible
fisheries. China has moved one step towards sustainable fisheries management.
The international fisheries instruments emphasise the importance of scientific
data, and the development of responsible fisheries has highlighted the need for
scientific data. 146 However, no relevant laws or regulations can be found in China
regarding fisheries scientific data.147 Recent years have seen some efforts by China in
addressing the issue of scientific data. 148 China has participated in international
cooperation on the exchange of fisheries scientific and technical data,149 and has joined
international agencies to develop fisheries information and data by getting assistance
from foreign experts in the form of short-term training courses.150 China has set out a
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plan to establish a national database for the management of marine living resources.151
This will include information on licences, quotas, species, closed zones/seasons, size
or age limits for the fish caught, information requirements for fishing vessels and the
fish caught, enforcement procedures, and illegal fishing.152 Nevertheless, China needs
to accelerate its steps to overcome its technical and financial constraints to improve the
availability and quality of scientific data.153

Conclusion
This chapter discussed China’s national actions in achieving the harmonisation of its
law and policy according to international fisheries instruments. Frustrated by the
depleting resources and a deteriorating ecosystem, China is making an effort to find
achievable ways to address the issues affecting its fisheries. Such an effort in
legislative and policy changes is seen from the amendment of its national fisheries law
to improve its management objectives, to control its fishing capacity, combat illegal
and destructive fishing practices, and the protection of the fisheries ecosystem.
Overall, China has responded to international calls and fallen in line with the
management measures of international fisheries instruments, particularly the LOSC
obligations on the conservation of fisheries resources and the principles of the Code of
the Conduct. As for enforcement, there have been some recent positive developments.
However, the progress has been slow and implementation has been selective and
incomplete. China’s fisheries management still does not meet the requirements of
sustainable fisheries. Further measures are still required to improve the effectiveness of
its fisheries law and policy.
China’s fisheries management has been hampered by many constraints due to
economic pressures and an increasing population. The chapter identified the causes of
China’s excessive fishing capacity, which has a close relationship with its overriding
priority to develop its economy. A developing economy, such as China’s, inevitably
generates an increased demand for the exploitation of natural resources, which puts
151
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China’s conservation effort up against economic pressures. These pressures are so
strong that they often override management measures. Thus the decline of fisheries
resources in China is a symptom of many complex problems that have no easy
solutions. Sustainable fisheries management in China is unlikely to be achieved
without a hard fight.
Facing the difficult challenge of reversing the trends of destruction, China has
to overcome many management constraints to improve the status of the resources and
the marine environment. The chapter indicates that the LOSC and other international
fisheries instruments provide China with an opportunity to achieve sustainable
fisheries, thus it is crucial for China to develop its fisheries in accordance with
international requirements. China’s effort in fulfilling its obligations under the
international instruments regarding maritime zones and distant water fisheries will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5 CHINA’S MARITIME LEGISLATION AND FLAG
STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
Introduction
Many changes have occurred in international fisheries management since the entry into
force of the LOSC. Chapter 2 examined the major post-LOSC fisheries instruments:
the major principles and management measures of the Compliance Agreement, Fish
Stocks Agreement, Code of Conduct, and IPOA-IUU. It was shown that these
instruments have made substantial improvements in the conservation and management
of fisheries resources, particularly in areas of high seas fisheries. Against this
background, this chapter discusses China’s responses to coastal state’s rights in
maritime zones entitled by the LOSC and flag state responsibilities regarding its
distant water fishing fleets.
China’s responses to the international fisheries framework are at two levels:
legislative implementation of the EEZ regime and implementation of flag state
responsibilities. This chapter starts with an analysis of China’s domestic legislation on
maritime zones. The Chinese laws on the territorial sea/contiguous zone and the
EEZ/continental shelf are selected to illustrate China’s responses to the LOSC
framework. Fisheries-related elements within these laws are scrutinised to determine
the extent to which China’s implementation is consistent with its LOSC obligations.
A substantial part of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of China’s
practice on flag state responsibility. Developing distant water fisheries is one of the
two ways of reducing China’s excessive fishing pressure (the other being the
development of aquaculture). As a major distant water fishing nation (DWFN), China
has to cope with the requirements imposed by the Compliance Agreement and the Fish
Stocks Agreement and to fulfil its obligations as a flag state. This chapter highlights
China’s policy adjustment for distant water fisheries as responses to the management
measures of the two agreements, and points out the constraints facing China’s fisheries
management.

Maritime Legislation and Fisheries Implication: Coastal State Rights
China signed the LOSC on 10 December 1982, the very day it was opened for
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signature, together with 118 other states.1 On 15 May 1996, China ratified the LOSC.2
China’s ratification has brought about strong impact on its maritime legislation and
practice in the course of fulfilling its LOSC obligations.3 The LOSC provides China
with an opportunity to consolidate its links with the world in the field of fisheries.4 As
a coastal state, the ratification of the LOSC secured China’s sovereignty and sovereign
rights over three million square kilometres of maritime space, which provided China
with a vital opportunity to develop its “Blue Economy” and fisheries industry.5 This
enabled it to take part in world marine affairs, and more importantly, to pursue a
sustainable development strategy consistent with international standards.
It may be recalled that the LOSC grants coastal states full sovereign rights to
the conservation and utilisation of the fisheries resources of their EEZs. Meanwhile, it
also obligates coastal states to ensure that the living resources in their EEZs are not
endangered by overexploitation. 6 To implement the LOSC regime, China declared
maritime zones and enacted national legislation. The most important legislation
include the Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone enacted in
1992 (1992 TS/CZ Law) and the Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf enacted in 1998 (1998 EEZ/CS Law).7 These two fundamental
maritime laws also have important fisheries implications; they thus merit a discussion.

Legislation on Territorial Seas
China’s first national statement regarding the territorial sea was the Declaration of the
Government of the PRC on China’s Territorial Sea announced in September 1958
1

See K. Zou, "Chinese approaches to international law," in China's International Relations in the 21st
Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts, ed. W. Hu, G. Chan, and D. Zha (Lanham: University Press of
America, 2001), p.182.
2
See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic
of China on the Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1996. For the
English version, see SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations, p.199.
3
M. J. Valencia and J. M. V. Dyke, "Vietnam's national interests and the Law of the Sea," ODIL 25
(1994), p.217.
4
E. Zhao, "To speed up the progress of China's marine legislation," Ocean Development and
Management (in Chinese) 13, No. 3 (1996); Wolfrum, "The legal order for the seas and oceans," in
Entry into Force of the LOSC (1994 Rhodes Papers), ed. M. H. Nordquist and G. Moore (1995), p.162.
5
See "Better manage and utilise the ocean to benefit the future generations," Ocean Development and
Management (in Chinese), No. 3 (1996), p.1.
6
The LOSC, Article 61 (2).
7
The 1992 TS/CZ Law was adopted by the Standing Committee of NPC in 1992. For the Chinese and
English Version, see SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations, pp.4-6; pp.201-215. The 1998
EEZ/CS Law was approved by the same legislative authority in 1998. For the Chinese and English
versions, see SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations, pp.11-14; pp.210-215.
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(1958 Declaration). 8 The 1958 Declaration was announced five months after the
conclusion of the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I),
and it reflected the general principles concluded in UNCLOS I and represented by the
Geneva Conventions. 9 As China’s early practice of the law of the sea, the general
position of the 1958 Declaration was effectively carried out on matters concerning
China’s territorial seas.
The 1958 Declaration was silent on fisheries, but it declared a 12 nm
territorial sea.10 This action may have been necessitated by the desire to control foreign
fishing activities in its coastal waters.11 This is evidenced by the fisheries agreements
signed between China and Japan dating back to 1955. 12 The protection of China’s
fisheries resources may be one of the impetuses for defining a wider territorial sea.
China’s action to adjust its territorial sea regime to conform to the LOSC
framework is made clear by the 1992 TS/CZ Law.13 In general, the 1992 TS/CZ Law
maintained the principles of the 1958 Declaration. 14 It improved the territorial sea
8

See Declaration of the Government of the PRC on China’s Territorial Sea. For Chinese and English
versions, see SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations pp.1-2; pp.197-198. According to
Greenfield, China acknowledged the concept of territorial waters as early as 1874, see Greenfield,
China's Practice in the Law of the Sea, p.57. It defined the application of China’s sovereignty (Para. 1
states that China’s sovereignty applies to some islands separated from the mainland and four large
groups of archipelagoes in the South China Sea); established a 12 nm breadth territorial sea measured by
straight baselines; claimed internal waters including the Bohai Sea and Qiongzhou Strait; and required
foreign military vessels to obtain permission before passing through China’s territorial sea. See 1958
Declaration, Paras 1, 2, and 3.
9
The adoption of some Geneva principles indicates China’s intention to stay within the broad
framework of the Geneva Conventions, see C. Park, "Oil under the troubled waters: the Northeast Asia
sea-bed controversy," in East Asia and the Law of the Sea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press,
1983), p.17. For China’s attitude towards the four Geneva Convention, see Gao, "China and the LOS
Convention," pp.199-201. See also J. Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air and Environment
(Alpen ann den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), p.18.
10
The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone does not specify the extent of the
territorial sea, but common practice then was 3 nm.
11
Park is of the opinion that China’s claim to 12 nm territorial sea should be viewed against its bitter
history of being invaded on six occasions from the sea. See Park, "Oil under the troubled waters: the
Northeast Asia sea-bed controversy," p.16. See also Wang, "China and the law of the sea," p.582.
12
See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion on these agreements.
13
For discussions, see L. Wang and P. Pearse, "The new legal regime for China's territorial sea," ODIL
25 (1994), p.434; M. Herriman, "China's Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Law and International
Law of the Sea," Maritime Studies January-February (1997), pp.15-20; Y. Song and K. Zou, "Maritime
Legislation of Mainland China and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential
Challenges for the United States," ODIL 31 (2000), pp.303-345.
14
The 1992 TS/CZ Law remains the 12-nm breadth of territorial sea, straight baselines, prior approval
of foreign military vessels, and sovereignty over China’s archipelagos and islands claimed in the 1958
Declaration. See Articles 2, 3, 6. Article 2 of the 1992 TS/CZ Law specifically mentions the name of the
claimed islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in particular, the Daoyu (Senkaku)
Islands. Some countries of East Asia expressed concern over this announcement: Japan complained that
China’s claim to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands is illegal; Vietnam claims sovereignty over all of the
Spratly Islands and protested against China’s TS/CZ Law. This is because the fishing activities in these
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regime in a number of aspects, including control over foreign scientific research and
other activities;

15

clarification of enforcement powers/authorities;

establishment of a contiguous zone.

17

16

and the

The 1992 TS/CZ Law sets forth the legal

framework for China’s sovereignty, national interests, and maritime security.18
The 1992 TS/CZ Law contains no provisions regarding fisheries. This is
consistent with the LOSC framework on territorial sea where fishery-related activities
are subject to coastal states’ full sovereignty. 19 China’s sovereignty applies to its
territorial sea including fisheries resources and the control of foreign fishing access.
The regulation of fisheries resources in China’s territorial sea is subject to its national
fisheries laws and regulations.

Legislation on the EEZ
China proclaimed its EEZ upon the ratification of the LOSC in 1996.20 This enabled
China to declare sovereign rights over a significant ocean domain, guaranteed its
areas were traditionally conducted by all these states, China’s claims in a sense affect the fishing
interests of the states concerned). See, Anon, "Testing the waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12
March 1992, p.9; ‘L. G. Cordner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea," ODIL 25
(1994), p.65.
15
Article 11 of the 1992 TS/CZ Law requires all international organisations, and foreign organisations
or individuals obtain approval before carrying out scientific research and other activities.
16
See Articles, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of the 1992 TS/CZ Law. The 1958 Declaration was silent about
the control of territorial sea. It might be subject to domestic regulations in this regard.
17
See the 1992 TS/CZ Law, Articles 4 and 13. It is worth noting that Article 13 provides that China
exercises control in the contiguous zone to prevent and impose penalties for activities violating Chinese
laws and regulations on security customs, fiscal, sanitary, or entry-exist control within its territory,
internal waters, or territorial sea (emphasis added). It can be see that security is of the most concern to
China. Adding security control is said to be on the basis of existing states practice and China’s special
circumstances. See X. Ni and A. Zhao, A Introduction to Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (in
Chinese) (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 1993), p.84. Morgan is of the view that the security zones
claimed by China and North Korea in the Yellow Sea, though not sanctioned by the LOSC, appear to
contribute to the stability of the region. See J. R. Morgan, "Maritime zones in the Yellow Sea and their
effects on SLOC security," in The Regime of the Yellow Sea: Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation
in the Changing Environment, ed. C. Park, D. Kim, and S. Lee (Seoul: The Institute of East and West
Studies, 1990), pp.59-61.
18
In 1996, China promulgated some baseline coordinates upon its ratification of the LOSC. See
Declaration of the Government of the PRC on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea of the PRC, SOA,
Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations pp.7-10; pp.206-209. This brought an end to the uncertainty
of China’s territorial baseline and produced a more effective position to protect China’s sovereignty. For
a discussion, see Zou, "The Establishment of a Marine Legal System in China," p.28.
19
Articles 17, 19(2) (j), and 51 of the LOSC regulate fishery related activities under coastal states’
sovereignty. It regards the right of innocent passage for foreign fishing vessels in coastal states’
territorial sea (fishing is prohibited); Article 42(1) (c): the stowage of fishing gear; and Article 51(1) for
archipelagic water states to recognise existing treaties and traditional fishing rights of other states.
20
See note 4, Para. 1 provides that “China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an EEZ of
200 nm and the continental shelf.” Para. 2 states that "China will effect, through consultations, the
delimitation of maritime boundaries with the states whose coasts opposite or adjacent to China
respectively on the basis of international law and in accordance with the equitable principle."
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growing interests in ocean-related activities, and provided an impetus for China to
focus more on the sea and resources bordering its landmass. China finalised its law on
the EEZ and continental shelf by adopting the 1998 EEZ/CS Law.21 This law ensures,
with its 16 articles, China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and
continental shelf and safeguards China’s national interests. 22 It provides a legal
framework to manage China’s marine resources, particularly fisheries resources
according to the requirements of the LOSC.23
Regime on EEZ Fisheries
As provided by the LOSC, China is required to take necessary measures to prevent the
living resources of its EEZ from being overexploited.24 These resources include the
straddling stocks, highly migratory species, and marine mammals. 25 China claims
primary interests in anadromous stocks originating in China’s rivers,26 and the same
right to catadromous species that spend the greater part of their life cycle in China’s
EEZ.27
The LOSC requires a coastal state to determine its allowable catch in its
EEZ. 28 Where the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire
allowable catch, it is required to grant other states access to the surplus of the
allowable catch. 29 However, China’s 1998 EEZ/CS Law does not have provisions
regarding a surplus. 30 China’s coastal waters have been overexploited for several

21

See note 7. It is obvious that this legislative action was stimulated by its neighbouring states’
legislative move on the same subject. Japan and South Korea promulgated their EEZ and continental
shelf in 1996, respectively. See Chapter 6 for details.
22
See Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental
Shelf, 1998, Article 1. The LOSC grants coastal states sovereign rights to the natural resources of their
EEZs and jurisdiction over certain activities. See The LOSC, Article 56.
23
China employed the relevant provisions of the LOSC to define its EEZ and sovereign rights. See
Articles 2 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law and Articles 55 and 57 of the LOSC.
24
Article 5 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law largely repeats Article 56 of the LOSC.
25
1998 EEZ/CS Law, Article 6.
26
It should be mentioned that some species of salmon in the North Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan
originate in China's rivers, and China has the right and interest in the utilisation and conservation of such
species. However, China is not a member of the 1992 Convention on the Conservation of the
Anadromous Species in the North Pacific Ocean. For a fuller account, see K. Zou, "International Legal
Framework on the Anadromous Stocks of the North Pacific" (in Chinese), Proceedings of the
Conference on International Fisheries Laws and Policy (Beijing: FMB, 1995), pp.160-167.
27
1998 EEZ/CS Law, Article 6.
28
See Chapter 1 for relevant discussion.
29
The LOSC, Article 62.
30
National legislation of states does not generally provide for the determination of the allowable catch,
the promotion of the optimum utilisation of the living resources and the access by other states to the
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decades, and there is no surplus left for foreign fishing vessels. Even if there is a
surplus, the required data to determine the allowable catch may be difficult for China
to provide, as it, to date, has not put the TAC regime into practice in its fisheries
management. Without determining the allowable catch, it might not be possible for
China to grant the surplus to other states.31 Nonetheless, the 1998 EEZ/CS Law does
not prohibit foreign fishing in China’s EEZ. 32 Article 5 of this law provides that
foreign fishing vessels need to get a permit and strictly observe China’s relevant laws
and regulations as well as international agreements to which China is a party.33 This
provision allows China flexibility.34
Regarding enforcement in China’s EEZ, Article 12 of the EEZ/CS Law makes
it clear that China may take measures such as boarding, inspection, arrest, detention,
and judicial proceedings over foreign fishing vessels to ensure compliance with
Chinese laws and regulations.35 However, this law does not specify any operational
procedures. The lack of specific operational regulations leaves the law incomplete and
difficult to implement. This gap has been filled by several ministerial regulations in
1999.36
The LOSC recognises the historic title or historic waters in Articles 10 (6), 15,
and 46 (b) without defining them. Elferink observes that the LOSC regime for such
waters is to be determined in accordance with customary international law.37 Article 14
of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law provides that the provisions of “this law shall not affect the
historic rights that China enjoys.” This provision is confusing in that it does not specify
what provisions might affect China’s historical rights, and it is not clear what

surplus of the allowable catch, as set out in Articles 61 and 62 of the LOSC. See Moore, Coastal state
requirements for foreign fishing, p.4.
31
The LOSC, Article 56 (1) (a).
32
1998 EEZ/CS Law, Article 5. The foreign fishing rights in China’s EEZ are also guaranteed by
bilateral agreement.
33
Ibid., Article 5.
34
This provision takes into account the practical situation of fisheries resources and consistency with the
LOSC obligations. It also allows China to decide a surplus when fisheries resources are restored in the
future. See K. Zou, "China's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf: developments, problems,
and prospects," Marine Policy 25, No. 1 (2001), p.75.
35
1998 EEZ/CS Law, Article 12 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law echoes Article 73 of the LOSC.
36
In June 1999, the MOA issued the Provisional Regulations on Foreigners and Foreign Fishing Vessels
in the Sea Waters under the Jurisdiction of China. Series No. 18 of the MOA, 24 June 1999, FMB,
Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese). See Chapter 6 for an analysis.
37
A. G. O. Elferink, "The islands in the South China Sea: How does their presence limit the extent of
the high seas and the area and the maritime zones of the mainland coasts?" ODIL 32 (2001), p.172.
145

“historical rights” are being referred to. 38 Arguably these rights refer to traditional
fishing rights in the South China Sea, as China claims historic title to these waters.39
There is an opinion that China’s claim in Article 14 (also Article 4) is intended
to cover the EEZ and continental shelf of other states and would inevitably cause
conflicts.40 This opinion has raised another fisheries issue associated with China’s EEZ
regime, that is, the overlapping EEZ claims between China and its maritime
neighbours. 41 China has taken steps to settle fisheries disputes by signing bilateral
fisheries agreements pending the delimitations of overlapping EEZ boundaries. It
remains to be seen, however, what measures could be worked out between China and
its maritime neighbours to resolve this unspecified claim to historical rights.42
Issues Regarding EEZ Enforcement
In regard to EEZ enforcement, there is great variation in the national regimes that
coastal states have put in place.43 China’s general approach towards the international
conventions and agreements it has ratified is to incorporate them into its national
laws.44 In the event of any inconsistency, international law prevails,45 except where
there is clear legislative intent to the contrary. However, China has adopted strict
domestic measures to control the activities of other states in its EEZ in recent years,
resulting in some debate about their legality.46
According to the LOSC, the EEZ is an area of shared rights and
responsibilities between coastal states and foreign states.47 China holds the view that a
38

There was no explanation of this provision during its legislative process. For a comprehensive
discussion, see K. Zou, "Historic Rights in International Law and in China's Practice," ODIL 32 (2001),
pp.149-168.
39
See J. Li and D. Li, "The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note," ODIL 34
(2003), p.292.
40
See N. H. Thao, "China's maritime moves raise neighbours' hackles'," Vietnam Law and Legal Forum
4, No. 47 (1998), pp.23-25. See also Thao, "Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea."
41
Article 2 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law stipulates that these overlaps shall be determined by agreement in
accordance with the equitable principle of international law.
42
Zou is of the view that China’s claim may be called “historic rights with tempered sovereignty.” See
Zou, "Historic Rights in International Law and in China's Practice." p.160. See also J. Li and D. Li, "The
Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note," ODIL 34 (2003), p.293.
43
See Moore, Coastal state requirements for foreign fishing, p.13.
44
Zou, "Chinese approaches to international law," p.181.
45
For instance, see Article 46 of the Law of PRC on Environmental Protection and Article 40 of Law of
PRC on the Protection of Wildlife. See FMB, Complete Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in
Chinese), pp.13-24; pp.8-12.
46
See M. J. Valencia, "Summary of the Bali dialogue," Marine Policy 28, No. 1 (2004), pp.7-12.
47
The LOSC provides coastal states sovereign rights and jurisdiction over natural resources, whereas
foreign states retain certain freedoms such as navigation and overfly. See The LOSC, Article 58.
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coastal state is entitled to more control over its EEZ than the LOSC provides.48 The
EEZ is a special regime.49 It is not territorial sea and it is not the high seas either.50
Further, China considers that its EEZ serves as a buffer zone for defence. 51 This
position is demonstrated by the amendment of the Law of the PRC on Surveying and
Mapping (Surveying and Mapping Law).52 The Surveying and Mapping Law provides
that any survey and mapping activities cannot involve state secrets or harm state
security. This is a departure from its previous policy which granted all states “freedom
of navigation in and flight over” its EEZ as long as they comply with international law
and Chinese law.53 China’s practice shows that the EEZ is a relatively new regime in
international law, and that its precise nature and the full conceptualisation of coastal
states’ and other states’ rights and responsibilities in the EEZ is still evolving.54
The 1998 EEZ/CS Law signified China’s formal establishment of its maritime
zones entitled by the LOSC.55 China has taken an important step in building up its
capacity and institutional framework to implement its LOSC obligations as a coastal

48

See Morgan, "Maritime zones in the Yellow Sea and their effects on SLOC security," p.58. China is
of the view that the use of the EEZ for non-peaceful purposes such as military and electronic
intelligence gathering is illegal. See X. Cheng, "A Chinese perspective on 'Operational Modalities',"
Marine Policy 28, No. 1 (2004), pp.25-27.
49
See China’s working papers submitted to the UNCLOS III: Greenfield, China's Practice in the Law of
the Sea, Appendices.
50
For a supporting view: “EEZ is subject to a ‘special regime’. The regime is specific in the sense that
the legal regime of the EEZ is different from both the territorial sea and the high seas. It is a zone which
partakes of some of the characteristics of both regime but belong to neither.” See UN, The Law of the
Sea: National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Economic Zone and the Exclusive
Fishery Zone (New York: UN Publication, 1986), p.13.
51
Morgan, "Maritime zones in the Yellow Sea and their effects on SLOC security," p.61.
52
The Law of PRC on Surveying and Mapping was adopted in December 1992. It was promulgated by
President Decree No.66 and put into effect on 1 July 1993. See SOA, Collection of the Sea Laws and
Regulations, pp.64-70; pp.300-313. The announcement of this new law followed the confrontation with
the American Navy’s ocean-survey ship US Bowditch with Chinese military patrol aircraft and ships in
September 2002. See B. Gertz, "China Enacts Law Extending its control," The Washington Times, 27
January 2003, p.1.
53
See The Surveying and Mapping Law, Article 19. This has been considered by the USA as posing a
threat to US Navy survey operations, such as ocean mapping and environmental monitoring. See Gertz,
"China Enacts Law Extending Its Control," p.1.
54
China’s EEZ enforcement practice may also suggest that international law is determined not so much
by conventions but by the practice of states. With the changed global political dynamics, international
legal framework needs to develop to be consistent with the current context. For a summary of states’
EEZ legislation and practice, see UN, The Law of the Sea: Practice of States at the Time of Entry into
Force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pp.9-13. See also M. Valencia, The
Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and Responses, A Report of the Tokyo Meeting
February 2003, available from http://www.EastWestCenter.org.
55
China has established a 12 nm territorial sea, a 24 nm contiguous zone, and EEZ and continental shelf.
Both the EEZ and continental shelf extend up to 200 nm measured from the baseline of China’s
territorial sea. China announced part of straight baseline coordinates of territorial sea, but some of the
outer limits are still not clear.
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state and in bringing its national actions in line with the provisions of the LOSC.56
The 1998 EEZ/CS Law improved China’s maritime legislation and provided a
legal basis for China to conserve and manage its EEZ fisheries resources. It
emphasises conservation more than exploitation, and its provisions take into account
the status of resources, its fishing capacity, and existing problems. China is to take
measures to ensure the fisheries resources therein are not to be endangered. In addition,
the 1998 EEZ/CS law makes China stand ready for fisheries cooperation with other
coastal states based on a compatible legal system. This is especially important for
China’s cooperation for the shared stocks with its maritime neighbours.
However, the 1998 EEZ/CS Law is very brief and contains only skeleton
provisions. It would be difficult to enforce this legislation without detailed
implementation regulations. 57 China needs to develop regulations of this kind to
implement the 1998 EEZ/CS Law, such as the conservation and management of
particular species in China’s EEZs.58 Improved EEZ enforcement is also an essential
element that needs to be considered.

Policy Adjustment to Control Distant Water Fishing Vessels
As the LOSC left the enforcement of high seas fishing in the hands of flag states, the
Compliance Agreement established a range of obligations to emphasise flag state
responsibility.59 Along the same line, the Fish Stocks Agreement addressed this issue
from two main aspects: the enforcement over high seas fishing vessels, and the
enhancement of international cooperation.60 The Compliance Agreement and the Fish
Stocks Agreement specify the requirements of compliance by high seas fishing vessels,
and provide basic procedures for enforcement including boarding and inspection of

56

The analysis of the provisions of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law and China’s EEZ practice indicates that
China’s implementation practice is consistent with the general principles of the LOSC provisions. For
instances, Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law are virtually a verbatim copy of Articles 56 (1),
and 77 (1) of the LOSC. Article 10 of the 1998 EEZ/CS Law specifies that China is to prevent and
control marine pollution.
57
The 1998 EEZ/CS Law lacks specific implementation regulations, and this has been matched up by
some ministerial regulations. See Chapter 6 on discussion on China’s EEZ enforcement.
58
A series of activities in this regard have been carried out in China's EEZ including the establishment
of marine reserves and legislations in specific areas. See MOA, China Marine Fisheries Maps, vol. 1
(Beijing: MOA, China, 2002), p.10, p.25, and p.36.
59
See Chapter 2 for relevant discussion.
60
Articles 18 to 23 of the Fish Stocks Agreement deal with compliance and enforcement. The
Compliance Agreement also addresses this issue in Article III. For detailed discussion, see Chapter 2.
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high seas fishing vessels that violate their management measures.61 They have created
new obligations on coastal states and highs seas fishing states to comply with and
cooperate for the conservation and management of high seas fish stocks.

62

Consequently, they have had a great impact on states fishing on the high seas.
As a major fishing state, China has a strong interest in all matters related to
fisheries. China participated in the negotiation process that led to the conclusion of the
Compliance Agreement, and attended all six conferences on the negotiation of the Fish
Stocks Agreement from 1993 to 1995. 63 China’s basic attitude towards these
instruments is positive.64 However, China is not fully satisfied with some provisions of
the Fish Stocks Agreement regarding the enforcement of high seas fishing vessels.65
When China signed the Fish Stocks Agreement in November 1996, China made a
statement to emphasise its “understandings” towards those provisions concerning the
use of force while boarding and inspecting a fishing vessel. 66 This statement is
consistent with the basic principles China holds regarding international affairs. From
this statement it may be assumed that China has concerns about its nationals and
fishing vessels being attacked by undue force on the high seas or the abuse of rights by
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See The Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 19-23.
Edeson is of the view that by these instruments, the importance of the long-term sustainable use of the
marine living resources has been placed in the forefront of any serious analysis of the legal regime
governing marine living resources. See Edeson, "Towards long-term sustainable use: some recent
developments in the legal regime of fisheries," p. 165.
63
FMB, "The development of international cooperation on fisheries," China Fisheries (in Chinese) 10
(1998), p.1.
64
China states that the Fish Stocks Agreement is “an important development of the LOSC fisheries
regime; it will have a great impact on the conservation and management of marine living resources,
especially fisheries resources of the high seas; and it will promote international fisheries cooperation.”
See Statement of the Government of PRC on Relevant Provisions of the (Fish Stocks) Agreement (in
Chinese), Preamble. The English version of this statement can be found in Law of the Sea Bulletin 33
(1997), p.30.
65
When the fish Stocks Agreement was negotiated, China and other states objected to using force on the
grounds that this provision is not consistent with the UN Charter. See Le, "The tendency of international
fisheries management and its impact on China's fisheries," p.10.
66
The Fish Stocks Agreement emphasises in Article 42 that no reservations or exceptions may be made
to this Agreement, but Article 43 makes it clear that declarations and statements may be made. Article
43 reads as: “Article 42 does not preclude a State or any entity, when signing, ratifying or acceding this
Agreement, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia,
to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that
such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions
of this Agreement in their application to that State or entity.” This provision made it possible for China
to put forward its statement. See The Fish Stocks Agreement (Chinese version), note 1. See also
Statement of the Government of PRC on Relevant Provisions of the (Fish Stocks) Agreement (in
Chinese), FMB, Complete Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese), p.548.
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coastal states.67 China has not ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement. This might have
something to do with China’s dissatisfaction about the legalised “use of force” in this
agreement.
In spite of China’s concerns about some provisions of the Fish Stocks
Agreement, as a flag state, China is under international political and diplomatic
pressure to control its high seas fishing vessels. China also needs to manage and
develop its fisheries in accordance with international requirements. As distant water
fisheries are concerned, China must prohibit its vessels from fishing on the high seas
without authorisation, to ensure that they do not undermine the management measures
of the international fisheries instruments, and to take enforcement measures against
vessels that disregard or violate international management measures. Under such
circumstances, it may be predicted that China will have to ratify the Compliance
Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement. China has to accelerate its steps to ratify
the two instruments should it wish to develop its distant water fisheries.

China’s Distant Water Fisheries: An Industry Carrying Great Weight
China began its distant water fisheries in 1985.68 This start signalled an adjustment of
China’s fisheries from its own coastal waters to the open oceans. Since then, China has
made a substantial effort to develop its distant water fisheries. 69 China’s fisheries
policy generally restricts coastal and inshore fisheries, but encourages the development
of distant water fisheries. 70 This policy is in response to the overexploitation of
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China’s attitude is adamant: to avoid using force to the utmost extent; and to minimise the danger to
human life under all circumstances. However, it would be difficult to justify how the inspecting state or
the authorised inspector has exhausted other significant means to avoid using force. Second, if the
inspector and crewmembers involve the use of force, it is hard to protect human life from being injured
on a fishing vessel. For a discussion on this account, see Le, "The tendency of international fisheries
management and its impact on China's fisheries," p.10.
68
Distant water fisheries refer to fishing on the high seas or fishing in foreign states’ waters under an
agreement (mostly in the water of coastal states’ EEZ). At present, there are about 30 states and entities
engaged in distant water fisheries, but only 10 of them (Japan, ROK, Russia, Taiwan Province of China,
the United states, China, Spain, Poland, and France) have an annual output over one million tonnes. See
FAO, FAOSTAT Database, available from http://www.fao.org/faostat/servelet.
69
For a historical view of the development of China’s distant water fisheries, see F. Tu, A Turning Point
in the History of the Chinese Fisheries: the Background about the Announcement of “Relaxing Policy
Control and Accelerating the Development of Fisheries Industry” in 1985 by the CCP and the State
Council (in Chinese), 2004, available from http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=1605 (accessed
22 March 2004).
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China’s overall fisheries policy accelerates the development of aquaculture; conserves and rationally
utilises inshore resources; actively expands distant water fisheries; pays attention to processing and
marketing; and strengthens fisheries management and the enforcement of laws and regulations. See
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China’s coastal and inshore fisheries resources and the substantial reduction of China’s
offshore fishing grounds that have become joint fishing zones under bilateral fisheries
agreements between China and its maritime neighbours.

71

China regards the

development of distant water fisheries a priority. Strategically, distant water fishing is
one of the two outlets to reduce the pressure on its traditional fishing operations in
coastal and inshore grounds and to release its excessive fishing capacity.72
To encourage the development of distant water fisheries, China provides
preferential treatment through funding allocations and tax policies. 73 Scientific
research is also promoted to support the distant water fisheries by providing services to
the industry in areas including:
• analysing production trends and market information to distant water fisheries
enterprises for decision-making;
• providing information about major fishing states’ fisheries;
• analysing the requirements of international fisheries instruments on distant water
fisheries;
• analysing fisheries economic development trends; and
• demonstrating the technical and economical value of a distant water fisheries
program.74
Over the past two decades, the distant water fisheries industry has become an
important component of China’s fisheries. China’s distant water fisheries are mainly
guided by bilateral agreements, and some are carried out in the form of economic and

Regulations on the Qualification of Distant Water Fisheries Enterprises, 1997, FMB, Complete
Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese), p.417.
71
For details, see Chapter 6 on Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean agreements.
72
Another outlet is to develop aquaculture. China has promoted distant water fisheries and aquaculture
as substitutes for capture fisheries and as an alternate employment source. In January 1997, the State
Council approved the MOA’s call for further expansion of China’s distant water fisheries as an
important component of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). See The State Council Approved the
Ministry of Agriculture’s Report on Further Acceleration of Fisheries Development, 27 January 1997,
FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese).
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Article 21 of China’s Amended Fisheries Law provides that “the state shall takes measures in the
fields of finance, loan, and taxation to encourage and support the development of offshore and deep sea
fisheries.”
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For intensive information on this account, see http://www.cafs.ac.cn.
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technical cooperation. 75 China encourages its fishing companies to undertake joint
ventures,76 and has established cooperation with 38 states including Ecuador, Namibia,
Malaysia and Argentina.77 In 2002, China had more than 1,700 distant water fishing
vessels accounting for an annual output of 830,000 tonnes and a total value of 6 billion
Yuan (RMB).78 These vessels fish in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the
Atlantic Ocean.79

Challenges Facing China’s Distant Water Fisheries
China’s distant water fisheries have, as expected, played a role in easing the excessive
domestic fishing effort, improving China’s capability to participate in international
cooperation and the overall utilisation of global fisheries resources. As an important
source of international trade, China’s distant water fisheries have achieved positive
economic outcomes. 80 However, the widespread jurisdiction of coastal states over
EEZs has resulted in not only the loss of free fishing grounds of DWFNs, but also the
restrictions of access to coastal states’ fisheries resources.
Overall, to fish in coastal states’ EEZs by agreement is to be subject to various
terms and conditions. 81 Besides requiring an access fee, coastal states have other
conditions for DWFNs to get access. These conditions include fishing quotas,
vessel/gear control, observer programs, catch reports, and the instalment of VMSs.82
While coping with these restrictions, DWFNs also have to deal with other costs such
as the rising price of fuel and wages and the fluctuating price of fish products. These
75

China’s supporting fishing method is bottom trawling, long line squid and tuna fishing is only a small
portion (Japan’s tuna catches account for 40% of its total distant water fisheries, ROK is 30%, and
China has only 2%). In 1999, China’s total catch from distant water fisheries was 899,000 tonnes (tuna
accounts for 190,000 tonnes, 2.1%; squid 179,000 tonnes, 19.9%, trawler takes up 78%). The output is
valued US$5.2 billion: tuna US$0.08 billion, squid US$0.15 billion). In recent years, China takes 15%19% of the world total and 1.5% of the value, which is 5-6 million tonnes and US$0.4 billion. See Y.
Wang et al., A Handbook on the Technology and Economy of Distant Water Fisheries (in Chinese)
(Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2002), p.77.
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China has 75 distant water fishing enterprises, see MOA, The List of Qualified Distant Water
Fisheries Enterprises in 2003, available from http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=376
(accessed 22 March 2004).
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FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2003 (in Chinese), p.11.
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Ibid., p.11.
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See China’s Distant Water Fisheries (in Chinese), Chinese Academy of Fisheries Sciences (CAFS),
available from http://www.cafs.ac.cn (accessed 23 October 2003).
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H. Zhu, "Current state of marine fisheries and relative administrative measures," Journal of Zhejiang
College of Fisheries (in Chinese) 10, No. 2 (1991), pp.123-128.
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For details on this account, see Moore, Coastal State Requirements for Foreign Fishing.
82
VMS, standing for “vessel monitoring system”, provides monitoring agencies with accurate locations,
of fishing vessels that are participating in the VMS. See FAO, Fishing Operations: Vessel Monitoring
System, FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries (Rome: FAO, 1998), p.4.
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costs have directly increased investment and resulted in non-viable fishing enterprises.
In addition, the intensified competition for negotiating access agreement has
compounded the difficulties for the distant water fisheries industry. DWFNs sometimes
have to provide financial assistance and technical cooperation to get access to the
fisheries resources of coastal states.83
Similarly China’s distant water fisheries have faced a series of challenges and
disadvantages in developing the industry. First, when China finally could have a share
in distant water fisheries, there were no free fishing grounds available. Of China’s
distant water fishing vessels, 95% are small ones only capable of operating in coastal
waters, so they have to pay an access fee to catch fish. China’s landings from distant
water fisheries are known as two “90%s”, that is, 90% of the landings come from
bottom trawling, and 90% of the fish is taken from EEZs of coastal states by
agreement and with an access fee.84 Of the output of capture fisheries, small fish and
low-value fish constitute a considerable proportion. The high access fee and low
productivity make it difficult for the Chinese distant water fishing vessels to be
profitable.85
Second, China has China’s distant water fisheries industry is still restricted by
inadequate equipment and technical limitations.86 Of China’s larger high sea fishing
vessels, 90% is second-hand. 87 Most Chinese fleets lack sea-going capability, are
unable to operate all year round, and are unable to shift between the fishing grounds of
the North and the South Pacific Ocean, as the Korean and Japanese fishing fleets do.88
In recent years, however, China’s distant water fisheries industry has seen
apparent development, and it has made an effort to develop its high seas capability.
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For instance, to get access to Argentina’s EEZ, Japan was required to accept 50% of local fish workers
on Japanese fishing vessels and to import annually 25,000 tonnes fish product from Argentina. See
"Fisheries news," Modern Fisheries Information (in Chinese) 16, No. 1 (2001), p.32.
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Chinese Academy of Fisheries Sciences, China’s Distant Water Fisheries (in Chinese), available from
http://www.cafs.ac.cn/ (accessed 23 October 2003).
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China Fishery Economic Studies (in Chinese) 3 (1998), p.11.
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China has managed some fishing vessels operating in the North Pacific for squid,89 and
in the Indian Ocean and Central Western Atlantic for tuna.90 It is also becoming active
in the South Pacific Ocean. 91 However, China has yet to deploy a high seas fleet
targeting large pelagic fishes and other high-value species. 92 China lacks the
technology for the construction of modern long liners and seiners with speed, deck
machinery and freezing capacity suitable for competitive international fishing
operations.93
Constrained by jurisdictional shifts and technical limitations, China also has
to abide by the management measures of international fisheries instruments
represented by the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement. These
instruments have various legal and technical requirements on fishing vessels and
management requirements for flag states. This is because inadequate flag state control
over fishing vessels has exacerbated the problem of overfishing. As a flag state, China
has no option but to respond to these challenges, as the sustainable development of
distant water fisheries lies largely in the compliance of management measures of
vessels fishing on the high seas or in EEZs of coastal states.

Control over Distant Water Fishing Vessels
The key element of the Compliance Agreement is to require a flag state to ensure its
fishing vessels do not undermine international conservation measures. The Fish Stocks
Agreement reiterated this requirement with specified measures.94 Although it is not a
party to the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement, China has made
an effort to implement its flag state responsibilities over its distant water fishing
vessels. This has been carried out through the adjustment of the relevant laws and
89
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regulations.
The laws and regulations enacted in this regard include the registration of
fishing vessels, authorisation to fish on the high seas, and compliance with
international requirements, and abiding by international fisheries laws and agreements
by crewmembers. One such instrument that laid down general requirements is the
Circular on Enhancement of Offshore Fishing Vessels issued by the MOA in November
1994. 95 The circular required vessels to carry fishing licences and registration
certificates on board, mark the vessels as required, and fly the flag granted. In
particular, it required Chinese vessels:
• to comply with international law, custom law, UN resolutions,96 and fisheries
agreements to which China is a party;97
• to fish in accordance with conditions specified in their licences, such as the
requirement for high seas fishing vessels not to enter coastal states EEZs; and
• to observe rules on innocent passage in coastal states’ territorial seas, the
prohibition of transhipment, procedure for emergency calls, and the avoidance of
pollution.98
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See Circular on Enhancement Management on Offshore Fishing Vessels, FMB, Database for
Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese). The circular states in Para. 7 that it also
applies to Chinese vessels fishing on the Sea of Japan and North Pacific Ocean.
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See FMB, Complete Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese), for the 1990 Circular, see
p.200; for the 1991 Circular, see p.204. For discussions on high seas driftnet fishing, see K. Sumi,
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Hey, et al., FAO Legislative Study (Rome: FAO, 1991), pp.45-70.
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The Circular also contains requirements for crewmembers to abide by international laws on navigation
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Para. 2.
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This circular was adopted shortly after the conclusion of the Compliance Agreement as
China’s instant policy response to the Compliance Agreement. As an internal circular
by the state FMB under the MOA, it contained only general requirements. For instance,
this circular did not specify the punishment for violation except mentioning possible
severe penalties including suspension or cancellation of the fishing licence.99
In order to keep pace with the requirements of international fisheries
instruments and to build up legal and physical capacity to control its distant water
fishing fleet, China in recent years has improved its national legislation by updating a
series of its laws and regulations regarding various aspects of distant water fishing.100
Major laws and regulations to this effect included:
• the Circular on the Issuance of Nationality Certificate to Distant Water Fishing
Vessels (adopted by MOA in 1993 and amended in 1997);101
• the Regulations of the PRC on the Registration of Fishing Vessels (adopted by
MOA in 1996, amended in 1997);102
• the Circular on Further Enhancement and Control over Distant Water Fishing
Vessels (circulated by FMB in 1998);103
• the Regulations on the Inspection and Management of Distant Water Fishing
Vessels (adopted by MOA in 1999);104
• the Urgent Circular on Firm Control and Management of Distant Water Fishing
Vessels (circulated by FMB in 1999);105
• the Regulations of the PRC on the Inspection of Fishing Vessels (adopted by the
State Council in 2003); and
99
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As a reflection of international requirements on flag state control and data collection, Article 17 of
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• the Regulations on Distant Water Fisheries (adopted by MOA in 2003).106
Of these laws and regulations, the Regulations of the PRC on the Registration of
Fishing Vessels, the Regulations of the PRC on the Inspection of Fishing Vessels, and
the Regulations on Distant Water Fisheries contain important elements of China’s
policy adjustment in an effort to respond to flag state responsibility, and they merit
more detailed discussion.
The Regulations of the PRC on the Registration of Fishing Vessels (Vessel
Registration Regulations) was issued in 1996, and it was amended in 1997. It defines
“fishing vessels” in a broad sense that covers all vessels associated with fishing
activities including vessels for fisheries enforcement.107 It may be noted that vessels
less than 12 metres are also included, but the registration procedure can be simplified
where appropriate, depending on each provincial FMB. It lays down detailed
requirements of fishing vessel registration for ownership and nationality, fishing port,
and other legal matters concerning the vessel.108
Article 5 of the Vessel Registration Regulations stipulates that all fishing
vessels have to be registered according to the ascribed procedures if they are to be
granted nationality and allowed to fly the flag of PRC. The owners of the fishing
vessels are required to apply for nationality at the time when registering the ownership
of the vessel.109 The required documents for vessel registration include fishing permit,
vessel inspection certificate, and authorisation by MOA for distant water fishing.110
Article 6 provides that fishing vessels are not allowed to have dual nationality. Each
fishing vessel is only allowed one port of registry (home port).111
The Vessel Registration Regulations also lay down requirements for
registering the name of the vessel, and the nationality of the crew (foreign crewmen are
not to exceed 30% of the total crew).112 It also has provisions for the compilation of
vessel records and the requirements for the transfer of a vessel’s ownership. 113
106

It was adopted by MOA in April 2003 (Serial No.27). The full text is available from
http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=10.
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Vessel Registration Regulations, Articles 40, and 43.
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Templates for various application forms for vessel registration are provided in its nine
Annexes.
China’s another major law in implementing flag state responsibility is the
Regulations of the PRC on the Inspection of Fishing Vessels (Vessel Inspection
Regulations). 114 This legislation was not the first one of its kind regarding the
inspection of fishing vessels, but it is China’s most recent effort to comply with
international standards. It is based on the general principles formulated in the 1986
Fisheries Law (its amended version done in 2000), 115 and some 20 pieces of
legislations concerning various aspects of fishing vessels including inspection.116 The
first ministerial regulation to this regard entitled the Regulations of the PRC on the
Supervision and Inspection of Fishing Vessels was adopted by MOA in 1996 with 22
articles. 117 This legislation sets out basic management measures to control fishing
vessels’ quality and safety.
The Vessel Inspection Regulation, enacted by the State Council in June 2003,
is an upgraded version of the 1996 ministerial regulation. As the first national law of
this regard, it was put into force on 1 August 2003 to improve the management and
control of fishing vessels. The Vessels Inspection Regulations set out stricter legal
liability for violations and more authority to fisheries administration.118 For instance, it
retains the requirement on compulsory vessels inspection,119 but empowers fisheries
administration to confiscate any vessel that does not have the required compliance
certificate. Under the new regulation, vessels are removed from fishing fleets if they do
not satisfy the conditions of seaworthiness. Any such vessels found in operation will be
dismantled and the owner will be fined up to 50,000 Yuan (US$6,000).120
The Vessel Inspection Regulations also stipulate the rights and responsibilities
of relevant authorities for vessel inspection. To ensure standard requirements of fishing
114

See State Council, Regulations of the PRC on Fishing Vessels Inspection, 2003, (in Chinese),
available from http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=17.
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and mandated that the State Council is to administrate specific measures for fishing vessel inspection.
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Ibid., Article 4.
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China Daily, 6 June 2003, see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-07/06/content_243268.htm
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vessels, an initial inspection is compulsory for all newly built or overhauled vessels.
Vessels that go into operation without passing the compulsory inspection will be
confiscated and the owner will be fined.121 Regular and random inspections are also
conducted. Any equipment or material used for navigation, fishing, or pollution
prevention should not be taken aboard without a certificate from the inspecting
authority. Shipbuilding and maintenance is required to be conducted by qualified
factories. The regulations also emphasise the safety of fishermen and the prevention of
marine environmental pollution.122
Along the same line, China amended the Regulations on Distant Water
Fisheries in June 2003 (Regulations on DWF).123 It replaced the Regulations on the
Qualification of Distant Water Fisheries Enterprises, approved by MOA in 1998, and
the Provisional Regulations on Distant Water Fisheries, adopted by MOA in 1999.124
The Regulations on DWF applies to all its nationals and vessels conducting fishing or
fisheries-related activities on the high seas or waters under other states’ jurisdiction.125
As an overriding legislation for distant water fisheries, its provisions reflect
international requirements in a number of aspects.
First, the Regulations on DWF improved the requirements on the qualification
of enterprises to apply for fishing licences to conduct distant water fishing. 126 In
particular, the approval of a fishing licence takes into account the vessels’ compliance
record. An enterprise with a bad compliance record, i.e., its qualification for distant
water fishing was cancelled by the MOA within the last three years, will not be granted
a licence for distant water fishing.127 This requirement implemented the Compliance
Agreement Article III (5. a).
Second, the Regulations on DWF enhanced the management and control of
Chinese distant water fishing vessels. Authorised fishing vessels are required to report
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their catches, species, landings, and value.128 They are also required to carry required
documents on vessels’ registration, qualification, and fishing licence; fly China’s flag;
and abide by the international conventions and agreements to which China is a party or
signatory.129 Vessels fishing by agreement in the waters of other state are required to
observe the agreements and the domestic laws of the state concerned.130 As well the
authorised fishing vessels are required to complete fishing logbooks. 131 These
provisions reflect the general requirements of international fisheries instruments on
highs seas fishing, particularly the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks
Agreement.132
Third, the Regulations on DWF strengthened the requirements on vessel
monitoring, control, and surveillance. Fishing vessels are required to install VMS with
a qualified crewmember responsible for the operation of the system.133 Observers may
be placed on board the vessel according to the requirements of international
organisations or the request of the Chinese authority, and the vessels are required to
bear the costs and provide necessary assistance for the observers to carry out their
functions. 134 These provisions respond to the requirements of the Fish Stocks
Agreement.135
Fourth, the Regulations on DWF emphasised penalties for violations. It lists a
range of circumstances whereby fishing vessels violating the regulations will be
sanctioned depending on the severity. 136 In serious cases, such as unreported or
misreported catches, refusal to accept observers or obstruction of observers’ function,
and failure to fill in logbooks, can result in the suspension or cancellation of the
authorisation for distant water fishing.137
The adoption of the regulations on distant water fishing vessels indicates that
China is committed to its flag state responsibilities. The Vessels Inspection Regulations
and the Regulations on DWF are positive steps in responding to the Compliance
128
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Agreement and Fish Stocks Agreement. Properly enforced, they will prevent Chinese
fishing vessels from undermining international management measures. However, the
promulgation of regulations one after another in a short period of time would raise the
questions about their effectiveness. It can be difficult for fisheries authorities to
enforce these frequently changed regulations, and it may cause confusion for fisheries
enterprises in the comprehension of, and compliance with, these regulations.

Participation of International Cooperation
The Fish Stocks Agreement calls for states to cooperate on the conservation and
management of high seas fish stocks, and it has improved the framework for
international cooperation, particularly regional cooperation.

138

It places special

emphasis on the role of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) and
makes the enforcement of high seas fishing subject to their strict management
measures.139 Thus the issue of cooperation represents a challenge and an opportunity to
many states.140
In China’s case, distant water fishing is an important industry, and it would
not be possible to develop this industry without paying due regard to the management
measure of the Fish Stocks Agreement. Although China has expressed concerns about
its provisions on enforcement, and has not ratified it, China has to observe them to
secure a fishing quota. As access to high seas fisheries resources is largely determined
by the burgeoning RFMOs, China also has to cope with their management measures.
To get fishing access, China has taken steps to participate in various forms of
cooperation. 141 Recent years have seen China become a member of a number of
RFMOs, for instance, the International Committee for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tuna (ICCAT) in 1996 and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) in 1998.142 In
2001, China sent delegations to the 12th Special Meeting of the ICCAT, the 5th Annual
138
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Meeting of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Annual Meeting of the
International Commission on Whaling (IWC), the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), and North Pacific
Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC).143 China is becoming active in cooperation
on fisheries affairs.144
China’s participation in the establishment of the Commission for the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in
the Western and Central Pacific (WCPFC) merits a few more details.145 As its name
implies, the Convention focuses on the conservation and management of tuna and aims
at the establishment of cooperative mechanisms in the Western Central Pacific. 146
Since the adoption of the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Pacific Islands states have been
making a consistent effort seeking a solution to manage their tuna resources. This
effort has drawn global attention because of the significance of the resource: tuna is the
world’s largest commercial fishery. The Convention is the first multilateral agreement
that implements the Fish Stocks Agreement, and it follows the provisions of the latter
closely.
From 1994 to 2000, China participated in the seven sessions of the
Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC) and the preparatory conferences for the
draft text of the Convention and the establishment of the Commission. 147 The
Convention was concluded at the Seventh and final session in September 2000 and
entered into force in June 2004.148 From this participation, China experienced regional
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Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific,
(Honolulu: MHLC, 2000).
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See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOA), China and the Regional Fisheries Management, available
from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/14697.html (accessed 16 June 2003).
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In accordance with Article 36, Para. 2, the Convention will enter into force 30 days after the deposit
of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by three of the States situated north of
the 20° parallel of north latitude, or on June 2004, being six months after the deposit of the thirteenth
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cooperation, which provided further impetus for China to adjust its domestic
legislations. China’s regulations on distant water fisheries reflect the WCPFC
Convention in many aspects, and China has expressed its intention to become a
member of the WCPFC.149 If this happens, it may not be too far away for China to
ratify the Fish Stocks Agreement.
While expanding regional fisheries cooperation, China has also participated in
international conferences and negotiations for global fisheries instruments. It attended
conferences on the adoption of the Compliance Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement,
and the Code of Conduct. These activities improved China’s position in these forums,
and provided invaluable experience for China’s fisheries policy-making and
management competence. It is apparent that the level and type of representation at
international fisheries forums measures China’s commitment to global fisheries issues.
Bilateral linkages with the coastal states have also been enhanced through these
activities.

An Unfinished Battle against IUU Fishing
IUU fishing has drawn international attention in recent years due to its detrimental
impact on many respects of fisheries sustainability, such as further depleting global
fish stocks, natural resources, and food reserves.150 International focus has been on
large-scale, high seas industrial operations involving large fishing fleets from various
states, and published material on IUU fishing has also focused on the high seas.151
However, IUU fishing actually has long existed as an issue of concern in national
waters and in waters where the jurisdiction has changed owing to the advent of the
EEZ regime.
In domestic context, IUU fishing is simply classified as illegal fishing. As a
phenomenon it has long existed in China’s inshore and offshore fishing grounds.
Illegal fishing of this kind includes fishing with the required licences but in a manner
that violates national fisheries laws and regulations, or fishing without a licence. In
particular, IUU fishing includes:

instrument ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, whichever is the earlier. The Convention
entered into force in June 2004 by the latter case. See WCPFC/PrepCon/40, 23 April 2004.
149
See WCPFC/PrepCon/40, (23 April 2004), available from http://www.oceanaffair.index.htm.
150
For a discussion, see Chapter 2 on IPOA-IUU.
151
For discussions on this account, see http://www.affa.gov.au/docs/fisheries.ecoiuuf/papers.html.
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• fishing by vessels using high-impact fishing methods including small mesh sizes;
• fishing practices in inshore fishing grounds with explosive and/or poisoning by
both licensed and unlicensed vessels; and,
• fishing conducted by “three nos” vessels (vessels that have “no name, no
registration certificate, and no homeport”).152
Another form of IUU fishing is associated with the wide establishment of the EEZ
regime, which has changed the jurisdiction of many offshore fishing grounds fished by
Chinese vessels. Some of these fishing grounds have become EEZs of China’s
neighbouring states. Some have become disputed waters where boundaries have not
yet been settled, and similarly some have turned into joint fishing zones under bilateral
agreements.153 Many Chinese fishing vessels have been detained by Japan and South
Korea for illegal fishing in their EEZs. Fishing vessels from other states have also been
detained by China for the same reason. What complicates the matter is that such
detentions take place in overlapping waters where maritime boundaries are disputed.
Under these circumstances, IUU fishing not only results in fisheries conflicts, but also
intensifies political and diplomatic tension among the governments concerned. Thus
IUU fishing has arisen as a hot issue.
The fundamental cause of IUU fishing is economic incentives. Some fishing
vessels, driven by economic incentives, venture to fish in these waters. Limited
physical capacity such as insufficient personnel and the lack of financial support to
conduct inspection and monitoring further aggravates the situation. The occurrence of
illegal fishing in China’s domestic waters, particularly by small vessels, is the result of
ineffective fisheries enforcement and inadequate monitoring and surveillance of
fishing vessels.
Combating IUU fishing in the waters under jurisdictional changes is more
complex and challenging. The vast areas of ocean to monitor, the physical resource
limitations, and the sheer number of fishing vessels plying the seas make the situation
worse. To exercise jurisdiction over foreign fishing vessels is also subtle and sensitive.
152

See FMB, Complete Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese), pp.207-209. In 2002,
however, China registered 108,500 “three nos” fishing vessels. See FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook
2003 (in Chinese), p.19.
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See Chapter 6 for relevant discussion.
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It has the potential to escalate into diplomatic and political conflicts if not handled
properly. This issue is of more concern to China than IUU fishing itself, thus, Chinese
patrol vessels sometimes do not seize foreign IUU fishing vessels. 154 Even having
detected illegal fishing vessels, they would not escort them back to China for
prosecution.155
IUU fishing presents a great challenge to China’s fisheries industries and
fisheries management. It requires not only judicial and administrative measures but
also economic sanctions. Successful combating of IUU fishing is largely determined
by the capacity of fisheries authorities to control fishing vessels according to
competent laws and regulations.
China has made an effort to address IUU fishing. It has adopted measures to
control fishing vessels and has reissued fishing licences. To improve the effectiveness
of its fisheries law and regulations, China established a Fisheries Law Enforcement
Command (FLEC) in 1999. The FLEC is part of China’s plan to develop a multiagency surveillance and enforcement team. It is expected to integrate relevant
authorities at the state level with the 12 coastal provinces to coordinate nationwide
action to improve fisheries management, including the implementation of bilateral
fisheries agreements China signed with its maritime neighbours.156
China has also improved the monitoring of fishing activities in order to
prevent fishing vessels from operating in restricted zones and overlapping waters. To
improve its capacity to deal with IUU fishing, China has built new enforcement vessels
with better equipment to patrol its EEZ.157 More recently, the FMB announced the
names of 140 vessels that are qualified to enforce fisheries laws and regulations.158 To
formalise the enforcement procedure, China has adopted the Measures on Fisheries
Administration and Enforcement Vessels, and has increased personnel in law
enforcement.159
China has spared no effort to monitor China’s distant water fishing fleet that
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For detailed responsibilities of the FEC, see FMB, China Fisheries Yearbook 2001 (in Chinese),
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See “The construction of new fisheries enforcement vessels for FMB of MOA progressing smoothly”
see http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=314 (accessed 22 March 2004).
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These vessels were first utilised in January 2004 and will be in service for three years (1 January
2004 to 31 December 2006). See FMB Series No.4, “Announcement of first group of vessels for
fisheries enforcement,” 2004, available from http://www.agri.gov.cn/zcfg/t20040225_170267.htm.
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conduct fishing under access agreements. In areas’ such as western Africa and the
South Pacific Islands countries, China ensures its nationals and their vessels comply
with and adhere to the fisheries laws of the state concerned.160
As a flag state China has also put effort into controlling IUU fishing by its
high seas fishing vessels. China’s best effort in this regard has been its close
cooperation with the US in the North Pacific Ocean.161 China has about 300 vessels
fishing in the area covered by the Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous
Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean. 162 Although China is not a member to this
convention, China, together with Russia, has provided enforcement support to the US
Coast Guard to prevent driftnet fishing banned by the UN 44/225 Resolution.163 China
allocated enforcement vessels to patrol the North Pacific Ocean during fishing
seasons. 164 This cooperative enforcement has substantially reduced illegal driftnet
fishing, and it has sent a strong message that IUU fishing can be deterred by
international cooperation.165

Conclusion
This chapter has discussed China’s practice in two areas: China’s maritime legislation
as a coastal state to implement the LOSC framework and China’s policy adjustment as
a flag state in controlling its distant water fishing fleet. It has been shown that China
has endeavoured to respond to the LOSC framework positively. As a coastal state,
China has taken steps in building up institutional framework for its maritime zones.
160

See “China donates boats to monitor illegal fishing”, Fiji Government Online, 18 September 2002,
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Judging by China’s national laws on maritime zones and its enforcement practice,
China’s implementation appears to be consistent with the LOSC requirements.
Flag state responsibility is a key component of the post-LOSC fisheries
instruments. As one of the states whose distant water fisheries have been affected by
the Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement, China has to adapt to the
requirements imposed by these instruments. This chapter analysed China’s practices in
responding to its flag state responsibilities to control its distant water fishing vessels.
However, of the two fisheries instruments, China has only signed the Fish Stocks
Agreement. It would appear that China needs to set priorities to improve its overall
management capacity and to enact national legislation so as to make it ready to ratify
the two instruments and to live up to their terms.
The chapter also identified the driving force for China’s policy harmonisation
and participation in international fisheries forums is to resolve its longstanding
problems of depleting resources and deteriorating ecosystem in its domestic waters.
Due to this very fact, China’s action has been selective, and has not gone far enough to
discharge its full obligations imposed by international fisheries instruments. China will
have to take concrete steps to bring its management practice in line with international
requirements, and have to commit to cooperation with other states in resources
conservation and management.
China’s commitment to regional cooperation with its maritime neighbours
concerning the management of the shared resource of its bordering seas will be
discussed in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 6 CHINA’S FISHERIES RELATIONS WITH JAPAN
AND SOUTH KOREA
Introduction
China borders Japan in the East China Sea, and neighbours South Korea in both the
Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. As Japan is also a fishing state of the Yellow Sea,1
the three states have shared the fish stocks of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea
for centuries.
The geographical proximity and the fishing competition have made the
relations among them complex and the cooperative management of the shared fisheries
resources inevitable but extremely difficult. This is because these semi-enclosed seas
not only provide distinctive ecosystems and abundant fisheries resources, but also
formed a unique social and political environment among the bordering states. As a
result, the shared resources and marine environment have long been depleting and
deteriorating. This situation has raised concerns about the sustainability of the shared
fish stocks. Over the years, the three states have made a number of efforts to address
this issue, however, no regional cooperative framework has been established.
Against this background, the chapter analyses China’s fisheries relations with
Japan and South Korea. It starts with a general picture of the ecological nature of the
shared resources and the complexity and difficulties associated with the conservation
and management of these resources. It will be shown that the Yellow Sea and the East
China Sea have favourable natural conditions that foster abundant fisheries resources,
but the complex regional issues have affected the establishment of a proper mechanism
to manage the shared resources and protect the marine environment.
Under the LOSC framework, the three states all claimed their EEZs, and this
has brought about new tensions and a profound impact on their fisheries relations. As
all the Yellow Sea and most of the East China Sea are less than 400 nm in width, and
their EEZ claims overlap. This has not only delayed the delimitations of their EEZ
boundaries, but has also affected the conservation and management of the shared
resources.
Realising that the boundary issue was unlikely to be settled in a short time,
1

Japan called itself a “third state’ of the Yellow Sea. See Nakahara, "The Yellow Sea and the third state:
Japanese perspective," p.173.

168

China and Japan agreed to negotiate a new fisheries agreement reflecting the EEZ
regime. China and South Korea decided to initiate an agreement to establish formal
fisheries relations. The new fisheries agreement between China and Japan was signed
in 1997 and came into force in 2000. The first fisheries agreement between China and
South Korea was concluded in 1998 and came into effect in 2001.
The chapter examines the regimes embodied in the above-mentioned fisheries
agreements, together with their significance for the conservation and management of
the shared resources and constraints in the implementation of their management
measures. This will be based on an evaluation of the major bilateral fisheries
agreements of different periods between China and Japan, and the fisheries relations
between China and South Korea to understand better the progress achieved and areas
for improvement. Implementation challenges is to be examined from China’s
perspectives to reflect the impact of the two agreements on China’s fisheries.
It will be shown that the basic principles of the new agreements, together with
the provisions regulating various types of Agreed Zones, have practical consequences
for the establishment of a cooperative regime for the shared resources. In this sense,
these agreements are significant steps towards the cooperative management of the
shared resources. However, the constraints of the agreements undermine their effective
implementation, and bilateral agreements are not the final solution for the long-term
conservation of the shared resources, rather, a cooperative framework or a regional
organisation is highly desirable.

The China Seas and Shared Resources
The landmass of China links three semi-enclosed seas: the Yellow Sea, the East China
Sea, and the South China Sea. 2 As the South China Sea constitutes a different
ecosystem and much more complex social and political circumstances, it is discussed
in Chapter 7 in the context of fisheries cooperation between China and Vietnam in the
Gulf of Tonkin. For the convenience of discussion, the Yellow Sea and the East China
Sea are referred to as “the China Seas”. The bordering states are referred to as the
China Seas states (see Map 6.1 The China Seas and China Seas States).3
2

The names of these seas are commonly used in English. The use of this term does not imply that the
seas are somehow graced to China. In Chinese the East China Sea and the South China Sea are simply
the East Sea (Donghai) and the South Sea (Nanhai) respectively.
3
North Korea’s fisheries are not dealt with in this study due to the unavailability of information.
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Map 6.1

The China Seas and the China Seas States

Source: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/refmaps.html

For centuries, the China Seas have been an important channel for the flow of culture
and goods between the China Seas states. They have stimulated the economic growth
of the bordering states by providing a vital source of food, energy, and an important
means of transportation. The fisheries industry has supported the national economies
of the China Seas states by providing fish products that promote food security and
employment opportunities.4 However, the geographical proximity of the semi-enclosed
seas and competition over shared fisheries resources among the states have prevented
them from implementing a cooperative framework to conserve and manage the shared
stocks. In order to understand these issues better, one has to commence with an
explanation o f the characteristics of these seas.

4 These states have similar coastal ecosystems, access to common resources, and they share the same
fish stocks o f the China Seas. See X. Liu, Investigation and Division o f the Yellow Sea and Bohai Sea
Fisheries Resources (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 1990).
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Abundant Fisheries Resources and Dependency of States
The China Seas have a wide geographical coverage of different climates and
ecosystems (15 degrees of latitude: 25º- 40ºN, and 10 degrees of longitude: 119º31'129º30'E), and provide a favourable environment suitable for a variety of marine life to
reproduce and grow.5
Flushed all year round by large rivers along the east and west coasts, such as
the Yellow River and the Yangtzi River, the China Seas form flat and shallow seabeds
which are ideal for fishing.6 The large volume of fresh water from these rivers brings
abundant organic and nutritional matter to the sea, nurturing dense populations of
plankton and zooplankton. The fertile waters provide many species with an ideal
environment for spawning, breeding, feeding, and over-wintering grounds, and form
the basis of the most productive fishing grounds in the world.7
Based on the water temperature, fish stocks in the China Seas are grouped
into various ecotypes. There are 289 fish species in the Yellow Sea, of which 47.8%
are warm-temperature species; while there are 727 species in the East China Sea where
warm-water ones account for 69.6% of the total. 8 More than 160 species have
considerable commercial value.9 There are 249 species that appear in both the Yellow
Sea and the East China Sea. These common species account for 34.4% and 86.2% of
the total of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea respectively.10 The distribution of these
groups often overlaps, especially during over-wintering and spawning periods. In
addition, large amounts of cephalopods and crustaceans, such as shrimp, crab, and
shellfish, with economic value are found in the China Seas.11
The favourable natural environment and the abundant fisheries resources of
5

Xia, Zhao, and Feng, China Fishery Divisions: A Survey and Division on China's Fishery Resources
(in Chinese), p.37.
6
Ibid. The shallow water overlying the shelf area (mostly within a 200 metre depth) provides some of
the most productive fishing grounds in the world.
7
See J. Deng and Q. Zhao, Marine Fisheries Biology (Beijing: China Agriculture Press, 1991); Q. Zhao,
Marine Fisheries Resources of China (China: Zhejiang Science and Technology Press, 1990).
8
See The List of the Chinese Marine Fisheries Statistics, cited in R. Liu, "Exploitation and management
of the fisheries resources and regional cooperation in the Yellow Sea and the East China Seas," in Ocean
Affairs in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Korean-Chinese Maritime Cooperation, edited by D. Kim,
Y. Jiao, J. Paik and D. Chen (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994), p.47.
9
Ibid., p.47.
10
Ibid., p.47.
11
With regard to the species, the number of crustacean species: 124 live in the East China Sea and 41 in
the Yellow Sea; the cephalopod species: 64 and 20 species live in the East China Sea and the Yellow
Sea respectively. Ibid., p.48.
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the China Seas have provided the coastal states opportunities to develop fisheries with
a steady and comprehensive productive potential. According to the FAO’s statistics
from 1995 to 2001, the catch from the Northwest Pacific (Area 61) has been the largest
among the 19 fishing areas of the world.12 The Yellow Sea and the East China Sea
contribute significantly to this figure.13
Fishing has had a long tradition and has been an important economic activity
for them all.14 China, Japan, and South Korea are the major fishing states of the region,
and they are also rated among the world’s top fishing powers.15 The fisheries industry
plays an important part in their international trade and national economies, and
contributes considerably to their GDPs. 16 More than 66% of the world’s total fish
supply is produced in this region.17 Major seafood markets in Japan and South Korea
play a considerable role in increasing the intensity of fishing activities.
With a growing population and migration toward coastal areas, the China Seas
states’ dependency on fisheries resources has rapidly increased and the coastal
population relies on the fishing industry for food and employment. Most of their
protein intake is derived from fish and fish-related products. At the same time, the
states’ economic expansion and modernisation drive have also increased their
dependency on marine resources. Economic development depends on a stable regional
environment and requires a sustainable resources basis. The China Seas have provided
vital resources and a fundamental means of employment for the states, and these seas
are more important for the economic growth of their bordering states than in many
other regions of the world.18

12

For statistical purposes, the oceans and inland waters are divided and numbered as standard FAO
fishing areas. In total, there are 7 inland fishing areas and 19 marine fishing areas. For the detailed
divisions of FAO statistical areas, see ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/maps/world_2003.gif.
13
For specific catch in this region, see ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/stat/by_Fish Area_00/Default.htm.
14
At the same time, fishing vessels from Malaysia and the Philippines also conduct fishing in the East
China Sea and the southern Yellow Sea. See C. Park, "Fishing under troubled waters: The Northeast
Asia fisheries controversy," ODILJ 2, No. 2 (1974), pp.93-135.
15
For a historical perspective, see Cong and Li, The Fisheries History of China (in Chinese).
16
Asia provides about 80% of the world’s cultivated shrimps, much of it exported to Japan. WWF,
Living Seas, Marine Conservation Actions in Asia/Pacific, available from http://www.wwf.net.org.
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The average world consumption of fish per capita is between 16 kg to 20 kg, but Korea and Japan is
50 kg/cap/year. See M. Gates and J. Cho, "The benefits from Korean-Japanese cooperative management
of transnational fisheries resources," Korea Observer Seoul, Winter (1999), p.623.
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S. Bateman, "Regional efforts for maritime cooperation: state and prospect," in Maritime Security and
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Toward the 21st Century, ed. D. Kim, S. Lee, and J. Paik (Seoul:
Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 2000), p.222.
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Migratory Nature of Fish Stocks and Depleting Resources
Semi-enclosed seas tend to form separate ecosystems where species are relatively
isolated from those in other marine ecosystems. The geographical location and wide
range of temperatures of the China Seas fosters species with many different biological
and ecological characteristics. The majority of them, however, have one characteristic
in common, that is, they migrate in different seasons to different locations for various
purposes such as breeding, spawning, feeding, and wintering.19
Driven by suitable water temperatures, the fish stocks in the China Seas have
many similarities in their migratory nature and present distinctive seasonal movement
patterns.20 Unlike tuna and most of the great whales, which are highly migratory and
are capable of covering considerable distances in the open sea, the migratory species in
the China Seas generally form an integrated migratory pattern. They inhabit the China
Seas all year round, spending all of their lives as native species.21 Their migration is
mainly conducted within their own ecosystem, which covers the EEZs of the China
Seas states. The spawning and feeding grounds of the major economic species are
located along the west coast; during winter, however, some species migrate from the
Yellow Sea to the central and the eastern edge of the East China Sea. 22 They are
actually shared in a ‘common pool’ among the China Seas states.
The biological and ecological characteristics of fish stocks in the China Seas
have been studied by scholars from Japan, China, and South Korea.23 Different data,
methodologies, and theories were used in these studies, which resulted in different
estimations of initial and present status of fish stocks. 24 However, their complex
migratory patterns are identified as an important characteristic, and the stocks of the
China Seas in general have early sexual maturity, fast growth, short reproductive
19

For some of the migratory grounds, see MOA, China Marine Fisheries Maps (in Chinese).
Liu, "Exploitation and management of the fisheries resources and regional cooperation in the Yellow
Sea and the East China Seas," p.48.
21
See Y. Jiang and T. Nakamura, "The Northwest Pacific-the UNEP action plan facing the sub-polar
Asian seas," Ocean & Coastal Management 45 (2002), p.858.
22
See Du, "China's strategy for development of its marine living resources in the EEZ".
23
For more information on this, see K. Kim, "Marine scientific research in Northeast Asia: Current
situation and future prospect," in Ocean Affairs in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Korean-Chinese
Maritime Cooperation, ed. D. Kim, et al. (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994), pp.155-160. See also Y. Jiao,
"Bilateral cooperation in marine and fisheries science and technology between China and other
countries," in Ocean Affairs in Northeast Asia and Prospects for Korean-Chinese Maritime
Cooperation, ed. D. Kim, et al. (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994), pp.161-175.
24
Liu, "Exploitation and management of the fisheries resources and regional cooperation in the Yellow
Sea and the East China Seas," p.50.
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cycles, and long spawning seasons. 25 These factors contribut to the well-developed
fishing industry of coastal states, but the migratory patterns of species and the common
pool nature of the China Seas have made conservation and management very
difficult.26
First, the migration of species does not conform to political boundaries. One
state’s fishing practice may affect species of fish spanning the boundaries of another
state. Second, the China Seas states form a complex fishing structure. There is a range
of targeted species, in some cases captured at different stages of their life cycle by
various fishing states, and this requires a comprehensive management plan. Third,
competition tends to cause overfishing. Although the China Seas states rely heavily on
the fish stocks, their conservation and management has not been dealt with effectively.
The China Seas states are usually more concerned with maximising national
economic growth and ensuring adequate food supplies than in conserving the shared
fisheries resources. Consequently, the fish stocks have been declining due to
overfishing, environmental pollution and conflicting claims over territorial and fishing
rights. After years of intensive fishing, the quantity of species found in the China Seas
has changed considerably. Since the early 1970s, the catches of higher value species
have decreased year after year, and have been replaced by low-value and small
species.27 This indicates that species at the top of the pyramid have been fished out and
now the fishermen are going after the rest. Also, the seas are not in the same healthy
state as they were before. Major fish stocks, such as large yellow croaker, small yellow
croaker, and hairtail, suffered a disastrous decline in the mid-1980s.28 They have been
a high-value species for decades and have been targeted by all the states along the
China Seas. Currently, these species are hardly found in the China Seas, even in fishing
seasons. These fish stocks have been depleted to the point of low productivity, if not to
the point of collapse of all the stocks. They are on the verge of extinction despite
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Ibid., p.49.
The lack of scientific data in fisheries management is apparent, even the limited available data is often
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China may have the data for the eastern side of the Yellow Sea, and Korea may produce for the western
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Sea--Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the Changing Environment, p.4.
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efforts made to recover the stocks.29
The late 1980s saw the resources of the China Seas being heavily exploited.
Bottom trawlers were widely used by Japanese, Chinese, and Korean fishermen. The
quantity of targeted species declined and fisheries resources were in a very critical
condition. Following the collapse of the major commercial species, the proportion of
valuable species decreased, and herring and mackerel became targeted species. The
supply of commercially important species was significantly reduced. Smaller and less
valuable species replaced some larger and commercially important species.
As it becomes more and more difficult to maintain the levels of catch and to
sustain a profitable fishing industry, fishing equipment has been developed for high
capacity to pursue higher yields. Many fishermen resort to more efficient and
aggressive techniques, and venture further out to new fishing grounds. Destructive
fishing practices, like bottom trawling, damages the environment as they physically
disturb marine habitats such as the sea floor and sea grass beds. Some desperate
fishermen also used illegal methods such as blast fishing and cyanide poisoning,
operations which cause severe damage to the fisheries ecosystem. Fish habitats have
also been degraded by increased sedimentation.

A Fragile Ecosystem and the Deteriorating Environment
An important feature of semi-enclosed seas is that they are vulnerable to human
activities, especially to pollution, because they are separated from oceans by narrow
straits. The China Seas provide a repository of fisheries resources for the bordering
states, but like any other semi-enclosed seas, they have a fragile ecosystem. They exist
as an inseparable entity with a continuous circulation system. This circulation system
is restricted by narrow passages with slow flush rates to the open seas, thus making
these seas particularly susceptible to environmental degradation.
The intensive fishing of the China Seas has depleted most, if not all, of the
fish stocks. Not so obvious is the deterioration of the marine environment from rapid
economic development. The ecosystem of the China Seas is under pressure from the
densely populated coastal areas and the rapid industrialisation around the China Seas.
This development generates pollution from dense population, industrial waste,
29

In 1992 China promulgated Regulations on the Arrangement and Management of Fishing Operations
in the Major Fishing Grounds in Fishing Seasons in the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Bohai
Sea. See FMB, Complete Collection of Fisheries Law and Regulation (in Chinese), p.62.
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sewerage from port cities, shipping traffic, and other uses of the seas.30 In addition,
rapidly developed mariculture in the coastal waters of the China Seas has an adverse
impact on the health of the ecosystem.31
Coastal pollution not only degrades the marine environment, but also
threatens the health of resources. Many species have declined due to the seriously
polluted marine environment. In the polluted areas, fishing grounds have moved
seaward. Pollutants have destroyed the spawning, nursery, feeding, and over-wintering
grounds for the main commercial species, and many habitats are disappearing. The loss
of ecological balance is an important reason for the decline in fish stocks.32
These environmental problems call for immediate action. It is clear that
environmental problems are of a trans-boundary nature: the seas carry pollution
without regard for maritime boundaries. 33 Protection measures by a single state to
control marine pollution have not been effective.34 Individual environmental protection
programs often run short of a comprehensive arrangement. Monitoring and research
programs often stop at disputed state borders rather than at an ecosystem boundary. As
such, it is extremely important for states to establish cooperative arrangements,
particularly with respect to the conservation of marine living resources and the
protection of the environment. States need to have a complete and deep understanding
of the natural environment and its resources in the semi-enclosed seas. Most
importantly, states should share the common obligation to protect the fragile
environment, ensure rational development of coastal areas and ensure sustainable use
of resources.

The China Seas States and Complex Relations
The shared nature of fish stocks necessitates the participation of all states in the region
30
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to initiate an effective management framework, but this is difficult because of the
complex relations among the China Seas states. The confluence of a myriad of social
and political factors, including historical legacy, different social systems and ideology,
and international politics, have made the relationships among the China Seas states
complex over the last century. 35 As Valencia observes, the region “…is especially
complicated in that it is surrounded or used by states sharing a similar historical and
cultural background, but differing in internal political systems, external political and
economic alignment, and levels of economic development.”36

Major Fishing States
In order to investigate issues generating from the shared nature of the seas and
resources, and to better understand the complex relations among the China Seas states,
this section provides a brief view of the three major fishing states, that is, China, Japan,
and South Korea.
China is basically a land power whose traditional maritime interest had been
confined primarily to areas of the sea along its coastline, with security issues
representing its major concerns.37 Compared with its maritime neighbours, China is
disadvantaged in terms of utilising the resources of the China Seas. Although China
claims 3 million square kilometres “blue territory” under the LOSC,38 the ratio of land
and sea is smaller than those of its maritime neighbours. China is a traditional fishing
state of the China Seas with its fishing operation mainly concentrated along the inshore
waters of its bordering seas.
The participation in UNCLOS III and the maritime practices of its neighbours
kindled China’s interest in the seas.39 It was an ardent supporter of the EEZ regime
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during the negotiation of the LOSC, and voiced its stand on many occasions.40 China
took it as the most important legal framework for the utilisation and management of
the ocean and its resources. 41 However, when the EEZ was approved under
international law, China was in a dilemma. As a signatory to the LOSC, it was keen to
embrace the new regime and enjoy the maritime rights and interests attached to it. On
the other hand, as a coastal state bordering three semi-enclosed seas, China found itself
disadvantaged in enjoying full entitlement under the LOSC. It had to deal with
overlapping boundaries with its neighbours opposite or adjacent to its own coast and
within 400 nm.42
Japan, as an island state, has depended heavily on the sea for its survival and
prosperity for centuries. The rich resources of the China Seas provide it with valuable
resources to develop its vast economy, and it is the most advanced DWFN in the
world.43 Japanese fishing depended heavily on the coastal waters of China and South
Korea.44 While most states were confined by limited technology to their own coastal
waters, Japan started distant water fisheries and conducted fishing operations in the
coastal waters of other states.45
In sharp contrast to China, Japan strongly opposed the EEZ regime at the
initial stages,46 though Japan established fairly early its exclusive fishing zone (EFZ),
following on the heels of the former Soviet Union.47 Japan’s opposition to the EEZ was
prompted by the severe impact that the regime would have on its distant water
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fisheries.48 The Japanese were worried that the establishment of EEZs would result in a
loss of their free fishing grounds around the world, particularly in the China Seas,
which have been the most important grounds for Japanese fishermen.49 Even when it
established its EFZ, Japan believed it was wise to retain the fishing status quo without
applying it to Korea and China. In return, Korea and China allowed Japan to continue
fishing in their coastal waters.50
Japan’s fishing interest and fisheries policy is different from that of China and
South Korea. Japan exploited largely pelagic fish stocks, while China and South Korea
fish mainly for demersal fish stocks. 51 The establishment of the EEZ regime did
substantially reduce Japanese fishing access to other states’ coastal waters.52 As one of
the states that has greatly benefited from the traditional concept of the freedom of the
high seas,53 Japan had to adjust its fishing strategies after the wide acceptance of the
LOSC and establish new fishing grounds in the EEZs of developing countries. 54
Recent decades have seen Japan restructuring its fishing industry and getting access to
other states’ coastal waters.55 It has also improved the control of fishing access to its
coastal waters. 56 As a result of China’s and South Korea’s increased catches in
Japanese waters in the mid-1980s, Japan adopted its EEZ Law in June 1996 to call an
end to the exclusion of China and Korea from its EFZ.57 This action also prompted the
48
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promulgation of EEZ laws by Korea in August 1996 and China in June 1998.58
South Korea’s interest in the sea has traditionally ended at its coastal waters.59
In the 1970s South Korea advanced its fisheries, and steadily increased its catch,
making it one of the top fishing states in the world in the 1980s.60 South Korea was
reluctant to accept the EEZ regime but was not openly against it. 61 One of South
Korea’s concerns, similar to Japan, was its well-developed distant water fisheries.62
Another was the boundary issue with its maritime neighbours, in particular with China
and Japan.
While sharing the fisheries resources of the China Seas, South Korea had
similar fishing interests to China. For instance, it also catches Chinese prawns which
migrate along China’s mainland coast, but in spring, a small number migrate from
north to south along the coast of the Korean Peninsula.63 This is where international
cooperation is needed. China has made an effort to prohibit Chinese vessels from
catching breeding prawns.64 However, their endeavours would not yield the desired
outcome unless the same approach is adopted by South Korea.

Key Issues Concerning State Relations
Besides the competition over shared resources, there are other issues of common
concern among the China Seas states that complicate state relations. As the region has
the most complex maritime issues in the world, fisheries relations have similarly been
58
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affected. This makes it difficult for the China Seas states to establish an effective
cooperative regime to manage shared stocks.
Economic Partnership
The China Seas states have a total population of 1.5 billion, and an average per capita
income of US$4,000.65 In 2002 the three countries achieved a GDP of US$6 trillion
and a foreign trade value of US$1.7 trillion.66 They account for 20.2% of world Gross
National Product (GNP).67 Japan is one of the world’s largest economies; China is a
rising economic giant,68 and South Korea is also important to the world economy.
China, Japan, and South Korea, three key players in the world economy are
also the most influential countries in Asia. Besides having a strong impact on the
regional economy, these states have kept a very active economic partnership among
each other. In recent years there has been continued dynamic expansion of trade among
them, and strengthening trade-related cooperation remains a priority in their bilateral
political dialogue. 69 Even though there is a wide gap between their politics and
ideology, the economic relationship among the China Seas states complements each
other. This makes them reluctant to engage in open conflict issues such as fisheries.
Different Social and Political Systems
In regards to social and political relations among the China Seas states, it is a different
picture. In spite of their proximity, China, Japan, and South Korea have widely
different social and political systems that affect their attitudes and practices towards
regional affairs. The largest socialist state and the most developed capitalist states in
Asia have co-existed with many complicated historical and regional issues. They also
have their own internal dynamics and political realities that affect the development of a
65
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cooperative regime.
In recent years the region has undergone significant changes, and the present
political environment has substantially diminished the intensity of conflicts. However,
relations between the China Seas states are still constrained by major political and
ideological differences. These differences, if not well managed, could pose major
security challenges, such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula and relations across
the Taiwan Straits.70 The China Sea states sit in a deeply divided regional model that
creates enormous obstacles to establishing any cooperative regime.71
Fisheries Disputes/Conflicts
In the context of global economic and political priorities, fisheries issues are a
relatively minor one, but not among the China Seas states. They are crucial in
balancing political relations, and may significantly influence, or even change, the basic
pattern of state relations. 72 The China Seas states are always cautious in handling
fisheries issues, and strategic when making their maritime claims,73 because maritime
issues have a direct effect on their national and regional interests. Due to their
exploitation of the shared commercial fish stocks, the China Seas states have had
disputes for many years. The depleting resources of the China Seas and the extensive
fishing capacity of the bordering states have intensified their disputes.
The exploitation of the shared stocks of the China Seas often, if not always,
involves conflict. The China Seas have witnessed numerous fisheries incidents in
recent years, including military intimidation where fishing vessels have been fired
upon or sunk.74 It is not unusual for fishing vessels to be escorted by naval vessels
when fishing in disputed waters. Disputes also arise over damage to spawning or
70
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breeding grounds by shipping. These disputes/conflicts make it difficult to maintain
harmonious and stable fisheries relations.75
The China Seas states have attempted to settle their fisheries disputes through
bilateral agreements. Indeed, the shared stocks of the China Seas have long been the
subject of bilateral arrangements.

76

The first bilateral agreement, of a non-

governmental nature, commenced in 1955, and it was later replaced by formal,
governmental accords, which existed for almost half a century. 77 These fisheries
agreements functioned for specific circumstances of a historical period for the
exploitation of the shared fish stocks of the China Seas. They balanced the chaotic
inter-fishing relations among the states prior to the LOSC. 78 They are especially
meaningful because the China Seas states have been the major fishing states of the
world. However, the resource situation has not improved much, and fisheries disputes
still happen from time to time. The China Seas states have been frustrated by the
difficulties in reaching an effective regime to co-manage the resources they are sharing,
and sometimes they are challenged by the lack of enforcement authority.
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Considerable effort is needed to deal with fisheries conflicts, and conflict resolution
can only be achieved by means of cooperation.
Overlapping Claims and Boundary Delimitations
Besides conflicts over fishing interests, the China Seas states have made various
unilateral maritime claims that sometimes cause friction between them. Several lines
have been drawn to address different types of ocean use, such as fisheries management
and other maritime related purposes by the China Seas states. 80 These lines or
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boundaries often cause fisheries disputes/conflicts which complicate relations among
the states throughout the China Seas.81
Since the LOSC was signed, the EEZ concept has been firmly established in
customary international law. By the time the LOSC finally came into force in 1994,
more and more states had started to define the limits of their maritime zones and had
started negotiations to settle maritime boundary disputes with their neighbours. This is
also the case with the China Seas where all the coastal states have made unilateral
assertions of jurisdiction over extensive areas of offshore waters, including full 200 nm
EEZ claims.82 However, nowhere in the Yellow Sea does the distance from one end to
the other reach 400 nm. Most of the East China Sea is less than 400 nm in width. Any
unilateral claim of a full EEZ, or continental shelf, would create substantial overlaps.
The overlaps trigger disputes between the states opposite each other, especially in
areas with economic potential.83 Thus the geography of the region makes boundary
delimitation inevitable between adjacent and opposite states.84
What further complicate the issue are the disputes over the ownership of some
uninhabited islands and the boundary delimitation of the continental shelf.85 There are
two territorial disputes in the region that have obstructed the development of fisheries
cooperation. One is the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan,86 the other
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is the Dok-do/Takeshima dispute between South Korea and Japan. 87 Both cases
concerning the ownership of offshore islands that are valuable to the owners because
of their location rather than their physical usefulness.88 The state that gets the islands
would gain enormous jurisdictional rights over the surrounding seas by establishing an
EEZ.89
No agreement has been reached regarding these disputes owing largely to the
fact that they are claimed by more than one state, or because of the political
relationship between the states involved. 90 The essential problem stems from the
differences between the parties concerning the principle of international law to be
employed in delimitation, as well as the geophysical nature of the seabed at issue.91
South Korea argues for the median line in the Yellow Sea and part of the East China
Sea, but relies on the doctrine of natural prolongation in the north-eastern part of the
East China Sea because it extends 200 nm beyond the baseline of its territorial sea.92
China adheres to the doctrine of natural prolongation. 93 Ostensibly, the Okinawa
Trough terminates the natural prolongation of Japanese territory, thus it constitutes a
natural boundary between Japan on the one hand, and China and Korea on the other.
However, Japan denied this characteristic and insisted on the application of the
equidistance principle.94
These factors mix together and affect each other. The emergence of EEZ
regimes intensified these issues and made them more complicated. 95 The LOSC
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provisions are too vague to settle these overlapping claims.96 Instead, they often lead to
different interpretations, with two or more parties disputing different wording in their
favour.97 This situation has generated a large amount of literature on almost all aspects
of maritime boundary delimitation, but no silver bullet has been produced. 98 The
uniqueness of the China Seas and the various issues involved with each dispute makes
boundary delimitation a most difficult task.99
These factors also affect the development of cooperative mechanisms among
the China Seas states for the sustainable utilisation of the shared stocks. With
overfishing and the depletion of fisheries resources not only in national waters but also
in the areas beyond national jurisdiction, international cooperation needs to be
promoted. The variety and complexity of the problems in the China Seas will not allow
political barriers to stand indefinitely in the way of cooperation. Fisheries resources
cannot be put at risk by the failure to settle boundary delimitations. No boundary will
result in the conservation and management of fisheries. Boundary is only a
confirmation of possession, cooperation should be the desired solution to protect
resources, and sustainable use is the ultimate goal. Cooperation is not a magic process,
nor can it rely on a single state. States need to realise that they have to make a common
effort towards the conservation of the shared resources. Each state must do its utmost
to fulfil its role in conserving the shared fish stocks.

Cooperative Obligations under the LOSC
The obligations for fisheries cooperation imposed on states by the LOSC framework
and international fisheries instruments have been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The
LOSC provisions found in Part IX dealing with “Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas”,
together with Article 63 (1) on migratory stocks (shared stocks in the China Seas
context) are also applicable to the China Seas states, and they provide guidelines for
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the China Seas states in achieving a cooperative framework for the shared stocks.100 A
review of these provisions is helpful in comprehending the situation facing the China
Seas states.
LOSC Framework on Semi-enclosed Seas and Migratory Stocks
Semi-enclosed seas are areas surrounded by two or more states and may consist
entirely or primarily of the territorial sea or EEZ of the coastal states.101 Recognising
the special characteristics of semi-enclosed seas, the LOSC provides specific
provisions for states bordering semi-enclosed seas. Article 123 of the LOSC provides:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate with each
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their obligations
under this Convention [the LOSC]. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or
through an appropriate regional organization:
(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of
the living resources of the sea;
(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and obligations with respect
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations
to co-operate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.

The opening sentence of Article 123 makes it clear that the general regime set out in
the LOSC applies to semi-enclosed seas. The states bordering such seas have the same
rights, jurisdiction and obligations as all other coastal states. However, the LOSC
places an emphasis on bordering states to initiate cooperation to deal with this special
geographic situation, because activities taken by one state may have a direct impact on
the rights, obligations, and interests of other states.
The actions required for cooperation are listed in Article 123 subparagraphs (a)
to (d). Subparagraph (a) specifies the activities to be coordinated including the
“management, conservation, exploration and exploitation” of living resources of the
sea. This reinforces the provisions of Article 61, Paragraph 2, which requires coastal
states to take “proper conservation and management measures” to ensure that living
100

Valencia observes that the LOSC meant to build up a framework for the sustainable utilisation and
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Sea: Transnational marine resource management issues," p.382.
101
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resources are not endangered by over-exploitation.102 These provisions of the LOSC
provide the legal framework for states bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas,
such as the China Seas states. 103 In many cases, regional arrangements have been
initiated within the spirit of the LOSC provisions.104
Regarding the shared stocks, that is, the same stocks or stocks of associated
species that occur within the EEZs of two or more coastal states, the LOSC provides in
paragraph 1 of Article 63 that these states shall seek, either directly or through
appropriate sub-regional or regional organisations, to agree upon the measures
necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and management of such
stocks.105 It should be restated that the LOSC grants states sovereign rights over all fish
stocks presenting in their jurisdiction at any point in time. As a result of this general
framework

of

the

LOSC,

migratory

species

come

under

the

successive

sovereignty/sovereign rights of each of the states situated along their migration
route.106 This means that their conservation is subject to the successive legislation of
each of these states. Accordingly, conservation measures taken only in some of these
states may have little effect unless other states follow suit. International cooperation
among all states along the same migration route is therefore essential.
According to these provisions, the China Sea states are obligated to cooperate
with each other for the shared stocks. As most of the fish stocks migrate freely across
boundaries, fishing is mainly conducted along the migratory route, and is not confined
by political boundaries. The migratory nature of fish stocks renders exclusive national
resource management measures incomplete, and sometimes quite inadequate.107 The
shared stocks frustrate not only the management of individual states, but also challenge
bilateral arrangements.108 At least one fact is clear, the biological nature of the fish
102
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stocks and “common pool” fishing practices restrict an arrangement in the China Seas
set up by any one state because of an obvious impact on other states. As fisheries
constitute a crucial pillar for the economies of the China Seas states, any changes to
fisheries substantially affect the interest of many. In this sense, the LOSC has probably
brought more changes to fisheries relations among the China Seas states than it has to
any other area.109 The LOSC marked the beginning of a new phase in the establishment
of a cooperative mechanism for the shared stocks of the China Seas.
First, the LOSC provides an opportunity for the China Seas states to seek
cooperation. Although many factors have affected the progress towards a cooperative
framework to manage and conserve the shared resources of the China Seas, 110 the
dependency of coastal states on the fishing industry and the sustainable utilisation of
shared stocks are of common interest to all the China Seas states.111 They need the
continued existence and development of their fisheries and seek to maintain a healthy
resource that supports competitive yet sustainable fishing industries.

112

This

expectation, for common opportunities and benefits, acts as an incentive for
cooperation. The China Seas states have a clear interest in the sound management of
the resources and environment. In addition, the shared stocks, if managed effectively,
are capable of generating sustainable revenues over time. The ratification of the LOSC
and the extension of jurisdiction increased the pressures on the China Seas states to
initiate cooperation for their shared stocks.
Second, the LOSC provides the China Seas states with a common regime to
abide by in solving their fisheries issues. With the wide acceptance of the EEZ regime,
the China Seas states, one after another, have established their respective EEZs.113
Being party to the LOSC, they have a clear and predictable set of principles equally
binding among them. When they negotiate fisheries agreements they have to apply the
same principles. When different interpretations arise, they have to consult the same
provisions of the LOSC. One example to this point is the delimitation of EEZ
109
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boundaries. As the China Seas states have not reached agreements on their EEZ
boundaries, they have to consult Article 74 of the LOSC which requires them to make
every effort in a spirit of understanding and cooperation to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature.114 This provision also emphasises that during the
transitional period, states are not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final
agreement.
Third, the LOSC dispute settlement mechanism is applicable to the China
Seas states. The establishment of EEZs gives rise to overlapping claims and boundary
disputes among them. When dealing with these issues, the China Seas states have
shown little interest in using international adjudication. They appear in favour of
consultation and try to minimise the necessity for multilateral involvement. Predictably,
the China Seas states will eventually settle these disputes by their own means.
However, in situations where there is a dispute between two states as to the
interpretation or application of the LOSC, the compulsory dispute settlement
mechanism set out in Part XV is available to them.115 No doubt, the binding LOSC
provides a fundamental principle for them to resolve pending problems regarding their
disputed claims.
Application of the LOSC Framework
The shared stocks not only created common interests, but also tension among the
fishing states, particularly when sovereign rights and jurisdictional issues were
involved. This is probably more the case for the China Seas region than anywhere else.
Because of this, the attitudes of the China Seas states to the LOSC were not all that
enthusiastic.116 As mentioned earlier, in contrast to the worldwide acceptance of the
EEZ regime as a sensible system for the conservation of fisheries resources and the
protection of the marine environment, the China Seas states were either strongly
against it (as in the case of Japan and South Korea), or they hesitated to implement it
(as in the case of China). Japan reluctantly and selectively implemented a 200 nm EFZ
in 1977, but it avoided applying it to China and South Korea. China, Japan, and South
Korea only announced their EEZs in 1996 after years of debating the advantages and
114
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disadvantages, and the EEZ boundaries are yet to be settled among them.117
Japan’s avoidance of applying its fishing zone regime to China and Korea,
along with the reluctance of both China and South Korea to set up EEZs, can be
explained on the same grounds. Fisheries disputes and conflicts have been common
among these states. They had deep concerns about the conflicts over fishing interests
and disputes on boundary issues. 118 They did not want to change what has been a
relatively stable fisheries regime for many years.119 Any of these actions would create
more problems with neighbours than they would solve. Although the need for a
regional cooperative regime has always been at the top of the management agenda,
there are a whole variety of issues that make cooperation amongst the China Seas
states a complex and a difficult process.
The unsustainable exploitation of the shared resources of the China Seas
affects not only the survival of the stocks but also the economies of the bordering
states. The depleting resources and worsening environment increased the
understanding and appreciation of the China Seas’ wealth and ecosystem diversity. As
the resources crisis and deteriorating ecosystem clashed with traditional fishing
practices, the China Seas states felt the pressure to change their fisheries policies.
Upon awakening to the significance of the LOSC regime for maritime issues, the
China Seas states responded to the “Ocean Constitution” by a number of actions.
First, the China Seas states ratified the LOSC and redefined their maritime
zones accordingly. Realising the ratification of the LOSC is the best way to secure
national interests, they started to claim their sovereign rights and jurisdiction entitled
by the LOSC (see Table 6.1 Claims to Maritime Zones by the China Seas States).120
This action also triggered them to redefine the limits of their maritime jurisdiction
zones by laying down relevant legislation. Thus, the international effects of the LOSC
117

For a more detailed discussion on the establishment of the EEZ regime in the region, see Kang, "The
United Nation convention on the law of the sea and fishery relations between Korea, Japan and China."
118
China and Japan have maritime disputes over the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and
boundary delimitation of the continental shelf underlying the East China Sea. The maritime disputes
between the China Seas states are well documented by a Chinese scholar: see Ji, "Maritime jurisdiction
in the three China Seas: options for equitable settlement," pp.85-117.
119
See Park, "South Korea and the Law of the Sea," p.154.
120
For instance, Japans amended its Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Law No. 73 of
1996); adopted the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (Law No. 74 of
1996). South Korea followed Japan’s heel. The full texts of Japan’s laws are available from
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/JPN.htm; for Korea’s, see
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/KOR.htm. For China’s
maritime legislation, see Chapter 5.

191

1

have been transferred to national maritime policies. This indicates that a normalised
regime amongst the China Seas states could be set up according to this universal
instrument. The problems facing the China Seas can be addressed by this regime.

T a b l e 6.1

C l a im s t o M a r it im e Z o n e s b y t h e C h in a S e a s S t a t e s

Maritime zones

China

Japan

Korea

Territorial Sea

12 nm (1958/1992)

12 nm (July 1996)

12 nm (Aug. 1996)

Contiguous Zone

24nm (Feb. 1992)

24 nm (Aug. 1996)

24 nm(Aug. 1996)

EEZ

200 nm (June 1998)

200 nm (Jul 1996)

200 nm(Sep. 1996)

Baseline

Straight (May1996)

Straight (Jan. 1997)

Straight (April 1978)

Continental shelf

200 nm (June 1998)

200 nm (July 1996)

200 nm (1970)

Source: compiled from scattered information at http://www/un.org/Depts/los.

Second, they signed or ratified global fisheries agreements to bring their national
practices in line with international standards (see Table 6.2 Status of Ratification of
International Fisheries Instruments). Despite the regrettable situation that overfishing
has reduced the output o f the shared stocks, fishing is still the most developed industry
for the China Seas states. The sustainable utilisation of shared stocks is of common
interest to them all. Every coastal state is potentially required and obligated to
compromise to achieve the optimal management of shared resources.
Under the LOSC, coastal states may adopt laws and regulations for their EEZs
compatible with international laws and policies to conserve living resources from
being overexploited. The harmonisation of national fisheries policies according to the
universal instruments indicates the beginning of a new regime among the China Seas
states, and their fisheries problems could be addressed by a common regime.121

T a b l e 6 .2

S t a t u s o f R a t if ic a t io n o f In t e r n a t io n a l F is h e r ie s In s t r u m e n t s

Instruments

China

Japan

Korea

The LOSC

June 1996

June 1996

Jan. 1996

Fish Stocks Agreement

Sig. Nov. 1996

Sig. Nov. 1996

Sig. Nov. 1996

Compliance Agreement

Nil

June 2000

April 2003

121 For a discussion o f the nature o f international regimes, see B. A. Booze, "The concept o f regime and
the protection and preservation o f the marine environment," in Ocean Yearbook 6, ed. E. M. Borges and
N. Ginsburg (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1986), pp.271-297.
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Sources: http://fao.org/Legal/treaties/012s-e.htm;
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
Third, the China Seas states reached new bilateral agreements that reflect the new
regime of the LOSC. Although there are many problems and unseen difficulties lying
ahead of them, the need for improved cooperation to secure their interests in the shared
resources is urgent. Although it is difficult to settle fisheries issues without first
settling boundary issues—as there is no clearly defined fisheries jurisdiction—the
rapidly depleting fishing stocks cannot wait for the settlement of boundary issues. In
the meantime, there are many opportunities for deriving new solutions as well.
Improved relations between the states, extended jurisdiction through the EEZ regime,
and being party to the LOSC provides an opportunity for the China Seas states to build
a cooperative mechanism for the shared stocks.
The legal framework of the LOSC provides a common regime and guidelines
for them to address their fisheries issues and to achieve cooperative management for
the shared resources. Further, the concept of cooperation is accepted as the most
desirable solution for the states in managing their fishing activities. Only by relying on
cooperation can all states benefit from the resources. Moreover, the China Seas states
have engaged in negotiations to settle maritime boundary disputes with their
neighbours. 122 It may be that the fisheries regime, among various legal regimes
governing marine policies in the China Seas, could lead to a breakthrough for a regime
governing all maritime affairs.
With the new fisheries agreements signed in the post-LOSC era, the whole
fisheries issue has been transformed. The China Seas states have moved one step
towards a cooperative management regime for shared stocks. The following section
presents a review of the bilateral fisheries relations with a particular focus on ChinaJapan and China-Korea relations that led to the conclusion of the new fisheries
agreements.

China’s Fisheries Relations with Japan
The fisheries relations between China and Japan can be divided into three periods
122

UN, The Law of the Sea: Practice of States at the Time of Entry into Force of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, p.3.
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according to the nature and development of three major bilateral agreements. The first
agreement signed in 1955 was non-governmental in nature, but it set up the basic
regime to regulate fishing activities of both parties.123 The second one, signed in 1975,
was the first agreement between the two governments to adjust bilateral fisheries
relations. The third agreement was concluded in 1997 based on the EEZ regime. This
section will review these three agreements.

1955 Agreement: A Basis for Bilateral Cooperation
Japan has been a major fishing power of the world, but its fishing capacity was built on
resources in the coastal waters of its neighbours. 124 As the Japanese diet depends
heavily on fish protein, Japanese fishermen were driven by this demand to fish
wherever possible and profitable. 125 The productive waters along China’s coast
attracted many Japanese fishing vessels. With large vessels and advanced fishing
technology, Japanese fishermen were very active and they fished extensively in
China’s coastal waters of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.126 This situation
resulted in two consequences: the high occurrence of fisheries conflicts that often
caused mutual damage; and the frequent capture of Japanese fishermen by the Chinese
authorities.127
The Japanese government was forced to take measures to address the issue
and to provide a “safe operation” fishing environment in Chinese waters.128 Whilst
Japan was eager to enter into an arrangement, China, long focused on its internal and
coastal waters for fisheries resources, did not have the same degree of eagerness as
123
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Japan. However, China also saw the necessity to solve the fishing conflicts and bring
the long-standing presence of Japanese vessels in its coastal waters under control.129
Because at that time China and Japan did not have diplomatic relations between the
two governments, negotiation and consultation on fishing arrangements had to be done
through non-official channels. The Japan-China Fisheries Council, on the Japanese
side, and its Chinese counterpart, the China Fisheries Association, started to negotiate a
fisheries agreement in 1953.130 Consultations led to the first fisheries agreement signed
in April 1955: the Agreement on Fisheries of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea
between the China Fisheries Association and the Japan-China Fisheries Council (1955
Agreement).131
The 1955 Agreement aimed at promoting a peaceful fishing environment so as
to avoid conflicts through the proper arrangement of fishing grounds.132 It consisted of
10 documents: the principal text and 4 annexes, 2 memoranda, 2 exchanges of letters,
and a Joint Communiqué.133 These documents specified the objective of the agreement,
Agreed Waters, and various issues concerning fishing arrangement of the contracting
parties.134
The 1955 Agreement set up six fishing zones along China’s coast where
fishing vessels and fishermen of both sides were regulated accordingly.135 It laid down
restrictions on motor trawlers including vessels’ tonnage and operating seasons in
different zones.136 It specified regulations on fishing, the number of fishing vessels,
procedures for emergency port calls, and shipwreck rescue.137 The 1955 Agreement
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also laid down rules for handling fisheries offences and conflicts. 138 In order to
conserve fisheries resources and develop the fishing industry, the two associations
were willing to exchange information on fisheries surveys and fishing technology.139
Initially the 1955 Agreement was signed for one year, but it was extended in
1956 and again in 1957. It was terminated in 1958 due to an increase in offences by
Japanese fishing vessels. 140 There was no agreement between the two parties from
1958 to 1962, but fishing was generally carried out in accordance with the 1955
Agreement, and no substantial disputes occurred during the period.141
Although the 1955 Agreement was non-governmental in nature, 142 its
influence was far reaching. It formed a solid foundation for bilateral fisheries relations,
and also established the basic framework for an orderly exploitation of shared
resources between the two parties. A standing procedure was established whereby
problems could be discussed in a more orderly way than had previously been the case.
It brought an end to the chaotic fishing competition between Chinese and Japanese
fishermen. By virtue of negotiation, tension was greatly alleviated in fisheries relations
and conflicts were reduced substantially. Since 1955, fisheries agreements between
China and Japan were signed or renewed as many as 12 times, and the framework of
the 1955 Agreement was passed on. 143
In 1963, the Japan-China Fisheries Council and the China Fisheries
Association signed a new agreement for a period of two years with some modification
to the motor trawler restriction line and specific issues regarding fishing operations.144
In 1965 a third agreement of the same nature was signed, and it was extended six times
until it was replaced in 1975 by the first governmental agreement. The two subsequent
agreements applied the major principles and basic requirements of the 1955 Agreement
with only minor changes, such as the restriction on motor purse seiner with lights
attracting fish. The changes were required to bring the agreements up to date and
operational.
138
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The 1955 Agreement and the two subsequent agreements have a number of
similar characteristics. First, examining the circumstances that brought them into being
and their contents, they were reached largely to avoid fisheries conflicts. Fishing
arrangements and compliance was mostly based on mutual respect and self-restraint.
Second, although non-governmental in nature, they nonetheless dealt with
matters such as enforcement, emergency port calls, rescue of foreign fishing vessels,
and exchange of information, which normally require a formal, governmental
agreement.145 Their operation and implementation was with the full support of both
governments.
Third, these agreements regulated fishing activities taking place outside
China’s territorial sea. Japan tried hard to challenge the validity of this when the 1955
Agreement was negotiated on the grounds of high seas freedom of fishing, but driven
by its eagerness to have access to the fisheries resources off China’s coast, Japan
accepted the agreements.146 China extended its territorial sea up to 12 nm by the 1958
Declaration.147 This action can be viewed as being out of the necessity to protect its
fisheries resources from extensive Japanese fishing off its coast. In this sense, the 1955
Agreement motivated China’s expansion of the width of its territorial sea and
contributed to the development of international law of the sea. 148 The extension of
territorial seas later became a common practice by coastal states that led to the
establishment of the EEZ regime.149

1975 Agreement: A Product of the Normalised Bilateral Relations
Following the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1972, China and Japan signed
their first governmental fisheries agreement in August 1975 in Tokyo as part of SinoJapan general rapprochement. The Agreement on Fisheries between the Government of
People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan was put into effect in
December 1975 (1975 Agreement).150
The 1975 Agreement has 8 articles, 2 annexes and a memorandum on agreed
145
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terms. The agreed waters of this agreement were largely the same as the 1955
Agreement, and it also aimed at maintaining an orderly fishing environment in the
exploitation of the shared fisheries resources in China’s waters. The same obligations
bound the contracting parties including the measures applied to motor trawlers. Flag
state control was applied to the agreed waters, and fisheries issues between the two
parties were mainly resolved by consultation.151
Although the 1975 Agreement had no substantial changes to the management
regime set up by the1955 Agreement, compared to the non-governmental agreements,
it developed the bilateral fisheries relations in three areas.
First, the 1975 Agreement set up strict rules on fishing operations, such as the
requirement on the observation of China’s motor trawler restriction line where
Japanese fishing vessels over 600 hp are not allowed to cross.152 It also established
conservation zones where fishing was controlled by a limit on the number of vessels
and closed seasons.153
The two annexes of the 1975 Agreement formed an integrated part of the
agreement that could be amended through certain procedures.154 This allowed it to be
updated when circumstances changed. Major amendments to the 1975 Agreement took
place in January 1979 and again in May 1985. 155 These revisions to the 1975
Agreement led to the following set of regulations:
• seven closed zones where fishing was banned during designated seasons;156
• six conservation zones where the number of fishing vessels was limited during
151
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designated seasons;
• restrictions on the size of fish, mesh, incidental catch, and beam intensity of fish
attracting devices;157
• information on Japanese fishing vessels and catches from the western side of the
motor trawler restriction line;158 and
• an agreement between the two associations on the safety of fishing operations.159
Second, the 1975 Agreement established a Joint Fisheries Committee (JFC), the first of
its kind in the China Seas. The JFC consisted of three representatives appointed by
each party who made recommendations and decisions by consensus. 160 The main
responsibilities of the JFC included:
• to consult the implementation of the 1975 Agreement;
• to exchange information on the status of resources in the agreed waters;
• to recommend the revision of the annexes to both governments; and
• to recommend to both parties, if necessary, matters relating to the conservation of
fisheries resources in the agreed waters.161
Third, as the first governmental fisheries agreement between China and Japan, the
1975 Agreement was developed and modified according to circumstances. Owing to
the commitment of the contracting parties and the flexibility of its annexes, the 1975
Agreement was able to remain in force for 22 years with a complex set of rules to
regulate fishing operations of both parties. This is a significant contribution to the
cooperative management of the shared resources.

1997 Agreement: A Response to the EEZ Regime
The 1975 Agreement reflected the political, diplomatic, and economic circumstances
157

Annex 1 (2) of the 1997 Agreement. See also Zou, "Sino-Japanese joint fishery management in the
East China Sea," p.127, note 8.
158
This was required by China to distinguish Japanese vessels and maintain proper order at sea. Japan
agreed to supply the required information annually.
159
The Agreement between the Fisheries Association of China and Council of Japan-China Fisheries on
the Safety Fishing Operation was signed in September 1975 and was put into force simultaneously with
the 1975 Agreement, see FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese).
160
Ibid., Article 6 (1) and (2).
161
Ibid., Article 6 (4).

199

of the time. Since the 1980s, conditions have changed substantially, and a number of
problems have motivated a serious reconsideration of the legal requirements of the
1975 Agreement, particularly from the Japanese standpoint.162
First, when the 1975 Agreement was concluded, China’s fishing vessels were
confined, by technical limitations, to operate in its coastal waters. Since the mid-1980s,
along with the depletion of fisheries resources in coastal waters, China’s offshore and
distant water fishing had developed remarkably.163 The improved fishing technology
made it possible for many Chinese vessels fish as far as the waters off the Japanese
coast. 164 This situation put Japan in a defensive position to protect the fisheries
resources in its coastal waters. 165 When more and more Chinese fishing vessels
appeared in Japanese waters, fisheries disputes began to arise again but on a different
footing.166
As the 1975 Agreement only regulated fishing activities taking place along
China’s coast, no regulations were available to control Chinese fishing vessels in
Japanese waters. The changed circumstances and the declining fish stocks required
urgent and effective action. Japan and China were forced to re-examine their existing
bilateral fisheries regime. The Japanese fishing industry voiced its strong desire for a
new agreement to regulate Chinese fishing vessels along the Japanese coast.167
Second, China and Japan ratified the LOSC and proclaimed their respective
EEZs simultaneously.168 The LOSC provides states with an obligation to conserve the
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fisheries resources in their EEZs and guidelines to cooperate between and among
coastal states in respect of migratory stocks.169 Thus the legal framework of the LOSC
provided Japan with an excellent opportunity to raise the issue of negotiating a new
fisheries agreement.170
Although the LOSC brings fundamental changes to the China Seas status quo,
which initiates new cooperation for the shared resources, the overlapping EEZ claims
and boundary delimitation between China and Japan have complicated fisheries
issues.171 Recognising that boundary issues required more time to reach compromise
and agreement, they were unlikely to be settled in the short term, China and Japan,
through consultations, agreed to deal with fisheries issues separately from the
boundary delimitation and to negotiate a new fisheries agreement without delay.
Therefore, concern for the conservation of the depleting shared resources became the
primary factor and driving force for the new fisheries agreement. The LOSC fisheries
framework served as a legal basis that guided the development of such an agreement.
After intense and difficult negotiations, the Agreement on Fisheries between the
government of People’s Republic of China and the Government of Japan was signed in
November 1997 (Sino-Japanese Agreement),172 and came into force in June 2000.173
The management regime and detailed provisions of the 1997 Sino-Japanese
Agreement will be discussed at a later stage together with the Sino-Korean Agreement
(discussed in the next section) because of the similarities between the two agreements.

China’s Fisheries Relations with South Korea
China and South Korea are situated on opposite sides of the Yellow Sea and on the
northern part of the East China Sea. They share the fisheries resources of the seas, but
there was no diplomatic relations between them until 1992. The absence of formal
169
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relations made it impossible for the two governments to discuss formal arrangements
governing fisheries. Competition over the same resources, however, caused fisheries
conflict from time to time. The Fisheries Association of China and its counterpart, the
Fisheries Association of South Korea, acted as surrogates to discuss fisheries issues.
The effort between the two associations yielded an agreement in 1990 regarding the
handling of collision of fishing vessels.174 This agreement, non-governmental in nature,
did not involve fishing rights and interests, but as the first effective document between
the two neighbours, it marked the bilateral fisheries relations between China and South
Korea.175
Despite no formal talks prior to 1992, China and South Korea adopted similar
policies to protect the fisheries resources near their shores.176 This was because Japan’s
superiority in fishing capability was then beyond question, and their advanced fishing
capacity enabled their vessels to keep up an aggressive fishing practice. During the
1950s, China and South Korea closed off large areas to Japanese fishermen and
enforced their domestic laws by arresting and detaining Japanese fishing vessels.177
Both the Japanese government and fishermen were anxious to maintain their traditional
fishing in the waters of its neighbouring states.178 China and South Korea’s unilateral
attempts ended up with respective fisheries agreements with Japan. 179 Therefore
fisheries disputes were settled by agreements.180
Since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1992, contact between
China and South Korea has become more frequent. The improved relationship helped
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the two governments resolve fisheries issues.181 Due to their geographical proximity
and the migratory nature of fish stocks, fisheries issues were inevitable between China
and South Korea and had to be promoted. This is because the depletion of fish stocks
aggravated the competition for resources, which called for effective measures to ensure
the long-term utilisation of their common resources. The need for a joint effort to
conserve their shared resources was made possible by the normalisation of their
diplomatic relations and led to their first fisheries agreement. This agreement was also
prompted by the ratification of the LOSC by the two states in the same year.
China and South Korea held their first consultation in 1993, but the progress
was slow due to their different views on various issues such as maritime boundary.182
Only since their ratifications of the LOSC and following the lead of Japan’s
establishment of EEZ, did they both declare their respective EEZs and accelerate their
negotiations.
In 1998 after years of hard consultations, the Agreement on Fisheries between
the government of the People’s Republic of China and the government of the Republic
of Korea was signed (Sino-Korean Agreement).183 Based on the LOSC EEZ regime in
general and relevant provisions applicable to their situations in particular, the SinoKorean Agreement established a cooperative framework for the shared resources. It
took another three years for the contracting parties to settle detailed operational
procedures of the agreement and finally put it into effect in June 2001.

Fisheries Regime of the Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean Agreements
The Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean agreements established a fisheries management
regime based on the LOSC framework, and they promote cooperative exploitation and
conservation of the shared fisheries resources. They carry great weight for the
stabilisation of bilateral fisheries relations. The two agreements share fundamental
aspects regarding the application scope, Agreed Zones, and management measures
with modification and adjustment to adapt to the respective circumstances. Their
common nature and respective characteristics are the focus of this section.
181
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Nature and Structures
Both the Sino-Japanese Agreement and Sino-Korean Agreement regulate fisheries
relations between the contracting parties on the basis of the EEZ regime. The
agreements provide the contracting parties with exclusive rights over fisheries
resources and fishing activities in their EEZs. The contracting parties may take any
necessary management measures consistent with the provisions of the LOSC and the
two agreements. Both agreements are provisional in nature and are pending final
boundary delimitations.
The agreements established general principles for reciprocal fishing access.184
Fishing vessels of one party need to apply for a licence to fish in the other party’s EEZ,
authorised vessels have to comply with the agreement concerned and the domestic
laws and regulations of that party.185 Any violation is subject to legal procedures of the
party in whose EEZ fishing takes place, but in the case of seizure or detention, the
fishing vessels and crew must be promptly released upon posting a bond or other form
of security.186
As the agreements are pending the boundary delimitations, the contracting
parties have made it clear that the provisions of the agreements do not affect their
positions on other legal matters, including the issues of disputed islands, and boundary
delimitations of EEZs and continental shelves.187 The contracting parties of the two
agreements have made a commitment to continue boundary negotiations in good faith
to reach ultimate delimitation. The Sino-Japanese Agreement has been in force since
June 2000, whereas the Sino-Korean Agreement has been in force since June 2001.
Both agreements are effective for an initial period of five years and can be terminated
thereafter on prior written notice by one party.188

Joint Fisheries Committees
The Sino-Japanese Agreement established a JFC for the purpose of achieving its
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objectives.189 The JFC consists of two representatives appointed by each party. It has
the power to make recommendations to the government of each party on matters
relating to fishing access to the EEZ, including fishing quotas, types of species to be
caught, and the number of fishing vessels allowed in each fishing season.190 The JFC
also has the power to decide on matters in relation to the conservation and
management measures in the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ)—a joint fishing zone
set up by the agreement. The decisions include the allocation of fishing quotas,
maintenance of orderly fishing; the status of the fisheries resources; and fisheries
cooperation between the two parties. 191 The JFC also has the power to review the
implementation of the agreement and to recommend amendments where necessary. It
works by consensus and both governments must comply with its recommendations and
decisions.192
The Sino-Korean Agreement also has a JFC that functions basically in the
same way as the Sino-Japanese JFC. 193 One difference between the two is that the
Sino-Korean JFC consists of one representative and several members appointed by
each party, and where necessary, a scientific committee may be formed.194
The JFCs play key roles in the effective implementation of the respective
agreements. They hold annual meetings to determine fishing quotas for each fishing
season according to the status of fisheries resources. The management approach of the
JFCs has greatly influenced the allocation of fishing efforts and the way that fishing is
conducted. They have also provided a general forum where issues can be discussed.
Fisheries experts from the contracting parties can exchange their respective
assessments of the fish stocks and recommend to their governments acceptable levels
of fishing effort and management measures necessary to achieve these levels.
Negotiations between government representatives produce mutually acceptable
resolutions and the whole process puts pressure on governments to coordinate their
respective policies.
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Major Agreed Zones
The two agreements established various Agreed Zones where appropriate regimes
apply. This is an alternative approach to remedy the disagreement between the
contracting parties on their EEZ boundaries. Both agreements have created joint
fishing zones where joint management is conducted.
The Sino-Japanese Agreement sets up a Provisional Measures Zone in the
East China Sea where the EEZ claims of the two parties overlap (see Map 6.1 Agreed
Zones o f Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean Agreements). Also, the agreement regulates
zones that are covered under special arrangements but do not have formal names.
Typical zones of this kind include one where “current fishing patterns” have remained
(current fishing pattern zone),195 and the zone where Chinese traditional squid fishing
is allowed in Japanese waters (squid fishing zone).

Map 6.1

Agreed Zones of Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean Agreements

Source: adapted from Park, The Law o f the Sea and Northeast Asia: A Challenge for

195 The use o f the term “current fishing pattern” indicates a remaining fishing pattern before the
agreement was negotiated, thus it tends to mean “free fishing activities”. See Kim, "The UN convention
on the law o f the sea and new fisheries agreements in North East Asia," p. 104.
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Cooperation, xxix.
The Sino-Korean Agreement adopts the same approach to resolve the disagreement
between the contracting parties on their EEZ boundaries.196 It also established a PMZ
in the middle of the Yellow Sea as a joint fishing zone, 197 and the current fishing
pattern zone where, like the Sino-Japanese Agreement, free fishing by both parties is
carried out.198 What is distinctive in the Sino-Korean Agreement is that it established
two Transitional Zones (TZs) situated on the eastern and western sides of the PMZ.199
The following section will summarise the characteristics of the zones and the
regimes pertaining to them. As the Sino-Korean Agreement share the fundamental
aspects of those established by the Sino-Japanese Agreement, its Agreed Zones will not
be discussed separately. However, the TZs of the Sino-Korean Agreement are unique
and its nature and management measures merit a separate discussion.
China-Japan Provisional Measures Zone
The PMZ of China and Japan is situated between the parallels of 27°N and 30°40’N.
Its western and eastern limits start at a distance of 52 nm from the nearest coasts. It
covers the waters where the EEZ claims of both parties overlap.200 However, South
Korea challenges the legality of the northern limit of the China-Japan PMZ on the
grounds that its EEZ is enclosed in this zone, and that China and Japan did not consult
with it when the northern limit was determined.201
As a joint fishing zone, joint fisheries management is undertaken by the JFC
to ensure that the shared fisheries resources are not endangered by overexploitation.202
The JFC determines fishing quotas for both parties by annual consultation through a
“quantity control approach”.203 This approach quantifies the total amount of fishing
196
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quotas by taking into account traditional fishing activities, number of vessels, and
amount of allowable catch of the respective species.204 The quantity control approach
also considers the resource status, fishing operations, and management practices. Thus
it not only decides the allocation of fishing effort, but also influences the way the
shared resources are managed.205
Flag state control applies to the PMZ, but fisheries authorities of both parties
need to instruct and inspect their respective fishing vessels to ensure the compliance of
the agreement. An indirect form of cooperation in enforcement can take place. Article
7 (3) of the Sino-Japanese Agreement provides that when one party detects a violation
of the other party’s fishing vessels, it can notify the other party of the related details.
The other party is then required to take necessary measures to investigate the fact, and
inform the results to the party that detected the violation. To this end, fishing vessels
are required to be clearly marked to distinguish them from each other.206 Each party is
also required to take appropriate conservation measures and controls to ensure the
resources of the PMZ are not threatened by overexploitation.207
China-Japan Current Fishing Patterns Zone
The waters south of the PMZ around the disputed Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island are
maintained as Current Fishing Patterns Zone where the freedom of fishing is
maintained.208 Under the Sino-Japanese Agreement, both parties can continue to fish in
these waters as they did before the finalisation of the agreement, and the relevant laws
and regulations of one party do not apply to the other party’s fishermen and fishing
vessels.209 Presumably, the setting up of this zone was to shelve the dispute between
EEZ and Chinese 70,000 tonnes in Japan’s EEZ. In the year 2002, there were 20,612 fishing vessels
allowed to operate in the PMZ with the TAC as 2.136 million tonnes. FMB Serial No.6, (2002).
204
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the two states over the ownership of Diaoyu (Senkadu) Island.210 However, efforts are
made in the Exchange of Letters between Japan and China to restrict the freedom of
fishing in this zone. It is emphasised that the fishing activities in this zone are subject
to conditions that fisheries resources are not endangered by overfishing.211
China-Japan Squid Fishing Zone
Squid fishing is a major distant water fishery of China, particularly in the Sea of Japan
and the east of Hokkaido in the North Pacific Ocean off Japan’s coast. These waters
were high seas fishing grounds before the advent of the EEZ regime, but they came
into Japan’s jurisdiction when it declared its EEZ. As recognition of the traditional
right, Japan allowed Chinese fishermen to continue squid fishing for five years after
the Sino-Japanese Agreement.212 Chinese vessels are required to apply for a permit,
but they are exempted from licence fees within the five years.213 However, the number
of vessels and the amount of catch cannot exceed the 1996 level.214 The status of squid
resources needs to be considered when issuing the licences, and fishing conditions and
quotas are to be consulted with the JFC.215
China-Korea Transitional Zones
The TZs of China and South Korea are the outcome of a compromise between the two
parties. When the agreement was negotiated, South Korea supported larger EEZs and
tried to settle as much EEZ water as possible,216 whereas, China was in favour of a
wider joint fishing zone and tried to enlarge this area to accommodate its fishing
vessels.217 The two parties eventually agreed to set up two TZs on either side of their
PMZ. The TZs are joint fishing zones but will be converted to EEZs within four years
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of the agreement.218
As a consolation for South Korea’s compromise, China agreed to joint
enforcement measures in the TZs. Joint enforcement measures allow the fisheries
officials of both parties to be physically present on the same patrol vessel of either
party and to board and inspect fishing vessels of both parties.219 The approach makes
the TZs noticeably different from the PMZs in a number of ways.220 First, flag state
control applies to the TZs, but each contracting party is to take the necessary measures
to implement their EEZ fisheries regimes in the TZ situated on its side. Second, each
party has to phase out its fishing activities in the TZ of the other party and gradually to
adapt to the EEZ regime. Third, to carry out the agreed measures effectively, each
party has to provide the other party with a list of its nationals and fishing vessels that
fish in the TZ of the other party.221
The creation of TZs allows flexibility in response to specific circumstances.
Further, the joint enforcement regime applied to the TZs is a breakthrough in the China
Seas region for the cooperative management of the shared resources. It facilitates the
exchange of information on the compliance of the agreement and places pressure on
the contracting parties to commit to the management measures. 222 Although some
issues in respect of compliance still exist between China and South Korea, which need
further consultation and action, they are not as fundamentally serious as those
concerning the basic right to fish and where to fish.223 To date, the contracting parties
have, on several occasions, jointly conducted monitoring, surveillance and control of
fishing vessels including boarding and inspection, which was reported as being
effective.224
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Points to Ponder
Despite the difficulties of reaching compromises, China, Japan, and South Korea, the
three major fishing states, have concluded bilateral fisheries agreements based on the
EEZ regime. These are important steps towards the cooperative framework governing
the exploitation and conservation of shared resources. By establishing a new fishing
order in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, a foundation was laid for the China Seas
states to cooperate for the shared resources. However, the two agreements are the
consequences of the geographical features of the China Seas and the biological nature
of the fish stocks. They are mixed with complex regional issues, which resulted in their
obvious constraints. These constraints do not decisively diminish the essential value of
the agreements, but they ought to be pointed out and pondered.

Lack of a Holistic View and Ecosystem Consideration
The two agreements established agreed fishing zones under various names or without
names. They provisionally cover the estimated EEZs of the contracting parties until
such time as the boundaries are delimited, and they do not affect boundary
delimitations. These zones are meaningful in many aspects, particularly as an
alternative approach to remedy the disagreement of the contracting parties on the
delimitations of their EEZs boundaries.
However, the scope and application of management measures of the two
agreements applied to these fishing zones are all on a bilateral basis. From a biological
point of view, almost all fish stocks in the China Seas migrate beyond the boundary of
any one state. 225 The protective efforts or independent management made by an
individual or two states would not be effective for the whole migratory range of the
fish stocks.226 Given the nature of fisheries relations and interdependences of the China
Seas states on the resources, it is hard to conserve fish stocks without the compliance
of all states.227 Any one of them can easily destroy what it would take for all the others,
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years or even decades to restore.228 The two agreements lack a holistic view of the
biological nature of the fish stocks, and they do not provide any arrangement for other
bordering states or external fishing states. There is a lack of formal infrastructure to
bring

about

collaboration

and

cooperation

in

managing

fishing

activities

cooperatively.229 Ecosystem consideration would suggest that the shared resources be
managed through cooperation of all the bordering states, and that a unified
management system is necessary.

Unregulated Water and the Unresolved “Third State” Issue
The two agreements were reached after difficult negotiations and compromises but
largely for an agreed share of the migratory fish stocks and to avoid fisheries conflicts
between the contracting parties. They provide necessary measures for contracting
parties to enjoy rights regarding fishing in each other’s EEZs. But due to the
overlapping claims and unresolved boundaries, unregulated waters still exist under
both agreements (referred as the current fishing pattern zone).230 Fishing activities in
these waters are unregulated, fisheries conflicts occur from time to time, the status of
resources is worrisome, and the management is problematic. This situation does not
seem to be in line with the global trend which has been restricting the freedom of
fishing, even in the high seas, especially in the seas where the problem of
overexploitation of the marine living resources has been mounting.
A more complicated issue associated with the unregulated waters is the “third
state” issue regarding the waters to the northern limit of the China-Japan PMZ.231 The
Sino-Japanese Agreement provides that both Chinese and Japanese fishermen may
operate in this zone, 232 but the precise extent of this zone is ambiguous, and the
228
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management measures are not specified due to the unresolved boundaries between
China and South Korea, and Japan and South Korea.233 The Sino-Japanese Agreement
is applicable only to Chinese and Japanese fishing vessels, but the fishermen of South
Korea also fish in this zone. This has given rise to the issue of South Korea’s position
on this agreement. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, South
Korea as a third state is not bound to the Sino-Japanese Agreement, 234 thus
enforcement on Korean fishermen is impossible.
As mentioned earlier, South Korea challenged the legality of the northern
limit of the PMZ. 235 Meanwhile, China also protested the Japan and South Korea
fisheries agreement on the basis that China’s sovereign rights have been violated.236
The unresolved “third state” issue compromises the effective implementation of the
agreements.237 A cooperative mechanism for the rational and peaceful exploitation of
the shared resources is highly desirable.
The unique ecosystem of the China Seas and complex state relations demand
a multi-species, multi-national, and comprehensive legal regime.238 The absence of a
multilateral agreement or a regional organisation is illustrative of the complex relations
among the states, but this needs to be altered.239 As fishing pressure on the shared
stocks inevitably increases, there is a real need to develop a regional fisheries
organisation or arrangements capable of protecting the resources and, at the same time,
reconcile the needs of coastal states.240

Law and Order at Sea and Dispute Settlement
Compared with the old agreements, the new ones have fundamental changes in content
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and legal basis. Both of them were negotiated under the LOSC regime, reflecting the
advances in the cooperative management of the shared resources. To implement the
bilateral agreements, enhanced cooperation is required. The development of
competencies for cooperative management has been very challenging. One such
challenge is the enforcement of the Agreed Zones against illegal fishing vessels.241
Unless there is a clear demarcation of the respective maritime boundaries,
IUU fishing, mixed with fisheries conflicts, will continue in the China Seas. In
combating IUU fishing, improved domestic management is necessary, but regional
cooperation appears more crucial.
The contracting parties have made an effort to carry out periodical patrols to
prevent illegal fishing and other violations,242 but the outcome has not been satisfying.
Except for the joint enforcement arrangement in the China-South Korea TZs, these
agreements have not established workable enforcement mechanisms. Neither of the
agreements has established contact points for the exchange of information about
violations, or a joint program to provide information to fishermen about the laws and
regulations of contracting parties. This situation has resulted in the lack of law and
order at sea. Mindful of the importance of compliance to the effective implementation
of the agreements, steps need to be taken to address this problem.
The two agreements accommodate, with sufficient flexibility, different
interpretations of the provisions of the LOSC, and they have reduced open fishing
conflicts between the fishermen of contracting parties. However, it is worth
mentioning that neither agreement contains provisions on dispute settlement. In
situations where there is a dispute arsing between the contracting parties, the
provisions of the LOSC on compulsory disputes settlement shall apply.243

Transparency and Feedback
The two bilateral agreements have established JFCs that hold annual meetings to
recommend the status of resources and to determine and allocate the quotas for the
contracting parties of each fishing season. By so doing, they play key roles in the
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effective implementation of the respective agreements. The decisions and
recommendations made by the JFCs have considerable influence on the allocation of
fishing efforts and the way that fishing is conducted. They are vital to the conservation
and management of the shared resources.
However, information regarding JFC decision-making is absent. The JFCs
generally do not publish their decisions and the data upon which they are based, or the
results of scientific deliberations, for evaluation or general public information. Even
the details of the discussions held, or the documents used at such meetings, are not
made public. There is no transparency or feedback on the implementation of these
agreements. Without knowing the basis on which decisions are made, it is hard to
understand fully the necessity for and rationale of the management measures, and to
evaluate the effectiveness of the agreements.244

Implementation Challenges: A Chinese Perspective
The Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean agreements marked the formal regime shift of the
China Seas. The high seas free fishing rights have given way to the EEZ regime in
which fishing activities are governed by bilateral agreements between the contracting
parties. This shift has brought profound and extensive challenges to the contracting
parties. As far as China is concerned, the challenges come primarily from three aspects:
the impact on shrinking fishing grounds, a lack of appropriate domestic legislation to
enforce its newly established jurisdictional zones, and the difficulties of being a flag
state obligated to improve its fishermen’s compliance with the bilateral agreements.245

Shrinking Fishing Grounds and Fleet Reduction
The fish stocks of China’s inshore waters have undergone serious depletion over recent
decades. This situation has displaced a large number of fishing vessels to offshore
grounds which have supported China’s fisheries industry. However, under the SinoJapanese/Sino-Korean fisheries agreements, most of these grounds have become PMZs
or TZs, thus the areas available for Chinese vessels have been greatly reducd.246
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To cope with this situation, China has been reducing its fleet numbers and to
rearrange its fisheries surplus labour. According to statistics, the enforcement of the
bilateral agreements affected 30,000 fishing vessels, more than 300,000 fishermen, and
1,000,000 fisheries households nationwide. 247 These fishing vessels have had to
withdraw from China's offshore fishing grounds; the fishermen have had to give up
their traditional occupation and find alternative livelihoods, and the lives of fisheries
households have been seriously affected.248
As an agriculture-dominated country, fishing remains an attractive occupation
for many Chinese.249 Many fishermen and their families have engaged in fishing for
generations, and their numbers have expanded significantly. They rely almost entirely
on their fishing vessels, which are not only tools of production, but also their shelters.
Due to the reduction of fishing grounds and the loss of industry, many fishermen have
had to find new ways of living, and they found it hard to accept being pushed out from
their traditional way of living and facing the challenge of a new one.250
What makes the situation more difficult is that Chinese society is not ready to
accommodate a large transfer of fisheries surplus labour. Fisheries-related undertakings,
such as aquaculture and fish processing, are encouraged under fisheries regulations to
absorb the surplus labour.
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However, these undertakings depend heavily on

technology and large investment to start a business, thus they are beyond the financial
capacity of the majority of the fishermen. Also, many of them do not see the benefits
of turning from fishing to these new undertakings.
China’s fishing industry has also been affected substantially by these
agreements. China’s output of marine capture fisheries from these grounds has been
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substantially restricted. For instance, Shandong Province is China’s largest marine
fisheries economy,252 but due to the entry into force of the two agreements, Shandong
has only one-third of its fishing vessels operating in the PMZs and TZs of the
agreements, resulting in a large reduction of its annual catch and a loss of revenue.253
Indeed, all the coastal provinces of China along the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea
have suffered the same fate. With the substantially reduced total catch, many
processing factories and enterprises relating to the production of fish oil, fish powder,
and seafood have had to close due to a shortage of raw materials.254 Industries such as
fishing gear production and fishing port services have also encountered great losses.
Another impact on China’s fisheries from the two agreements has been the
extra pressure on China's inshore fishing grounds and seriously depleted resources.
The vessels withdrawing from offshore grounds compete for the inshore grounds. This
situation further worsens the status of resources, stresses the fisheries ecosystem,
challenges the conservation and management effort, and most importantly imposes a
severe threat to China’s sustainable fisheries.255
Facing these challenges and difficulties, China has to cut its fishing fleet and
transfer its surplus labour force to fulfil the obligations under the bilateral agreements
and enhance the conservation of fisheries resources.256 China has started a program to
scrap 30,000 fishing vessels between 2003 and 2010.257 This program aims at cutting
China’s marine fishing vessels from 222,390 (GRT 12,697,631 kW), based on the
number as of the end of 2002, to 192,390 (11,426,968 kW) — a total reduction of
13.49% of its fishing fleet.258 Each year, a certain number of vessels are taken out of
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operation through this program and the fishermen transferred to other jobs.259 In 2002,
4,748 fishing vessels were taken out of the industry and 29,978 fishermen were
transferred to other industry. 260 To enhance the fishing vessels reduction, China
adopted Provisional Regulations for Fishing Vessel Scrapping.261
The Chinese government offers preferential treatment to help the displaced
fishermen turn to aquaculture or other industries.262 The compensation for scrapped
vessels is up to US$12,000. 263 Fishermen are encouraged to expand aquaculture
operations, set up processing plants, or get involved in non-fisheries-related
industries.264 Governments and the FMBs at different levels have also made an effort
to help them. 265 However, misunderstandings among fishermen who have been
affected are common and this has increased the difficulty of the fleet reduction
policy.266

Accelerated Legislation and EEZ Enforcement
The LOSC provides coastal states jurisdictional rights to ensure the compliance of
management measures in their EEZs.267 In China’s case, however, it did not have the
capacity to enforce jurisdiction over foreign fishing vessels due to its lack of
legislation and enforcement resources. This was particularly the case when China
signed the bilateral fisheries agreements with Japan and South Korea. China’s 1998
EEZ/CS Law does have provisions regarding enforcement on foreign fishing vessels,
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but it does not specify operational procedures.268 With no other law in place to fill the
gap and with an urgent need for EEZ enforcement, China accelerated its legislation by
enacting a series of ministerial regulations in a short period of time.
The first law to regulate foreign fishing in China’s EEZ was the Provisional
Regulations on Foreigners and Foreign Fishing Vessels in the Jurisdictional Waters of
PRC (Regulations on Foreign Fishing).269 It was adopted in June 1999 by the MOA.
As its name specifies, the Regulations on Foreign Fishing set forth a range of rules to
regulate fishing operation, surveys on marine living resources, and fisheries-related
activities conducted by foreigners and foreign vessels in China’s “jurisdictional
waters”. 270 The law does not define “jurisdictional waters”, but different penalties
apply to violations occurring in various maritime zones including China’s internal
waters, territorial seas, EEZ, and continental shelf.271 Foreigners need to apply for a
licence to fish in China’s waters and to observe China’s domestic laws and regulations,
as well as international agreements to which China is a party.272 The Regulations on
Foreign Fishing also lists activities prohibited or restricted in various situations when
foreigners or foreign vessels conduct fishing or surveying in China’s jurisdictional
waters.
In September 1999, the FMB issued the Circular on Specific Procedures in
Processing Fisheries Violations by Foreigners and Foreign Vessels.
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It is a

supplementary instrument to the Regulations on Foreign Fishing, and it sets down
standard procedures, mainly for Chinese enforcement authorities to follow when
dealing with fisheries violations by foreigners or foreign vessels.
In order to enhance its EEZ enforcement, the FMB of China issued the
Management Measures on EEZ Fisheries Surveillance Patrolling (EEZ Surveillance
Patrolling).274 It sets out the tasks for the surveillance patrol, the duties of fisheries
authorities, and the requirements on vessels that are on surveillance patrolling
including:
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• prosecution of illegal fishing vessels in China’s EEZ;
• monitoring and surveillance of authorised foreign fishing vessels, including
boarding, inspection, and prosecution of violations;
• observation and recording of fishing activities by Chinese and foreign vessels;
• overseeing the compliance of multilateral or bilateral fisheries agreements in the
agreed waters including on-site administration of Chinese fishing vessels; and
• handling fishing conflicts and assisting in the case of the collision of fishing
vessels.275
In order to standardise the procedures to board and inspect foreign fishing vessels, the
FMB issued the Regulations on the Procedures of Fisheries Enforcement Vessels
Boarding and Inspection Foreign Fishing Vessels,276 and the Management Measures on
the Fisheries Enforcement Vessels on Duty of Patrolling EEZ. 277 Since July 2000,
China has improved its EEZ monitoring and enforcement capability.278
China has also put effort into implementing the Sino-Japanese and SinoKorean Agreement. Following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Agreement, China
issued the Provisional Measures on the Management of the Provisional Measures Zone
of the Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement in March 1999 (China-Japan PMZ
Measures).279 In order to better regulate Chinese vessels fishing in the China-Japan
PMZ, The China-Japan PMZ Measures empowered the coastal FMB of the East China
Sea as the competent authority to take charge of the issues regarding the
implementation of the China-Japan PMZ and Chinese fishing vessels in the PMZ.280
Detailed measures are set out for the application of fishing permits,281 fishing vessels
compliance to the agreement,282 and the collection and compilation of logbooks.283 The
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China-Japan PMZ Measures also provides standard application forms for fishing
permits, and templates for logbooks and other required forms.284
In the same fashion, China issued the Provisional Measures on the
Management of the PMZ and TZs of the Sino-Korean Fisheries Agreement in February
2001 (China-Korea PMZ and TZs Measures). 285 The China-Korea PMZ and TZs
Measures are largely the same as the China-Japan PMZ Measures. The FMB of the
Yellow/Bohai Sea is the competent authority to take charge of the implementation of
the China-Korea PMZ and TZs. 286 It also laid down detailed regulations on the
application of fishing permits, requirements on logbooks, vessel markings, and
templates for required forms.287
These laws and regulations were brought into being to respond to the EEZ
regime, especially to implement the emerging bilateral fisheries agreements China
signed with its neighbours. They reflected the urgency in resolving the issues that
surfaced from the new legal challenges of the EEZ regime and the management
measures of the bilateral agreements. They certainly provided an important regulative
basis for China to enforce its EEZ and to implement the two agreements. However, as
they were prompted by urgent need without systematic consideration and sufficient
legislative deliberation, they are fairly rough and lack operational consistency. It would
be appropriate for China to address these inadequacies in its implementation law for its
1998 EEZ/CS Law and to improve coherent enforcement.

Compliance and Flag State Control
Flag state control is extremely important in an area where fishing is regulated by an
agreement. Failing to regulate nationals and fishing vessels has the potential to lead to
the failure of the agreement and the decline of fisheries resources. Some agreements
have not always worked well, mainly due to implementation failure in ensuring
fishermen’s compliance and observation of the arrangements.288
Both the Sino-Japanese Agreement and Sino-Korean Agreement set up joint
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fishing zones (PMZ and TZs) where flag states’ control applies. Parties to the
agreements have to ensure that their nationals and fishing vessels comply with the
management measures of the agreements. This is critical to the successful operation of
the agreements. However, illegal fishing tends to occur, particularly on the part of
Chinese fishing vessels, in the waters that were high seas but are now under the
jurisdiction of Japan and Korea. This has challenged China’s compliance and flag state
responsibility to a considerable extent.289
With the entry into force of the Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean agreements, Japan
and South Korea have improved control and surveillance of Chinese vessels fishing in
their waters by adopting a series of legislation.290 In November 2003, a Chinese trawl
net fishing vessel was boarded by the Japanese authorities to check whether the fishing
quota, allocated by the Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement, was being adhered to, but
it was found not to have filled in the logbook with regard to the total catch in Japan’s
EEZ.291 The vessel was detained and the captain was arrested.292
A mixture of these circumstances has resulted in heightened conflicts over
fishing gear and collisions between fishing vessels. Meanwhile, quotas for Chinese
fishing vessels have reduced year by year. 293 Disputes involving Chinese fishing
vessels in the joint fishing zones are rising.294 These problems also challenge China’s
flag state responsibility.
Three factors contribute to the low compliance with the agreements by
Chinese fishermen. Many have found it difficult to accept the fact that they could no
longer fish in the waters where they fished for years. Their misunderstanding of the
regime change does not generate respect for the regulations to implement these
bilateral agreements. Another factor is associated with the poor equipment of some
small fishing vessels. They do not have the devices to locate their accurate position and
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sometimes accidentally enter the restricted zones and are caught for illegal fishing.295
Meanwhile, some fishermen driven by economic incentives risk the legal liability and
consequences of their offences. 296 Lastly, China’s fisheries officials fall short of
experience in handling the new EEZ regime and sometimes tend to underestimate the
severity of compliance and enforcement tasks. The complex nature of implementing
these fisheries agreements demands broad involvement of various departments and
commitment to sufficient finance, manpower and physical resources.
The mixture of these factors, directly or indirectly, results in fisheries offences
which affects China’s compliance with the agreements. In order to improve the
effectiveness of its flag state responsibilities, China has increased personnel in law
enforcement and established the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command to coordinate
relevant authorities to create a multi-agency surveillance and enforcement headquarter
to enhance fisheries laws and regulations including the implementation of China’s
bilateral fisheries agreements.297 China has also updated enforcement facilities and set
up land-based remote monitoring stations.298
The local and coastal FMBs have organised training programs to update their
staff’s qualifications and short courses to improve the compliance by fishermen with
the management measures of the agreements.299 They have also distributed handbooks
and publications about the relevant LOSC provisions, management requirements of
international fisheries instruments, relevant regulations of Japan and South Korea on
foreign fishing, coordinates of Japan’s and Korea’s territorial seas, charts of the Agreed
Zones, procedures for emergency calls, and rules on navigation safety.300

Conclusion
The chapter examined fisheries relations between China and two of its maritime
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neighbours: Japan and South Korea. The review of the geographical, biological, social
and political situations has illustrated the declining status of the shared stocks, complex
regional pattern, complicated state relations, and difficulties in establishing a
cooperative mechanism for the management of shared resources.
The chapter has also shown that the extension of coastal states’ jurisdiction
over EEZs and resources has encompassed the entire region and there are substantial
areas where maritime claims overlap. The overlapping claims of maritime boundaries,
together with competitive fishing interests, and the disputed sovereignty claims over
some islands, have made these semi-enclosed seas the most complex and sensitive
areas in the world.
The analysis of the bilateral fisheries relations between China and Japan, and
China and South Korea, has shown that the exploitation of the shared stocks of the
China Seas often, if not always, involves conflict. No single state can effectively
manage the shared resources of the China Seas, and cooperation is the only solution for
the sustainable development of the shared resources.
By assessing the management measures in the Sino-Japanese Agreement and
Sino-Korean Agreement, the chapter points out that the two agreements symbolise
concrete steps towards the cooperative management of the shared resources. They are
particularly significant in governing fishing activities in areas with overlapping claims
and pending boundary delimitations. However, the two agreements have obvious
constraints and limitations due to their bilateral nature and lack of consideration of the
biologic characteristics of the migratory stocks. These weaknesses undermine their
effectiveness. A comprehensive management regime needs to address these problems
and embody an increased sharing of capacity and responsibility for the shared stocks
and the marine environment.
The chapter underscores the task facing China and its maritime neighbours in
achieving cooperative fisheries management, as the challenge of protecting the shared
resources is not the responsibility of an individual state, but relies on the effort of all
the China Seas states. Bilateral agreements are not the final solution to the
conservation and management of shared resources. For a long-term and sustainable
development of the shared resources, a concerted response and cooperation throughout
the China Seas region is required.
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CHAPTER 7 CHINA’S FISHERIES COOPERATION WITH
VIETNAM
Introduction
This chapter deals with China’s fisheries relations with Vietnam in the South China
Sea (SCS) context where a cooperative mechanism has been established to manage the
shared resources of the Gulf of Tonkin. This mechanism was crystallised by a SinoVietnamese Fisheries Agreement signed in 2000, together with one on boundary
delimitation. Both were put into effect in June 2004. As the fisheries agreement is
based on the delimited maritime boundary, the boundary agreement is also discussed
where relevant.
The chapter reviews the fisheries relations between China and Vietnam in the
exploitation of the shared stocks in the Gulf of Tonkin. This is structured
chronologically to reflect the changes from the 1950s to the present in an effort to
illustrate how the overall political relations had affected the bilateral fisheries relations,
and subsequently resulted in a negative impact on the conservation and management of
the shared resources. It also explains the tensions endured and the progress made in the
lead up to the conclusion of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement.
A substantial part of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the management
measures pertaining to the Agreed Zones established by the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries
Agreement and an assessment of the cooperative mechanism. It emphasises, in
particular, the significance of such a cooperative mechanism for the long-term
sustainable utilisation of the shared fish stocks in the Gulf of Tonkin.
The chapter points out that as one of the many issues constituting the SCS
disputes, the establishment of a fisheries cooperative mechanism between China and
Vietnam, and the successful implementation of the agreement will facilitate the
negotiation and settlement of fisheries issues of common concern in a larger area.

The South China Sea and China’s Fisheries
Among the three semi-enclosed seas bordering China’s land territory, the SCS is the
largest one with an area of 3.5 million square kilometres.1 The SCS is made up of
1

See Chapter 3 for a comparison between the SCS and the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.
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various semi-submerged natural formations which compose the four main groups of
islands: the Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracels, and Spratlys.2
The states bordering the SCS vary greatly in size, geographical configuration,
social and cultural structures, and economic and political systems,3 but many of them
have contested sovereign rights or sovereignty claims to different parts of the SCS,
particularly islands.4 Of the disputed claims, the status of the Paracel Islands and the
Spratly Islands have been the most serious ones and have resulted in several clashes
involving military action in recent years,5 particularly between China and Vietnam (see
Map 7.1 The Disputed Islands of the South China Sea).6
The widely established EEZ regime has intensified these claims and made the
maritime boundary delimitations more complex and inevitable. The SCS also has a
distinct ecosystem, vital natural resources,

7

and the function of a maritime

superhighway.8 These features are of significance, not only to regional states but also

2

See M. J. Valencia, "The South China Sea: Prospects for marine regionalism," Marine Policy 2, No. 2
(1978), p.88. See also Greenfield, China's Practice in the Law of the Sea, pp.151-167.
3
Besides China (including Taiwan), countries bordering the SCS include: Vietnam; Cambodia;
Thailand; Malaysia; Singapore; the Philippines; Brunei Darussalam; Laos (the only land-locked state in
the region); and Indonesia. For a brief account on these states, See Valencia, "The South China Sea:
Prospects for marine regionalism," p.87.
4
Eight parties presently claim title to the South China Sea islands. China, both mainland and Taiwan,
and Vietnam contest ownership of the Paracels Islands. Six claims are asserted on the Spratlys: China,
both mainland and Taiwan, and Vietnam claim the entire archipelago, while the Philippines, Malaysia,
and Brunei claim sovereignty over certain portions of the area. These disputes concern the ownership of
some mid-ocean islets, most of which are rocks without much value, but the owner of the islets will be
entitled to sovereign rights of vast waters around them and interests in the natural resources of these
islets. See C. Joyner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: rethinking the interplay of law, diplomacy, and geopolitics in the South China Sea," IJMCL 13 (1998), p.195. See also S. B. Kaye, "The Spratly Islands
dispute: A legal background," Maritime Studies September-October (1998), pp.14-25. For a discussion
on the influence of the islands in the South China Sea, see A. G. O. Elferink, "The islands in the South
China Sea: how does their presence limit the extent of the high seas and the area and the maritime zones
of the mainland coasts?" ODIL 32 (2001), pp.169-190.
5
C. Park, "The South China Sea disputes: who owns the islands and the natural resources?" ODIL 5,
No. 1 (1978), p.30. See also D. Rosenberg, An Introductory Essay: Why a South China Sea Website?
See http://www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea (accessed 22 August 2003), p.4.
6
For a comprehensive discussion on China’s claims and action in the SCS, see G. Austin, China's
Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development, (Canberra: Australian
National University, 1998). A summary on territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands and
military clashes in the SCS that reflect the situation between China and Vietnam is available from
http://www.middlebury.edu/SouthChinaSea/scs-intro-html, see Tables 5 and 7.
7
The SCS is known to be rich in natural resources, particularly oil and gas, which is one of the most
important considerations sparking the territorial disputes. See Z. Gao, "The South China Sea: from
conflict to cooperation?" ODIL 25 (1994), p.349.
8
The SCS is one of the world’s busiest international sea lanes. More than half of the world’s super
tanker traffic passes through its waters. Over half of the world’s merchant fleet sails through the SCS
every year. See Rosenberg, An Introductory Essay: Why a South China Sea Website? For discussions,
see Park, "The South China Sea disputes: who owns the islands and the natural resources?" See also C.
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to trading nations worldwide, however, the intensive ongoing disputes and competition
over resources in the SCS have attracted global attention in the past decades.9

Map 7.1

The Disputed Islands of the South China Sea
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Park, "Offshore oil development in the China Seas: Some legal and Territorial issues," in East Asia and
the Law o f the Sea, ed. C. Park (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983), p.83.
9 See Gao, "The South China Sea: From conflict to cooperation?" p.349.
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The SCS is of strategic importance to China, not only owing to its position in regard to
defence and security, but also for it resources.10 Fishing has long been China’s most
important resource exploitation activity in the SCS. As the sea extends across tropical
and semi-tropical zones with a typical monsoon climate, it has a large and complex
marine ecosystem and an abundant variety of resource.11 There are over 1,000 species
in SCS waters and over 200 species are of economic value, and with the potential for
higher sustainable yields. 12 Important fish stocks in the SCS include pelagic and
demersal species.13 These abundant resources attract coastal states, including China, to
develop a fisheries industry. Among the fishing states of the SCS, China has the largest
catch owing to the population of its coastal provinces.14 The fishing grounds of the
SCS are an important part of China’s fisheries.15
Along with the development of fishing activities in the SCS, China’s fisheries
law and policy has been enhanced to deal with the SCS fisheries, including the basic
principles of management, the development of aquaculture, and the nurturing of fish
stocks.16 In recent years, however, China has strengthened its fisheries management in
the SCS, and has a policy to develop a community-based fisheries industry, which is
evidenced by the promotion of Hainan from an administrative region under
10

China claims historical rights to the SCS. See China’s 1998 EEZ/CS Law, Article 14. For a discussion,
see Chapter 5. See also Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and
National Development, pp.206-222.
11
Joyner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy, and Geo-Politics
in the South China Sea," p.194.
12
The abundant fisheries resources are found in all shelf and reef-islet regions, and the high economic
value group, including tuna, are found in the shallow waters and continental shelf. Overall, fisheries
resources in the South China Sea contribute a share of approximately 5 million tonnes to the world
annual catch. See Park, "The South China Sea disputes: who owns the islands and the natural
resources?" p.37.
13
The greatest species diversity exists with the demersal fishes and invertebrates, which also have a high
degree of species intermixing. Generally, small demersal, small pelagic and intermediate predators are
the most important groups of fish found in the area. Major pelagic fisheries include jacks, mullets,
herrings, sardines, anchovies, tuna, scads, mackerels, sharks, rays, squids, and cuttlefishes. See J. Marr,
"Fishery and Resource Management in Southeast Asia," in RFF Program of International Studies of
Fishery Arrangements Paper (Washington: 1976), pp.13-15. See also J. Morgan and M. Valencia, Atlas
for Marine Policy in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.56.
14
According to Djalal, China had a total of 17.5 million tonnes catch from the SCS in 1993. See H.
Djalal, "South China Sea Island Disputes," The Raffles Bulletin of Zoology, Supplement No. 8 (The
Biodiversity of the South China Sea) (2000), pp.9-12. However, China does not differentiate the origins
of the catches, thus there is no official data on the SCS.
15
For a overview of China’s fishing grounds in the SCS, see Xia, Zhao, and Feng, China Fishery
Divisions: A Survey and Division on China's Fishery Resources (in Chinese), pp.166-171.
16
China’s fisheries management in the SCS is basically the same as that of the Yellow Sea and the East
China Sea. See discussion in Chapters 3 and 4. For a list of China’s laws and regulations related to
fisheries, see http://www.lib.noaa.gov/china/law.htm.
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Guangdong Province to both an independent province and a Special Economic Zone
(SPZ).17.
However, the intensified competition for fisheries resources has seen a rise in
the number of disputes.18 These disputes, mixed with overlapping territorial claims,
have resulted in numerous clashes between fishermen themselves, and between
fishermen of one state and maritime forces of another.19 These clashes often result in
the loss of property and life.20 As a consequence, the SCS has become a site of tension
and potential conflict, which has made access to SCS waters somewhat dangerous and
problematic.
Besides a host of security challenges and territorial disputes, the SCS is
presently facing problems of overexploitation of fisheries resources, and degradation
of the marine environment. With the development of fishing industries, the ongoing
depletion of marine resources has put pressure on fish stocks and adversely affected
the ecosystem. Coastal states face difficulties in maintaining the integrity of the
fisheries industry in the sea. These issues necessitate cooperation between the
countries bordering theses seas. With disputed sovereignty claims over islands and
sovereign rights over fisheries resources, it is difficult to reach any multilateral
initiatives. This is a complex situation to which no conclusive answer is readily
available. As the largest state bordering the SCS, China is obligated to make an effort
to seek a solution to its disputes with its neighbouring states and it has an interest in
ensuring that the SCS fisheries resources are managed in a sustainable manner.21

China’s Fisheries Relations with Vietnam
China and Vietnam share both land and maritime boundaries and have been engaged in
a longstanding dispute over both boundaries. 22 Their land boundary extends for
17

For more detailed information on this account, see D. Zha, IUJ Research Institute Working Paper:
Asia Pacific SeriesChina's Exploitation of South China Sea Resources: The Case of Hainan Province
2000, available from http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/wpap015.cfm, p.2.
18
Park, "The South China Sea disputes: who owns the islands and the natural resources?" p. 37.
19
See Zha, China's Exploitation of South China Sea Resources: The Case of Hainan Province; p.2.
20
Ibid., p.1. See also Thao, "Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea," p.105.
21
China has participated in the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea adopted by the
member states of ASEAN and China in November 1999. See N. H. Thao, "Vietnam and the Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea," ODIL 32 (2001), p.124, Appendix 1.
22
Vietnam is situated on the eastern coast of the Indochina Peninsula, has a coastal line of 3,444
kilometres, an EEZ of 210,600 square miles. It holds claims on numerous islands in the SCS. Vietnam
has maritime boundaries with China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. It
resolved an agreement on historic waters with Cambodia in 1982 and an agreement on the Gulf of
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approximately 1,300 kilometres between the tri-point with Laos and the northern
distributary of the Beilun River. The two governments settled this boundary in 1999,
which was reported as being satisfactory to both sides, because they finally put to rest
their centuries-old border issue.23
The maritime boundary between China and Vietnam extends seaward from
the termination of the land boundary into the Gulf of Tonkin and out to the SCS (see
Map 7.2 Maritime Positions between China and Vietnam).24 The Gulf of Tonkin is a
semi-enclosed gulf embraced by the mainland of China and Vietnam as well as China’s
Hainan Island.25 It has an area of 128,000 square kilometres with an average depth of
38 metres.26 As the widest part of the gulf is only 180 nm, this required the two states
to demarcate their maritime boundaries in accordance with the LOSC. 27 China and
Vietnam also have competing sovereignty claims over the Paracel and Spratly
archipelagos in the SCS.28 Their complicated bilateral relations in the maritime sphere
have affected their fisheries relations.
The Gulf of Tonkin is one of the principal fishing grounds for Vietnamese

Thailand in 1997. For the former, see Valencia and Dyke, "Vietnam's national interests and the Law of
the Sea," p.217; for the latter, see K. Zou, "Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin,"
ODIL 30 (1999), p.248.
23
The Agreement on Land Border between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Sino-Vietnamese Land Border Agreement) was
signed on 30 December 1999 and came into effect on 6 July 2000. They installed their first new national
boundary tablet at the Mong Cai-Dongxing International Border Gate on 27 December 2001, see
http://www/fmprc.gov.cn/wjb/zzjg.
24
The Gulf of Tonkin is known in Chinese as the Beibu Wan and in Vietnamese as the Bac Bo Gulf. It
has two outlets to the SCS: one is the Qiongzhou Strait; the other is the Leizhou Peninsula. Vietnam
claimed the Gulf of Tonkin as its historic bay which is not supported by international law. According to
Oppenheim, “all gulfs and bays enclosed by the land of more than one littoral State, however narrow
their entrance may be, are non-territorial. They are parts of open sea, the marginal belt inside the gulfs
and bays excepted.” See R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (Chinese version),
trans. P. Jiang, vol. 1 (Beijing: China Encyclopaedia Publisher, 1992), p.43. For discussions, see Zou,
"Maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin," p.241.
25
For a comprehensive view of maritime issues on the Gulf of Tonkin, see Ji, "Maritime jurisdiction in
the three China Seas: options for equitable settlement," pp.99-103.
26
Zou, "Maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin," p.235.
27
For discussions, see J. Li, "The boundary dispute between China and France and the boundary
delimitation for the Gulf of Tonkin," Studies on Issues of the South China Sea (in Chinese) 2, No. 102
(2000), pp.76-89. Also J. Li, "Disputes over the islands and boundary of the South China Sea and
international sea laws," South China Sea Studies and Development (in Chinese) 3-4 (1998), p.5,
28
For disputes over the two archipelagos, see Kaye, "The Spratly Islands dispute: A legal background."
See also H. Chiu and C. Park, "Legal status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands," in The Law of the Sea:
Problems form the East Asian Perspective: Proceedings of Two Workshops of the Law of the Sea
Institute, ed. C. Park and J. K. Park (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii,
1984), pp.456-481; Cordner, "The Spratly Islands dispute and the law of the sea."
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fishermen.29 It is also a traditional fishing ground that has supported the livelihoods of
millions of Chinese fishermen (the provinces bordering the gulf including Guangdong,
Guangxi, and Haian provinces).30 The Gulf of Tonkin is of importance to the national
interests of both governments and the joint exploitation of the shared resources has
been the most important element of their bilateral fisheries relations.31

Map 7.2

Maritime Positions between China and Vietnam

Source: http://encarta.msn/encnet/features/MapCenter.asp.

Joint Exploitation of the Shared Resources
The Gulf of Tonkin sits in a tropical and semi-tropical zones with a typical monsoon
climate. Some large rivers discharging into the gulf bring nutrition for fish stocks. The

29 See Li, "The boundary dispute between China and France and the boundary delimitation for the Gulf
o f Tonkin," p. 87.
30 China has paid great attention to the fishermen who are affected by the agreement to ensure the
implementation o f the agreement. See http://wwwl.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2608057.html.
31 Huang, Law o f the Sea and Fisheries Regulations (in Chinese), p. 125.
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favourable geological environment and hydrographical condition provides an ideal
ecosystem for fish to spawn, breed, feed and mature, and thus forms productive fishing
grounds.32 Most commercial species migrate to the eastern and northern parts of the
gulf in spring to spawn and breed and then to the central west, close to the Vietnam
side, to mature. For centuries, Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen along the gulf have
sustained their livelihood by exploiting the fish stocks of the gulf.33
In the early 1950s, the fishing capacity of both China and Vietnam was
limited, and there was little competition for the shared resources of the gulf. The
fishermen of the two states peacefully conducted their fishing in the gulf along the
migratory route or according to the distribution of fish stocks.34 Some large rivers on
the Vietnam side discharge nutritious substances into the sea and provide more
productive fishing grounds. This attracted fishing vessels from both countries to
operate on the Vietnamese side during the fishing season. When the relations between
the two states were healthy, the fishermen called into each other’s fishing ports to take
on fresh water and food supplies.35 Chinese fishing vessels sometimes operated within
6 nm off the Vietnamese coast. From 1957 to 1966, China and Vietnam signed two
fisheries agreements to regulate fishing activities in the Gulf of Tonkin. These
agreements basically dealt with fishing arrangements such as fishing grounds and
vessels’ emergency port calls.
The first agreement, signed in April 1957 in Hanoi, defined that the coastal
fishing grounds were to be regulated by the coastal state, while the middle of the gulf
was free for fishing by both sides. 36 This arrangement restricted fishermen of both
parties from fishing within 6 nm of the coast. The agreement was initially valid for
three years, but it was extended in March 1961 in Beijing with a supplementary
protocol. Major amendments included a further restriction on vessels from fishing
32

For the characteristics of the resources in the Gulf of Tonkin, see Y. Deng, "An analysis on the joint
exploitation of the fisheries resources of the Gulf of the Tonkin by China and Vietnam," Marine
Fisheries (in Chinese) 4 (1997), p.29.
33
It is estimated that the sustainable annual yield of the fisheries resources in the Gulf of Tonkin is
600,000 tonnes. However, in recent years the annual catches from the gulf by both Chinese and
Vietnamese fishermen have exceeded 1,000,000. This necessitates the cooperative management for the
shared stocks by the both states. See An Introduction to the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Delimitation
Agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin, available from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t145558.htm
(accessed 12 August 2004).
34
Ibid., p.30.
35
Ibid.
36
K. Zou, "Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin," IJMCL 17, No. 1 (2002),
p.128.
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within 12 nm of the coasts. Despite the extension of the restriction line from 6 nm to
12 nm, a limited number of Chinese vessels were still allowed to fish between the old
and the new extended restriction lines of the Vietnamese coast.37
China and Vietnam signed their second agreement, which was valid for three
years, in August 1963 in Beijing. This agreement established restricted fishing lines on
both sides of the gulf. Fishing vessels of one party were not allowed to cross the
restriction line of the other (a distance of 12 nm from their coasts).38 However, as small
vessels less than 10 GRT could fish only in the shallow waters close to the shores,
consideration was given to a certain number of these vessels (no more than 120) to
continue fishing in the coastal waters.39
Although the two fisheries agreements regulated fishing vessels of both sides
in their coastal waters, traditional fishing activities were given appropriate
consideration. Both sides made an effort to exploit peacefully and utilise rationally the
fisheries resources in the Gulf of Tonkin. China provided technical assistance to
Vietnam to conduct comprehensive surveys on marine biology and hydrology jointly.40
The two states also cooperated in the management of resources in other areas.41
From 1966 to the early 1970s, no fisheries agreement was concluded between
China and Vietnam, because Vietnam was engaged in war with the United States.
During this period, China provided support to Vietnamese fishing vessels including
fishing ports, and services to fishermen such as landing rights and food supplies.42

Deteriorated Relations and Unilateral Management Efforts
Since the unification of South and North Vietnam in 1975, the bilateral relations
between the two socialist neighbours deteriorated due to political issues and border
conflicts. These issues, mixed with overlapping territorial claims, resulted in numerous
fisheries clashes between the two states. A reflection of the times was tightened
37

M. Le, Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Relations and Fisheries in the Gulf of Tonkin (in Chinese),
Textbook for the Training Courses on the EEZ Regime and Fisheries Management (Shanghai: FMB of
the East China Sea and Shanghai Fisheries University, 1999), p.3.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Y. Luo and C. Zeng, Marine Affairs of Contemporary China (in Chinese) (Beijing: China Science
Publishing House, 1985), p.416, cited in Zou, "Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement for the Gulf of
Tonkin," p.254.
41
For instance, China and Vietnam also signed in 1962 the Agreement on the Conservation of Fisheries
Resources in the Honghe River: Huang, Law of the Sea and Fisheries Regulations (in Chinese), pp.124125.
42
Ibid., p.125.
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restriction on Chinese vessels fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin where they were often
caught or detained even when they fished in the middle of the gulf.43 Fisheries conflict
became common resulting in serious loss of life and property of Chinese fishermen.
The hostile relations between the two states made it difficult to maintain orderly
fishing operations in this semi-enclosed gulf.
To avoid further losses, China limited the number of Chinese fishermen
allowed to fish in the Gulf of Tonkin and strictly prohibited them from crossing the
middle of the gulf. In 1988, the state FMB issued an internal Administrative Directive
on Safe Fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin (Safe Fishing Directive).44 It set up a restriction
line of 10 coordinates which Chinese vessels operating in the gulf were not allowed to
cross. 45 The Safe Fishing Directive required Chinese vessels to go through a strict
application procedure to get permits: only those vessels with good equipment were
granted fishing permits, and they were also required to carry the required documents to
fish in the gulf and work in teams for security purposes.46 To ensure the compliance of
these regulations, severe penalties for offences were prescribed, including the
suspension and cancellation of fishing permits.47 The Safe Fishing Directive illustrated
the extent of the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations and its impact on fisheries.
Although no fisheries agreements have been concluded between China and
Vietnam since the 1970s, unilateral efforts were made to conserve fisheries resources
in the Gulf of Tonkin. Such efforts appeared more evident from the Chinese side, as
China exploited the fishing resources of the gulf more heavily than Vietnam.48 Often
China’s management effort was associated with its SCS fisheries. For instance, when
China set up a motor trawler restriction line for its fishing grounds in the SCS in 1980,
it did the same for the Gulf of Tonkin.49 China also established conservation zones and
43

See W. Qin and Z. Lu, "Impact of the boundary delimitation on the Gulf of Tonkin and
recommendations," Marine Fisheries (in Chinese) 4 (1997), p.27.
44
Administrative Directive on the Safe Fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin, 1988, Serial No.11, FMB,
Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese).
45
Safe Fishing Directives, Articles 2 and 3.
46
Ibid., Articles 4-7.
47
Ibid., Articles 9-11.
48
Comparing the number of fishing vessels, China had 30% more than Vietnam, but China’s total catch
from the Gulf of Tonkin was 70% more than Vietnam. See Le, Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Relations and
Fisheries in the Gulf of Tonkin (in Chinese) p.7.
49
In January 1980, the State Council approved the report of the State Aquatic Bureau on setting up a
restriction line for motor trawlers along the coast of the SCS and Fujian Province (starting at the south
of 27ºN) and the Gulf of Tonkin. See Annex 1 (1) for the restriction line for the South China Sea, and
Annex 1 (2) for the Gulf of Tonkin. See the State Council, Series No. 112, Report of the State Aquatic
Bureau on the Restriction Line for Motor Trawlers in the South China Sea, 1980, FMB, Database for
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closed zones/seasons in the SCS and the Gulf of Tonkin on its side.50 The designation
of restriction lines and conservation zones aimed to conserve fisheries resources, avoid
fisheries conflicts, and protect China’s fishing rights and interests.51
Despite China’s effort, these management measures were applicable only to
China’s jurisdictional waters and Chinese fishermen. As there were no corresponding
efforts made by Vietnam, these measures were not very effective. The migratory nature
of fish stocks would require a joint effort to achieve sustainable utilisation of the
shared resources.

Progress towards New Fisheries Cooperation
The normalisation of bilateral relations between China and Vietnam in 1991 relaxed
the stressful political atmosphere and created a climate in which the two states could
settle their boundary disputes.52 However, the improved relationship did not smooth
the progress of the difficult fisheries relations.53 Instead, the unsettled boundary issue
imposed more tension on fisheries relations and caused increased fishing conflicts in
the Gulf of Tonkin.
In November 1991, China and Vietnam signed the Provisional Agreement on
the Settlement of the Bilateral Boundary Affairs, and in October 1993 the two states
formally signed the Agreement on the Basic Principles for the Settlement on the
Boundary and Territorial Affairs.54 China and Vietnam also agreed to negotiate the
boundary delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin according to the principle of fairness and

Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese). China has adopted the same approach in the
Yellow Sea and East China Sea since the 1950s to protect fish stocks and their habitat from being
damaged by trawlers. See discussions in Chapter 3.
50
FMB, Database for Fisheries Laws and Regulations (1949-1999) (in Chinese).
51
See note 49 for the Motor Trawler Restriction Line for the South China Sea.
52
China and Vietnam started the talks on the boundary of the Gulf of the Tonkin at the end of the land
border war in 1979, but they failed to achieve any outcome. Vietnam insisted on a boundary defined in
the 1887 Sino-French Convention, whereas China insisted on a half-half boundary. For the Sino-French
Boundary, see Vietnam, Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Viet Nam, Para. 3. It is collected in the Law of the Sea:
Current Developments in State Practice (New York: UN Publication, 1982), pp.143-144. For China’s
assertion, see C. Park, "Vietnam, Kampuchea, and the law of the sea," in The Law of the Sea: Problems
form the East Asian Perspective: Proceedings of Two Workshops of the Law of the Sea Institute, ed. C.
Park and J. K. Park (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1984), p.447.
53
Chinese fishing vessels were often fined, detained, even shot at by Vietnamese forces. See Qin and
Lu, "Impact of the boundary delimitation on the Gulf of Tonkin and recommendations," p.27.
54
See ‘Sino-Vietnam Border Treaties equal to both countries: Spokesperson’, People’s Daily, available
from http://www/english.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/24/eng20020124_89291.shtml (accessed 15 June
2002).
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taking into consideration relevant circumstances. 55 Since then, negotiations on
boundary issues were able to made progress.56
In June 1994 Vietnam ratified the LOSC, and so did China two years later.57
The LOSC does not provide readily available answers for states to settle their disputed
maritime claims,58 but it provides guidelines for states seeking a solution.59 In the light
of this significant progress, China raised the issue of negotiating a fisheries agreement
for the Gulf of Tonkin. 60 According to China, the fisheries issue is an important
component of maritime boundary delimitation, and China’s traditional fishing rights
need to be recognised. 61 At first, China’s request was refused by Vietnam on the
grounds that the conservation and utilisation of fisheries resources may be considered
only after the settlement of the maritime boundary.62
In 1998, Vietnam agreed to include fisheries issues in the boundary
negotiations for the Gulf of Tonkin, but it was difficult for the two states to make
progress due to disagreement on many issues. 63 Towards the end of 1999, the
finalisation of the Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Land Boundary accelerated the
negotiations on the maritime boundary negotiation.64 In 2000, the two states finally
agreed on the demarcation line for their maritime boundaries and terms and conditions
55
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for fisheries cooperation, which paved the way for the finalisation of the agreements
on both boundary delimitation and fisheries cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin.65
On 25 December 2000, China and Vietnam officially signed two agreements
in Beijing.66 The two agreements are: the Agreement between the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
on the Demarcation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones, and
Continental Shelves of the Gulf of Tonkin (Sino-Vietnamese Demarcation
Agreement),67 and the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Fisheries
Cooperation for the Gulf of Tonkin (Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement).68
The Sino-Vietnamese Demarcation Agreement not only delimits the territorial
sea, EEZ, and continental shelf of the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam, but
also promotes peaceful utilisation of the resources and outlines fisheries cooperation.69
Based on the clearly demarcated maritime zones, a cooperative mechanism was set up
for shared fisheries resources of the Gulf of Tonkin. The next section will examine this
mechanism and determine its significance for the shared resources.

Fisheries Cooperative Mechanism
The opening sentence of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement emphasises that it
is to maintain the traditional neighbouring and friendly relationship between the two
countries and the two peoples, and to conserve and rationally utilise marine living
resources of the Gulf of Tonkin. 70 To achieve this objective, the Sino-Vietnamese
Fisheries Agreement sets down a cooperative framework through its 22 articles and 1
annex. This framework applies to part of the EEZ and part of the territorial seas of the
65
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contracting parties (hereinafter referred to as “Agreed Zones”).71 The two parties are to
undertake fisheries cooperation in the Agreed Zones for the utilisation of fisheries
resources of the gulf based on mutual respect of sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
jurisdiction.72
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement sets up three Agreed Zones where
appropriate management regimes apply. The agreement makes it clear that such zones
are for fisheries cooperation purposes and should not affect the sovereignty over their
respective territorial seas, and sovereign rights and interests enjoyed by the two states
in their respective EEZs.73 To implement the management measures, the agreement
established a Joint Fisheries Committee (JFC). The responsibilities of the JFC and the
management measures pertaining to the three Agreed Zones are evaluated in turn.

Joint Fisheries Committee
The JFC of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement consists of one representative
appointed by each party and several committee members from both sides.74 The JFC is
to regulate the Agreed Zones, consult on management issues, implement relevant
regulations, and resolve fisheries conflicts.75 Its responsibilities are:76
• to recommend to the two governments, through consultation, on matters relevant
to the conservation and rational utilisation of fisheries resources of the Agreed
Zones
• to recommend to the two governments, through consultation, on fisheries
cooperation in the Agreed Zones;
• to adopt regulations and the implementation measures consistent with Article 5
of the Agreement on the conservation and management of fisheries resources in
the Joint Fishing Zone (JFZ);
• to determine annually according to Article 6 the numbers of fishing vessels for
both parties for the JFZ;
• to consult and determine other matters relating to the JFZ;
71
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• to carry out its responsibilities in accordance with the supplementary protocol on
the transitional arrangements;
• to settle fisheries disputes occurring in the buffer zone for small fishing vessels;
• to assist in the settlement of fisheries disputes and maritime incidents within its
competence;
• to evaluate the implementation of the agreement and report to the two
governments;
• to recommend amendment and revision of the agreement, its annex and
supplementary protocol to the two governments;
• to consult on other matters of common concern of the contracting parties.77
From this, it can be seen that the JFC has decisive power in handling all the issues
regarding the bilateral cooperation. The JFC works by consensus, and all its
recommendations and decisions are subject to the consent of the representatives of
both parties. 78 The JFC holds one or two meetings annually at alternative venues
between the two states. Ad hoc meetings may be held when necessary.79

Joint Fishing Zone
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement established a JFZ in the middle of the Gulf
of Tonkin (see Map 7.3 Agreed Zones of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement).
The southern boundary of the JFZ starts from the closing line of the gulf and extends
to 20°N. The eastern and western boundaries are located respectively 30.5 nm either
side of the demarcation line.80
The agreement provides that the contracting parties will undertake long-term
fisheries cooperation in the JFZ in the light of mutual benefit, and they will jointly take
measures to conserve, manage, and maintain sustainable utilisation of the living
resources in accordance with the natural conditions and status of the resources.81
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Map 7.3

Agreed Zones of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement
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Source: adapted and translated from http ://www.frnprc.gov.cn

A licensing system applies to the JFZ. Fishing vessels apply for a permit from their
respective competent authorities, but the number of fishing vessels of each party
allowed to fish in the JFZ is to be determined annually and allocated by the JFC.82 The
determination o f the vessel numbers is to be made in accordance with three conditions:
the allowable catch of fisheries resources based on the results of regular joint surveys,
the impact of fishing activities of both parties, and the need for sustainable
0 -5

development.
In 2004, the first year of the entry into force of the agreement, the number of
82 Ibid., Articles 6.
83 Ibid., Article 6.
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fishing vessels allowed to fish in the JFZ of the other party was 1,543 with a total of
211,391 GRT, among which, the number of trawlers was no more than 617.84 Fishing
vessels have to apply for a licence from their respective competent authorities and
comply with management measures of the agreement. 85 Fishing vessels are to be
clearly marked to distinguish themselves from each other and they must complete a
fishing logbook and submit it to their respective competent authorities within a
prescribed time, and the names of the authorised fishing vessels are to be exchanged.86
Since the JFZ falls under the EEZ of the contracting parties, coastal states’
sovereign rights and jurisdiction apply. That is to say, domestic laws apply to its own
side of the JFZ where the party concerned has the right to monitor and inspect the
fishing vessels of the other party.87 Each party, upon detecting any violation of the
agreement by fishing vessels of the other party, has the right to deal with such
violations in accordance with the regulations set down by the JFC; through the
consultation mechanism established by the JFC, they are required to notify the other
party promptly of the relevant circumstances and the way in which the issue has been
handled; and after an appropriate bond or other kind of security has been posted, the
detained fishing vessels or crew should be promptly released.88
Where necessary, the contracting parties may coordinate joint inspection and
prosecute offences according to the regulations laid down by the JFC; each party has
the right to impose penalties on fishing vessels that fish on its side of the JFZ without a
permit or conduct illegal activities other than fishing. 89 Each party is to provide
facilities in the JFZ for the authorised fishing vessels of the other party.
To ensure effective enforcement and compliance, the Sino-Vietnamese
Agreement provides that the competent authorities of each party, while conducting
inspection or other enforcement activities, should not abuse their rights, or obstruct
normal fishing activities. 90 Each party, having detected that the competent authorities
of the other party has conducted law enforcement in contravention of the management
84
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measures of the JFC, has the right to request explanations, and to submit, if necessary,
the matter to the JFC for discussion and settlement.91 It seems that neither China nor
Vietnam accepts judicial settlement of any dispute resulting from the interpretation or
application of the agreement. Instead, they prefer to seek settlement through direct
consultation provided in this agreement.92
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement allows the contracting parties to
grant fishing permits (only in the JFZ of its side) to other states in the form of
international cooperation or joint ventures.

93

The vessels fishing under such

arrangements should comply with the regulations on the management of fisheries
resources adopted by the JFC. These vessels should fly the flag of the authorising party,
mark the vessels in accordance with the regulations of the JFC, and operate within the
waters of the authorising party.94
The establishment of a JFZ for shared resources is not new in its form,95 but
the management measures attached to it have certainly been a breakthrough, indicating
a new phase of fisheries cooperation. Compared to the PMZs of the SinoJapanese/Sino-Korean Fisheries Agreement,96 the JFZ has a number of characteristics
of its own. First, the former is a permanent one aiming at long-term cooperation, and it
is connected to the demarcated maritime boundaries where the fisheries issue was one
of the critical considerations during the delimitation negotiation; whereas the latter is
provisional, is solely for fisheries purposes, and has no such connection to maritime
boundary.97
Second, the scope and management measures of the JFZ carry greater weight
in the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement. Physically, it accounts for one fourth of
the whole gulf, covers 61 nm from the east to the west, and includes most of the
productive fishing grounds. 98 Due to this reason, the determination of management
measures of the JFZ has been given appropriate attention. Implementation measures
91

Ibid.
The agreement authorises the JFC to settle the disputes arising from fishing activities. See Articles 9
(5), 12(2), 13 (7) (8), and particularly Article 18.
93
Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement, Article 10.
94
Ibid.
95
Both Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean agreements have similar arrangements. See Chapter 6.
96
See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion.
97
Zou, "Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin," p.136.
98
Y. Huang and S. Huang, "The impacts of the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement in the Beibu Gulf
on China’ marine fisheries in the South China Sea," Journal of Shanghai Fisheries University (in
Chinese) 10, No. 3 (2001), p.226.
92

242

have also been made by both parties to regulate their fishing vessels.99
Third, “flag state control” gives way to coastal state control in the JFZ as it is
based on the demarcated EEZs of both parties. Fishing vessels violating the
management measures of the agreement are subject to domestic laws and regulations
of the state in whose waters the fishing takes place. This is fundamentally different
from the management regimes of PMZs and TZs in the Sino-Japanese/Sino-Korean
Agreements where boundary delimitations are pending and “flag state control” applies
to fishing vessels that violate the agreements. The abandonment of the “flag state
control” doctrine ensures the compliance by fishing vessels and improves the
effectiveness of the agreement.100 In addition, fishing vessels of both parties must be
aware of the different regimes when they cross the demarcation line.

Transitional Arrangement Zone
Taking into consideration the existing fishing operations of both parties, the SinoVietnamese Fisheries Agreement sets forth provisions to allow transitional
arrangements for vessels fishing in the other party’s EEZ.101 The agreement does not
specify the detailed extent of the transitional arrangement zone (TAZ) and the
measures for such an arrangement. This was settled by the contracting parties in the
supplementary protocol, which was negotiated after the conclusion of the
agreement.102
The supplementary protocol is based on the mandate of the agreement and
thus constitutes an integral part of it. According to the protocol, the TAZ covers the
EEZ of both parties from the northern limit of the JFZ measured from 20°N to
20°54’N. The transitional period is four years upon the entry into force of the
agreement. 103 Each year, within the four-year period, each contracting party should
take measures to reduce the number of its vessels operating in the other party’s EEZ by
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25%.104 In the first year, 920 vessels, including a maximum of 322 trawlers, with a
total of 78,200 hp are allowed to fish in each other’s EEZs. 105 Reciprocal fishing
access to each other’s EEZs is promoted between the contracting parties at the end of
the transitional arrangement period.106 This arrangement, according to Zou, is a partial
realisation of China’s claim on traditional fishing rights in the gulf.107

Buffer Zone for Small Fishing Vessels
As noted earlier, both China and Vietnam have a substantial number of small vessels
fishing in the near shore waters of the gulf. Small fishing vessels usually do not have
the technology to locate their position accurately and identify the demarcation line.
They might cross the demarcation line by mistake and enter the territorial seas of the
other party, thus causing unnecessary conflicts. To avoid such situations, the SinoVietnamese Fisheries Agreement set up a buffer zone (BZ) for small fishing vessels.108
Small fishing vessels in this context refer to those under 15 metres long and less than
60 hp; vessels exceeding this size are prohibited from entering the BZ.109 The BZ starts
at the first coordinate of the demarcation line and extends 10 nm southward.110 Like
the JFZ, the BZ is also divided into two sections by the demarcation line and extends 3
nm either side of the line.111
As the BZ is located in the territorial seas of the two parties, in general,
fishing vessels of one party are prohibited from entering the other party’s side.
However, when small fishing vessels are detected in the BZ, the party concerned may
send a warning or take necessary measures to order them to leave. That party should
not detain or arrest the vessels, nor use force.112 Where disputes arise over fishing
activities in the BZ, they should be directed to the JFC; disputes other than fisheries
shall be resolved in accordance with the domestic laws of the contracting parties.113
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In addition to the above stipulations, the Sino-Vietnamese Agreement also
requires both sides to provide each other’s nationals and fishing vessels with assistance,
salvage, and protection when they are in distress or during emergencies.114 Regulations
concerning such circumstances are specified in the annex of the agreement. 115 It is
interesting to note that the agreement provides a clause to ensure the right of innocent
passage of the fishing vessels in accordance with the LOSC, as both states have strict
requirements on this matter in their territorial seas.116

Achievements and Prospects
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement set up a mechanism aiming at long-term
cooperative management of the shared resources. This mechanism has broad
implications in its infrastructure and operational framework, and it suggests significant
progress has been made in the area of fisheries cooperation. The full implementation of
this mechanism is expected to be beneficial for the sustainable management of the
shared resources.

A Model for Fisheries Cooperation
As a bilateral fisheries agreement, the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement is not the
first one for China, nor is it for Vietnam, but it is the first one that sets up a fisheries
cooperative mechanism within demarcated maritime zones in East Asia. Its framework
provides a model for fisheries cooperation.
First, the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement specifies the rights and
responsibilities of the contracting parties and lays down concrete measures to achieve
its objectives. The establishment of the JFZ and the management responsibilities given
to the JFC reflect the essence of the LOSC provisions for coastal states’ sovereign
rights and jurisdiction regarding the conservation and management of fisheries
resources in their EEZs. 117 The management measures of the Sino-Vietnamese
Fisheries Agreement genuinely follow the EEZ regime and set up its cooperative
mechanism on the basis of the said regime. In this sense, it is a thorough and faithful
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implementation of the LOSC framework.
Second, the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement set up a JFC as the
management authority to take charge of the smooth operation of its cooperative
mechanism. The JFC, under the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement, has more
authority than JFCs set up under other similar bilateral agreements in two aspects. To
safeguard the effective implementation of the agreement, the JFC was set up as a
permanent body and it is responsible for its operational mechanism;118 it has decisive
power in all matters regarding fisheries cooperation between the contracting parties,
including the settlement of disputes. These fundamentals made this JFC stand as a
milestone for future bilateral fisheries relations.
Third, the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement allows necessary flexibility
to accommodate particular circumstances. Through transitional arrangements for the
existing fishing operations and a BZ for small fishing vessels, the agreement shows
practical considerations to minimise the impact of the regime change on traditional
fishing activities and fishermen’s livelihood, and the socio-economic losses of the local
communities. This, in turn, will generate a better atmosphere for fishermen’s
compliance to the management measures, and more effective enforcement of the
cooperative mechanism.
Fourth, the agreement provides the contracting parties the rights to undertake
international cooperation for fisheries scientific research in the waters under its
jurisdiction. 119 This ensures the sovereign rights and interests of both parties are
satisfied within the cooperation framework. The contracting parties can also cooperate
on scientific research to conserve fisheries resources in the Agreed Zones.120 These
stipulations are crucial in ensuring the long-term successful implementation of its
cooperative mechanism. For areas where boundary demarcation has been settled, the
management regime of this agreement could serve as a model for regional cooperation.

Fisheries Factors in Boundary Delimitation
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement and the Demarcation Agreement is a
“package deal” between the contracting parties. The clearly defined boundaries
provide a legal basis to allow appropriate fisheries regimes to apply to various
118
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maritime zones according to their legal status. On the other hand, fisheries factors
played an important role towards the achievement of such a deal.
According to Article 8 of the demarcation agreement, “[t]he contracting
parties have agreed to consult on matters of cooperation in respect to the rational
utilisation and sustainable development of the living resources of the Gulf of Tonkin
and on matters regarding the conservation, management and utilisation of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zones of the two parties in the same area.” This
clause brought fisheries issues under a separate agreement. In this sense, the SinoVietnamese Fisheries Agreement is an indispensable part of the demarcation agreement
and has based its management regime on the groundwork of the latter. 121 The
contracting parties have an unambiguous view of their rights and obligations while
conducting fishing in each other’s EEZ. In addition, the geographical coordinates of
the JFZ and the BZ are measured by the demarcation line.122
At the same time, fisheries considerations served as the impetus for the
boundary delimitation. 123 It may be recalled that the two states had long-standing
fisheries conflicts in the Gulf of Tonkin, and fishing interests have been the most
critical concern for both sides. On consultation, China and Vietnam agreed that the two
agreements were to be signed and put into force at the same time.124 Since the fisheries
sector is imperative for both China and Vietnam, particularly the economic
development of the local communities in the Gulf of Tonkin, it took more than three
years for them to reach compromise, and settled the fisheries issues in the
Supplementary Protocol to the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement in April 2004.125
In this case, fisheries factors had unprecedented influence over the resolution of the
maritime boundary and on the progress of entry into force of the two agreements.
More over, the shared stocks serve as the biological and economic basis for
121
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the bilateral cooperation. Although the geographical characteristics of the Gulf of
Tonkin make the boundary delimitation between the two states inevitable, the shared
nature of fish stocks suggests that sustainable fisheries management would not be
effective unless a concerted effort is made by both states. In recognition of this reality,
the establishment of the JFZ and management measures attached to it for the shared
stocks has made the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement go beyond the demarcated
political boundaries.126 By so doing, it made up the deficiency of the zoning approach
under the LOSC framework. 127 When signing the Supplementary Protocol for the
agreement in April 2004, China and Vietnam also signed a Protocol for the
Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources of the Joint Fishing Zone.128

Implementation Preview
China and Vietnam agreed to put the two agreements into effect simultaneously, and
this event took place on 30 June 2004.129 This was reported as a “win-win” state of
affairs for both parties.130 Compared to the Sino-Japanese and Sino-Korean fisheries
agreements, China appears satisfied with the outcome of the two agreements.131 China
expressed that the agreements are beneficial to both sides in maintaining peace and
stability in the gulf, and make a positive contribution to herald a brighter future for
bilateral relations.132 The physical size of the JFZ would suggest a leaning towards
China’s preferred choice, as China was in favour of a large joint fishing zone to reduce
the impact of regime change on its huge fishing population. It also covers most of the
productive fishing grounds on the Vietnamese side. It is not clear what compromise
was made to achieve the outcome, but it is notable that China no longer allows its

126

Ibid.
For a discussion on the LOSC zoning approach, see Chapter 1.
128
See http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/disply.asp?id=2965 (accessed 2 July 2004). See note 101.
129
A ceremony on the entry into force of the two agreements was held in Hanoi. Senior officials from
both sides presented the event: People's Daily Online--Two China-Vietnam Beibu Gulf Agreements Take
Effect 2004, see http://english1.peopledaily.com.cn/200407/01/print20040701_148116.html (2 July
2004).
130
See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zxxx/t145558.htm (accessed 12 August 2004).
131
China’s domestic procedures to ratify the two agreements were completed by the approval of the
Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement on 6 June 2004 by the State Council, and the endorsement of the
Sino-Vietnamese Demarcation Agreement on 25 June 2004 by the Standing Committee of NPC. See
FMB, Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement Taking Effect on 30 June, Deputy Minister Qi Jingfa
Presenting the Enforcement Cruise Ceremony.
132
“Two China-Vietnam Beibu Gulf Agreements Take Effect,” People's Daily Online.
127

248

vessels to fish within 15 nm of Bach-Long Vi Island.133
Vietnam also seemed in good spirits after making arrangements for the
implementation of the agreements.134 Vietnam noted the significance of the agreements
to bilateral relations as a foundation for friendly ties with China.135 While announcing
its ratification of the demarcation agreement, Vietnam also made known that it would
enact an overall plan to implement the detailed stipulations of the agreement.136 This
implementation is based on the five principles of peace and co-existence, but also on
the cooperative conservation of the marine living resources of the Gulf of Tonkin.137
The high appreciation and earnest resolve expressed by both parties indicates
a bright future for the effective implementation of the fisheries cooperative mechanism.
In June 2004, China announced Urgent Circular on the Preparation for the
Implementation of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin.138
This was followed by an Announcement on the Implementation of the Sino-Vietnamese
Fisheries Agreement.139 Both instruments underscore compliance to the agreement by
Chinese fishing vessels and make ready for possible problems at the initial
implementation.
To ensure compliance by Chinese fishing vessels and maintain orderly fishing
operations in the Agreed Zones, China promulgated Twelve New Rules for Vessels
Fishing in the Agreed Zones of Sino-Vietnamese Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin,
which prescribe specific measures for vessels fishing to observe in the Agreed Zones
including:
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The Bach-Long Vi Island (called Yeying Dao in Chinese) was said belonging to China and had
Chinese inhabitants for centuries, but it was handed over to Vietnam in the 1950s as a sign of China’s
friendship and brotherhood. The dispute over the effect of this island was a focal point during the
boundary delimitation between the two states. For more details about this island, see Zou, "Maritime
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin," p.245.
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Vietnam ratified the Demarcation Agreement at its 11th National Congress. See H. Huang, "Vietnam
Ratified the Sino-Vietnamese Demarcation Agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin," People’s Daily (Chinese
Edition), 16 June 2004, p.7.
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Ibid.
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See Huang, "Vietnam Ratified the Sino-Vietnamese Demarcation Agreement for the Gulf of
Tonkin," p.7.
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Ibid., p.7.
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This circular was addressed to the coastal provinces bordering the Gulf of Tonkin and the coastal
FMB of the SCS. The circular is available from: http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=2947.
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This instrument is issued by MOA of China. It reiterated the overall requirements of the agreement
and emphasised the rules to be observed by Chinese vessels while fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin. The full
text is available from: http://www/cnfm.gov.cn/info/display.asp?id=2948. This instrument publicises the
phone numbers of the Fisheries Enforcement Law Command and the FMB of the SCS to encourage the
public to notify the incompliance by fishing vessels.
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• procedures for applying for a fishing permit;
• installation of GPS or devices for vessel monitoring;
• carrying the required documents on board;
• vessel flagging and marking;
• prohibition of destructive fishing operations;
• filling in and submitting of fishing logbook;
• prohibition of the catching of endangered species;
• maintenance of orderly fishing operation and avoidance of fishing conflicts;
• settlement of fishing disputes and vessel collision;
• compliance with and assistance for authorised boarding inspection; and
• procedures for emergency port calls. 140
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement will last for 12 years with an automatic
extension for another three years. 141 Both parties have also enhanced monitoring,
control and surveillance. Vietnam created the Maritime Police to strengthen its
enforcement capacity.142 Both parties have plans to increase patrol vessels and trained
staff to conduct monitoring and enforcement in the Agreed Zones.143 These measures
will surely improve the effectiveness of the agreement. However, in areas where
fishing conflicts had occurred, mutual trust and confidence building need to be
enhanced, and a cooperative mechanism to deal with issues of enforcement is
necessary.144

Conclusion
This chapter examined China’s fisheries cooperation with Vietnam for the shared fish
stocks in the Gulf of Tonkin. This cooperation is set against the SCS background
140

The full text is available from http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/12351/1110979.html.
Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement, Article 22.
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See N. H. Thao, Conservation and Management of Marine Living Resources in the Asia-Pacific-Who is Responsible, 2003, available from http://www/soc.nii.ac.jp/isil/Panel%20cz20%paper.pdf
(accessed 11 March 2004).
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where maritime disputes and fisheries conflicts have been common. Within such a
context, China and Vietnam have not only resolved their overlapping boundaries
claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, but also established a fisheries cooperative mechanism
for the shared resources of the gulf.
The review of the fisheries relations between China and Vietnam illustrated
that the overall political relations had affected the bilateral fisheries relations, and this,
in turn, had resulted in the negative impact on the conservation of the shard resources.
The finalisation of the agreement is an acknowledgement that efforts made by one state
would not be sufficient to conserve the shared fisheries resources, and a cooperative
mechanism is the best solution for long-term utilisation of the resources.
The analysis of the chapter has shown that the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries
Agreement is a faithful implementation of the LOSC regime. The agreement has set up
a long-term cooperative mechanism in clearly delimited maritime zones, and marked a
new phase of bilateral cooperation regarding the conservation and management of
shared resources. It has also demonstrated that despite the complex situation in state
relations, there is always an opportunity to achieve fisheries cooperation.
The chapter pointed out that the management measures and cooperative
framework under the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement has served as a model for
future management at regional level. The full operation of this mechanism will
generate further enthusiasm and confidence in both states to reach a final solution to
settle their disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. It will also facilitate the
settlement of the SCS fisheries issues.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: HEADING TOWARDS
SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
The study has examined China’s responses to the LOSC fisheries framework and the
major post-LOSC fisheries instruments. These instruments were brought into being to
address various fisheries issues at a global level and have produced a great impact on
state practice. Although no attempt has been made to evaluate the outcome of each
fisheries instrument and every aspect of China’s responses, an overall observation can
be made.

An Observation of the Global Management Effort
The legal elements and management regime of the LOSC fisheries framework have
profound and far-reaching influences on global fisheries management. The LOSC,
regarding fisheries management in the EEZs of coastal states, on the remaining high
seas, and for particular migratory species, has in general served as the basic framework
for much of the international fisheries law and policy that followed in its wake. As the
most authoritative instrument with the widest acceptance, the LOSC has changed
access to, and the regulation of, the majority of fisheries resources and fishing
activities. Despite its weaknesses, the LOSC has remained a dynamic instrument and a
point of reference for the legal norms at the global, regional and national levels in
dealing with the countless issues of fisheries management.1
Many changes have occurred in fisheries management since the advent of the
EEZ regime through the convening and implementing the post-LOSC instruments.
Each marked a distinctive phase in the development of the international fisheries law
and policy. In particular, they have improved the LOSC fisheries framework in many
aspects, including areas covered, species protected, and concepts applied. 2 These
instruments reflect a consensus of the international community on the necessity for the
effective management of fisheries resources, and on the measures needed to achieve

UN, The Oceans: the Source of Life20th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the
LOSC (1982-2002), p.12.
2
Edeson is of the view that the changes introduced by these instruments have substantially strengthened
the regime of the LOSC, and they have ensured the importance of the long-term sustainable use of the
marine living resources has been placed in the forefront of any serious analysis of the legal regime
governing marine living resources. See Edeson, "Towards long-term sustainable use: some recent
developments in the legal regime of fisheries," p.165.
1
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the ultimate goalsustainable fisheries. 3 The general principles and management
measures in these instruments have resulted in an improved legal framework in the
face of depleting resources and the frustrating realities of fisheries management. They
provide guidelines for states to conserve and manage fisheries resources.
However, the overexploitation of fisheries resources and the deterioration of
the fisheries ecosystem have continued in many, if not all, parts of the world. 4
According to the FAO, the overexploitation of fish stocks has been one of the main
problems that need to be dealt with urgently in order to achieve the sustainable
utilisation of fisheries resources.5 Although it is difficult to pinpoint a single overriding
factor to explain the failure of the global management effort, one fact is clear: the
LOSC and its subsequent fisheries instruments have not been able to provide an
effective framework to address the global fisheries crisis and to protect the dwindling
resources.6
The LOSC fisheries regime is based on a zoning approach without
consideration for the biological characteristics of various fish species. It also failed to
provide mechanisms for cooperation and enforcement. The post-LOSC instruments do
not address all the problems facing the world fisheries. Most frustratingly, these
instruments and their management measures have not been implemented by, or
incorporated into, the fishing activities of most coastal states and DWFNs. Regarding
the binding instruments, it is up to each state to decide whether it is in their interests to
be bound by them; regarding the non-binding ones, the individual state is free to
determine to what extent to incorporate their management measures into its domestic
legislation. These instruments can only be effective when all states are willing to be so
bound, and provided that adequate resources are made available for implementation.
Based on this observation, the study has taken China’s management practice
as a case study to examine how international fisheries law and policy being
3

See Rayfuse, "The interrelationship between the global instruments of international fisheries law,"
p.156.
4
Waugh summarised that the problems of the modern fisheries industry is the persistent trend toward
the severe depletion of fish stocks, resulting in low catch rates and poor economic returns, along with
the unnecessary accumulations of capital investments. See Waugh, Fisheries Management: Theoretical
Developments and Contemporary Applications, Preface.
5
See FAO, SOFIA 2002, p.23.
6
According to the BBC, the pressure on global fish stocks has intensified and the few marine fish stocks
which are not yet completely exploited will inevitable facing growing pressure due to global demand for
fish and increasing environmental worries. See A. Kirby, “Overfishing threat grows”, BBC News Online
Environment Correspondent, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3156340.stm
(accessed 23 October 2003).
253

implemented at a national level. An assessment is made below about China’s domestic
action and regional cooperation in responding to the international fisheries instruments.

An Assessment of China’s Management Practices
As a major fishing state, the fisheries sector in China has established its position by
contributing to the nation’s economic development, creating employment opportunities,
and enhancing food security. China’s fisheries management manifests a long and slow
process, mixed with Chinese characteristics combining social, political, and economic
factors. Such a complex and comprehensive system reflects the global situation and
brings insights about the way that fisheries resources are utilised and managed.

Domestic Action
The LOSC and post-LOSC fisheries instruments have provided basic principles and
guidelines for national law and policy development. The analysis of China’s responses
has shown that China has embraced these opportunities to develop its fisheries legal
and policy framework. Two trends in China’s progress can be identified: one is the
adoption of a more integrated and ecosystem-based approach in its fisheries
management; the other is an increased recognition of the need for international
cooperation.
As a contracting party to the LOSC, China has in general responded to its
obligations well. China has made progress in legislative harmonisation and policy
adjustment. The process included the adjustment to its existing laws and regulations
and, where necessary, the promulgation of new legislation. The years that followed
China’s ratification of the LOSC have witnessed major changes in China’s fisheries
management. China has come to realise that only a tangible response will ensure the
long-term sustainability of its fisheries resources. Notable actions by China include its
amendment of its national fisheries law, incorporation of new management concepts
and measures, participation in international fisheries organisations, and a contribution
to the cooperative management of shared stocks. China’s national laws on maritime
zones are consistent with the LOSC framework. Judging by what has been done, it can
be concluded that China has made a solid effort to implement the LOSC framework.
China’s response to the post-LOSC fisheries instruments appeared to be more
selective. Its best effort in this regard has been the commitment to flag state
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responsibilities concerning authorisation to fish and the compliance by fishing vessels
with the legal and technical requirements of the Compliance Agreement and the Fish
Stocks Agreement. Although China has not ratified the two agreements, its domestic
legislation has been adjusted accordingly. China, for its part, has been accelerating
domestic procedures with a view to enabling it to comply fully with the management
measures of these instruments. China’s position on these issues is clear: to secure an
opportunity for its fisheries and to accept the accompanying commitments at the same
time. The Code of Conduct and the IPOA-IUU only provide states with general
principles and management measures without legally binding obligations. This makes
it less demanding for China to incorporate them into its domestic fisheries regulations.
By virtue of these principles, China’s fisheries management has received more
attention than it had in the past decades. New management concepts such as
responsible fisheries have been introduced to China.
Notwithstanding China’s noticeable record of fisheries management, the study
has demonstrated that China has not gone far enough to discharge all the obligations of
the LOSC and the post-LSOC fisheries instruments. As a whole, China’s fisheries
resources have not been utilised and managed in a sustainable way. The development
of the nation’s fisheries industry has come at a high cost to its resources and
environment, thus its sustainable fisheries management have to depend upon a variety
of factors.
First, excessive fishing capacity needs to be reduced and destructive fishing
operations have to be brought under control. These issues have existed for years as
major concerns threatening China’s sustainable fisheries. This is because China’s past
policies promoted the build-up of excess capacity and encouraged fishermen to
increase their catch beyond sustainable levels. More often than not, decisions were
designed to satisfy short-term economic or political gains (or both) rather than longterm conservation and protection objectives. After almost 20 years since the adoption
of its first national fisheries law, the problems confronting China’s fisheries are
basically the same. China’s coastal fishing capacity is the highest in the world; illegal
fishing with destructive methods has destroyed both the fish population and their
habitat.
Although China has attempted to restore its fisheries resources and implement
international fisheries instruments, controlling China’s fishing capacity has not been
255

successful. The principal policy challenge in this regard is to bring the capacity of the
fishing fleet back to a level at which fish stocks can be harvested in a sustainable way.
Laws and institutions need to be established or strengthened to limit and control access
to marine fish stocks.
Along the same line, laws have been enacted to curb the use of destructive
fishing methods but enforcement remains weak and the political will to enforce the law
is lacking in many areas. Fisheries management decisions, whether influenced by
politics or not, have to be improved by an understanding that sustainable fisheries
would secure a long-term economic benefit, and that short-term gains have to give way
to effective management measures.
Second, reducing the impact of economic pressures on fisheries management
is imperative. The accumulation of China’s high fishing capacity has a close
relationship with its overriding priority to develop its economy. A developing economy,
such as China’s, inevitably generates an increasing demand for the exploitation of
natural resources. This demand puts China’s conservation effort up against economic
pressures which are so strong that they often override fisheries management measures.
Thus the decline of fisheries resources in China is a symptom of many complex
problems that have no easy solutions. China’s sustainable fisheries management is
unlikely to be achieved without a hard fight.
Third, China’s large population constitutes another constraint that hampers
China’s fisheries management. China’s large population not only puts pressure on the
industry and the resources, but also challenges its fishing capacity control. Further,
proper arrangements for the fisheries surplus labour are also critical to the successful
implementation of China’s three bilateral fisheries agreements. The urban areas cannot
provide employment for the displaced fishermen because a large number of educated
youths are already on a long waiting list for employment. Thus, China’s effort in
fishing capacity control could be more gradual and selective, but will have to proceed
with determination.
Fourth, China faces considerable structural, manpower, and financial
constraints within its fisheries administrative system. Frustrated by depleting resources
and a deteriorating ecosystem, China is making an effort to find achievable ways to
address the issues affecting its sustainable fisheries. However, the capacity and
institutional limitations embedded in China’s management system undermine the
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effectiveness of its fisheries law and policy, and the removal of these limitations cannot
be pursued in isolation. The study acknowledges that the existing and potential
problems have to be solved before sustainable fisheries can be achieved.
Other issues, including inappropriate exploitation patterns, post-harvest losses,
and insufficient scientific data also require immediate attention in the pursuit of
sustainable fisheries. These issues have collectively impacted on the healthy
development of China’s fisheries industry, and they jeopardise management effort. The
study supports an approach to fisheries management that is holistic and addresses a
variety of issues. Appropriate policies and responsible government actions have to be
improved to achieve an effective management outcome.

Regional Cooperation
China responded to international fisheries law and policy at two levels. Besides taking
domestic action, China has also committed to regional cooperation represented by
three bilateral fisheries agreements. China’s regional cooperation provides a broader
view of state practice towards cooperation and the general trend in the quest for the
conservation and management of the depleting fisheries resources. In its progress, two
trends are also noticeable: the first was the enclosure of the ocean in the form of
national control and jurisdiction; the second was an accommodation of competing
interests, or an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of states.
The consequences of the fundamental change of the LOSC framework is from
a regime based on “open access” to the resources of the high seas to a regime
involving enclosure of vast ocean areas into EEZs. All the China Seas states claimed
their EEZs to the full extent. As the resultant shift in jurisdiction cannot change the
migratory nature of fish stocks, the conservation and management of the shared stocks
of the seas require a joint effort. The coastal states of these semi-enclosed seas have to
compromise their competing interests, and this has led to the conclusion of bilateral
agreements for the shared stocks based on the EEZ regime. China’s commitment to
cooperation is commendable in that it has put effort into the finalisation of these
agreements even though it was not willing to change the status quo, and has committed
to implement them in spite of the great losses suffered. These efforts have been crucial
to the successful operation of the various cooperative management agreements.
The Sino-Japanese Agreement and the Sino-Korean Agreement are products
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of the formal establishment of EEZs by the three states. They represent important steps
towards the cooperative management of shared resources in the China Seas. The three
states have made efforts to manage fishing activities in areas of overlapping claims and
pending boundary delimitations. However, a similar picture to the global scenario of
failed fisheries management prevails in this region. Such a chronic failure is
particularly significant, since this region has a lengthy fishing history and the highest
fishing capacity in the world. Although China, Japan, and South Korea are major
fishing states, and the shared resources of the region have been plagued by overfishing
and massive excess fishing capacity, the absence of any Regional Fisheries
Management Organisation is due to complex state relations, and the fact that the states
have been maximising their catch while paying little attention to the need for the
conservation of fish stocks.
Even though the three states have concluded fisheries agreements on the EEZ
regime, there are still vast seas in the region which remains as the high seas, without a
proper conservation regime in place (due to territorial disputes over some islands and
unsettled overlapping maritime claims). This situation does not seem to be in line with
the global trend which has been to restrict freedom of fishing, even in the high seas.
Moreover, bilateral agreements are not the final solution to the conservation and
management of the resources. In the long run, a multilateral mechanism throughout the
China Seas region is required. Currently, it seems advisable for the China Seas states to
set up a trilateral cooperation mechanism for the conservation and management of the
shared stocks, rather than rely on the bilateral fisheries agreements which are not
effective because of their limited competence and overlaps between the joint fishing
zones of the agreements.
The Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement marked a new phase in bilateral
cooperation, and symbolized a faithful implementation of the LOSC regime. It set up a
model for the conservation and management of shared fisheries resources in that it
established a long-term cooperative mechanism in clearly demarcated maritime zones.
This agreement is an acknowledgement that efforts taken by one state would not be
sufficient to conserve shared fisheries resources; rather a suitable mechanism for
cooperation is the best solution. The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement has also shown that
despite complex state relations, there is an opportunity for achieving cooperation.
Further, the full operation of this mechanism will generate further enthusiasm and
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confidence between the contracting parties to promote further cooperation and
facilitate the settlement of South China Sea fisheries issues. However, as the agreement
builds its framework on joint management, the commitment of both parties is needed
for it to be operative.

Distance to Sustainable Fisheries
Through an analysis of the global management effort and China’s implementation
practices, this study has investigated the interrelationship between overexploitation and
the depletion of fish stocks, as well as marine pollution and the deterioration of the
fisheries ecosystem. China’s fisheries development, particularly the problems it has
encountered, provides a basis for understanding the driving forces behind a gradual
loss of control of fishing capacity leading to the depletion of resources. China’s
national action, both domestic and regional, mirrors the overall effort of the
international community in investigating the causes of the global fisheries crisis and
possible solutions to achieve sustainable fisheries.
Although it is not possible to provide a strategy to rescue the depleting
resources as too many fish stocks have become overfished, and too many unknowns
involved in achieving sustainable fisheries, one thing is certain, the obstacles
confronting world fisheries are many, and improving the status of fisheries resources
remains a severe challenge. From the status quo of fisheries management in the postLOSC era and China’s practice, it has been shown that international fisheries
instruments cannot go very far to address the global fisheries crisis without being
implemented by states. Based on such an observation, the study argues that the major
problem facing global fisheries is not that there is no legal framework at the
international level for fisheries management, but the inadequate implementation of
international fisheries law and policy. The successful management of fisheries is
largely determined by state practice in exercising their obligations and/or
responsibilities. States need to overcome political, economic, legal, and technical
obstacles to implement/incorporate these instruments.
The realisation of the management objectives of international fisheries
instruments will depend on a continuation of participation and cooperation by all
states. States need to build an effective system of management by starting to
implement the LOSC fisheries framework as well as other fisheries instruments. States
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that are involved in fishing have to take concrete measures to improve their capacity to
exercise authority, and to ensure that international fisheries law and policy are
implemented in a sustained and complete manner. Meanwhile, international fisheries
instruments will have to improve their potential for implementation and compliance by
states.
The essential role of implementation was emphasised in the Johannesburg
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).7
The plan, adopted in 2002, sets deadlines for implementation actions, such as 2015 for
the restoration of depleted stocks. Apart from providing goals for achieving the
designated outcomes, the plan requires the international community to move towards
greater responsibility and sustainability in fisheries.
Sustainable fisheries need proper policies and responsible fishing practices. At
the global and regional levels, it is desirable for fisheries management to emphasise
cooperation and recognise that neither the coastal state nor the DWFN can manage the
fish stocks in isolation. At the national level, it is necessary for governments to act
swiftly in bringing about urgently needed reforms, including substantial fleet
reductions and cutbacks in allowable catches to ensure the sustainable development of
fisheries.

7

See Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The text is available
from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PDEnglish/WSSD_planImpl.pdf.
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